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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON THE MARKET FOR HIGHER EDUCATION AND PUBLIC
POLICIES
Richard Svoboda, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2017
My dissertation analyzes the government provision of education. The first chapter eva-
luates how state performance-based funding affects student outcomes and other intermedi-
ate measures. I find significant increases to completion rates, retention rates and student’s
future income attributed to these programs. Further, the improvements increase with the
amount of state funding allocated based on college performance. My second chapter uses
a quantitative equilibrium model of the market for higher education to evaluate the impact
of performance-based federal financial aid. The model reveals that basing a rating system
entirely on one measure may lead to minor increases in the incentivized area and consi-
derable decreases in other areas. My final chapter develops a majority voting model with
both K-12 and post-secondary education to gain insight into how the education budget is
allocated in the presence of heterogeneous agents with conflicting preferences. The model
predicts an inverted U-shape relationship between income inequality and the education
fund allocation within a state. This prediction is confirmed by the data.
Keywords: Public Economics, Higher Education, Education Finance, Incentivized Com-
pensation.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
A common theme in my research is the study of incentivized compensation schemes.
I also have broader theoretical and empirical research related to the impact public finance
has on public organizations. I employ structural models, their quantitative versions, and
empirical strategies to study these topics.
My first chapter titled “Grading Colleges: An Empirical Analysis of State College
Performance-Based Funding,” studies the impact of tying state public college funding to
specific college outcomes, a practice utilized in more than 30 states. Despite the wide-
spread use, the effectiveness of these policies is still an open issue. I analyze the impact
of performance-based funding on college outcomes using a triple-difference model along
with a unique dataset I construct containing all state performance-based funding imple-
mentations. I find that adopting performance funding and allocating a larger portion of pu-
blic funds based on performance funding significantly increases both the completion and
retention rates. Selection of students, seen through an increase in the average SAT score,
are driving these results. However, there is evidence that complicated performance-based
funding programs lead to colleges shifting spending away from instruction towards admi-
nistration, potentially to remain in compliance with the new funding program. I also find
that the measures chosen to allocate funding differentially affect outcomes, with access
and progression having the largest effects.
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The federal government is also considering adopting performance-based funding, with
a number of current proposals suggesting that the federal Pell Grant be tied to school
outcome measures. My second chapter, “Access, Affordability, and Outcomes: Evaluating
Rating-Based College Aid,” considers how a performance-based federal aid system would
change the decisions of colleges and students. Since these changes have not yet been
made and a change to federal aid would effect both public and private colleges, empirical
analysis can not evaluate a federal performance-based funding program. Therefore, I build
a structural model of the market for higher education to simulate a performance-based
federal aid system. The model yields three main results. First, a performance-based system
that is based entirely on either access, affordability, or student outcomes, would lead to
minor a increase in the incentivized area and considerable decreases in the other two areas.
Second, I show that performance-based federal aid can increase the overall welfare of the
students. Third, performance-based systems based on access or affordability can be used
to remove the incentive for colleges to respond to increases in federal aid by raising tuition.
In my third chapter, “Allocating Education Funds Between Different Levels of Educa-
tion: A Majority Voting Result,” I explore why states spend different proportions of their
education budgets on college education. I find empirical evidence that differences in in-
come distribution across states are an important determinant of funding. To explore this
relation, I build a majority voting model with two complementary levels of education: a
compulsory lower level and a partially-funded higher level. The model reveals intuition
about why differences in the income distribution of state residents could lead to different
allocations of the education budget.
Educational funding has assumed a larger portion of state, federal, and household
budgets over time. In my research, I employ both structural and empirical techniques to
explore this topic of public finance. Since each technique has its own limitations and ad-
vantages, using both methods allows me to gain a more complete understanding of the
2
problem at hand. My research investigates how changing public policies change incenti-
ves, an important consideration that could inform policy discussions in the United States
and many other countries.
3
2.0 GRADING COLLEGES: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
OF STATE COLLEGE PERFORMANCE-BASED FUNDING
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In the public sector, the reliance on performance-based measures in the budgeting pro-
cess has become increasingly common. This movement towards public accountability is a
response to criticism that public organizations, compared to private organizations, are less
effective and responsive to external interests [Rabovsky, 2012]. By allocating public funds
based on performance, the government creates a direct incentive for public organizations
to improve efficiency and performance. Allocating spending based on outcomes also im-
proves the efficiency of government spending since funds are allocated to more efficient
organizations [Dougherty and Reddy, 2011].
In state governments’ financing of higher education, performance based funding (PBF)
plays an important role. PBF has been utilized as a tool to address concern about the over-
all poor performance of American public colleges. When compared to other international
institutions, American colleges are ranked poorly in measures of student success.1 To
push colleges towards better outcomes, many states have experimented with basing public
1According to a report by National Student Clearinghouse [2012], under 60 percent of United State’s
first-time degree seeking students who begin at a four-year public university complete their degree within
six years, making the United States college completion rate and college attainment rate lower than those of
many advanced economies.
4
college appropriations on college outputs. Since 1979, thirty-four states have used perfor-
mance measures to allocate some portion of either four-year or two-year college funding.
This movement towards college accountability extends beyond state governments. Re-
cently, the federal government has advocated changing the Pell Grant program to tie fede-
ral college aid to the performance of colleges.2 Despite widespread use, the effectiveness
of PBF is still an open issue, partially due to the fact that PBF adoption is not a random
event. Further, it is not clear which PBF characteristics are most effective at improving
college performance.
In this paper, I utilize a unique dataset I constructed containing all implementations
of state PBF along with college-level data to examine the effect of state PBF on four-year
college outcomes. I estimate the effect of PBF on the incentivized outcomes often used
by states as performance measures. I differentiate funding programs based on the amount
of funding available to estimate of how allocating funding based on PBF metrics affects
outcomes. I also explore how colleges respond to PBF by utilizing data on student labor
market outcomes, college admission decisions, and college spending decisions. Exami-
ning this data allows me to observe if colleges are increasing education quality to improve
incentivized outcomes or if standards are being changed in response to PBF. In addition,
I explore the differential effects of different PBF programs by using information on the
specific performance measure used by states to allocate PBF.
In my main specification, I address possible endogeneity issues by using a triple-
difference model which controls for state specific trends and nationwide public-college
trends. State specific trends, common among states who adopt PBF, are controlled for
by comparing the effect of PBF on public colleges to private colleges in the same state.
Since PBF changes do not directly affect the funding that private colleges receive from the
government, I am able to use private colleges as a control for state-level trends that are
2The details of the proposal are outlined in The White House [2013]
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common across both types of colleges in states that adopt PBF. Nationwide public-college
trends are accounted for by using states that do not adopt PBF as a control for the states
that do implement PBF.
I find that implementation of PBF increased the average completion rate by 1.18 per-
centage points and the average retention rate by 0.87 percentage points. The size of
these changes are large in reference to the average 2013 public college completion rate
of 48.87% and retention rate of 73.43%. The results are greatly affected by the amount of
funding allocated based on performance measures. As states distribute a larger percentage
of appropriations based on performance outcomes, colleges further increase their comple-
tion and retention rates. Using PBF to distribute an additional $1,000 per in-state full-time
equivalent (FTE) public college student further increases the average completion rate by
0.46 percentage points and the average first year retention rate by 0.47 percentage points.
I also demonstrate that PBF has a significant effect on student’s labor market outcomes.
Using PBF to distribute an additional $1,000 per in-state full-time equivalent (FTE) public
college student increases student’s 2014 median earnings by $1,351 and mean earnings by
$671.
I conclude that PBF leads to increased admission standards. Specifically, every year
PBF is in effect the average SAT score at public college increases by 1.2 points. This result
suggests colleges decide to limit enrollment to high ability students to improve outcomes.
I also find PBF causes some unexpected consequences. By examining spending decisions,
I find that colleges subject to PBF decrease the amount they spend on instruction by 167
dollars per FTE student. At the same time, colleges increase the amount they spend on
administration by 139 dollars per FTE student. These results suggest that the increased
administrative responsibility that colleges face leads to colleges decreasing the amount
spent on instruction in order to remain in compliance with new performance reporting
requirements. Taken together, an increase in the average SAT score combined with a
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decrease in instruction spending suggests colleges are improving performance through
student selection instead of improvements in academic performance.
In addition, allocating funding based on different performance measures has different
results. I classify PBF into different categories based on whether funding was tied to re-
search, access, completion, progression, or efficiency. I find that allocating more funding
based on the progression and access categories result in the largest changes to incenti-
vized outcomes. Further, these improvements are not only seen in the category which
performance funding is attached. Access and progression-based funding programs lead to
increases in completion, progression, and efficiency. I also find that increased spending
based on access or progression reduce the research measure, suggesting that the goal of
improving research output is at odds with the goals of improving completion, progression,
and efficiency. The increases to student’s future income seem to be driven by programs
relying on completion and efficiency-based performance measures.
Digging deeper, I find that colleges respond differently to each category of perfor-
mance measures. Specifically, the improvements to SAT score are associated with PBF
programs that base funding on access and progression. In response to these programs,
colleges become more selective and allocate funding towards providing more institutional
grants to high ability students. The decrease in instructional expenditure is associated with
programs that base funding on completion, research, and efficiency. When PBF programs
base funding on these combined measures, in an effort to increase efficiency and reduce
waste, colleges decrease the instructional budget.
The problem of incentivizing public colleges to improve the outcomes government va-
lues mirrors the multi-task principal-agent problem described in Holmstrom and Milgrom
[1991]. Public colleges are optimizing an objective function that is related but distinct from
the government’s objective of improving the educational quality provided. Public colleges
use money received from the government on a variety of tasks in pursuit of maximizing
7
their own goal. Performance funding attempts to push public organizations towards tasks
which most improve educational quality by basing college appropriations on a measure
which improves with educational quality, such as the completion rate. However under
a principal-agent setup with multidimensional incentives, if one of the public college’s
available tasks will improve the reported measure while having a limited effect on educa-
tional quality, the public college may decide to employ this task in order to increase their
appropriations. This type of action is referred to as “performance padding” or “window
dressing” in Lambert [2001] and Feltham and Xie [1994]. Under PBF, some examples
of performance padding are weakening standards or limiting admission to high achieving
students, both improve the measure used to allocate funding but not educational quality.
On the other hand, increased spending on academic focused programs is an example of a
task that may improve educational quality and the incentivized measure.
Previous literature has mainly focused on the primary question of whether PBF pro-
grams are effective at improving incentivized measures, though a consensus on the effecti-
veness has not been reached. Further, there are few comprehensive studies that examine
the overall effect of PBF. Shin [2010] finds limited evidence that PBF improves gradua-
tion rates. Rabovsky [2012] finds evidence that PBF has changed the spending profile of
colleges, resulting in an increase in spending on education related expenses and a decre-
ase in research related expenses. Other studies have focused on specific implementations
of PBF, for example Hillman et al. [2015] studies Washington community college PBF,
Sanford and Hunter [2011] analyzes PBF used in Tennessee, and Umbricht et al. [2015]
researches Indiana PBF programs.
I advance this line of research in several ways. First, I use college-level data to examine
the effect on a number of incentivized outcomes. Due to data availability, previous stu-
dies limited their analysis by examining how PBF impacts the number of degrees granted,
which is not the focus of many PBF programs and contains little information on outco-
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mes such as college access, progression, and efficiency. Second, I control for state-level
trends and public-college trends which may have been the catalyst of PBF adoption. Wit-
hout accounting for these trends, endogeneity may mask the true effect of PBF. Third, to
analyze the differential effects of distinct PBF implementations, I construct a new dataset
of all PBF programs. This dataset contains information on the incentivized performance
outcomes, the percent of funding allocated based on each outcome, and the total amount
of funding allocated based on performance. Finally, I examine not only how PBF changes
incentivized outcomes but also how PBF changes labor outcomes and college decisions.
When colleges are judged based on outcomes such as completion measures, there are con-
cerns that colleges might engage in performance padding and pass students through who
otherwise would have failed. Examining only outcomes tied to funding shows the com-
bined effect of lowered standards along with any actual improvements. Information on
actual improvements can be learned from analyzing colleges’ responses in areas which are
not directly incentivized and by seeing how these changes affect labor outcomes.
Other than papers which evaluate the impact of state PBF, this paper is related to
the public accountability research which analyzes the use of public funds to improve the
outcomes of public organizations. There are a number of papers which discuss diffe-
rent accountability programs attached to education funding. Svoboda [2016] uses a gene-
ral equilibrium model to simulate how a federal performance-based college aid program
would change decisions of students and colleges. I find colleges would engage in perfor-
mance padding by observing that federal performance-based college aid can lead to minor
increases in the incentivized areas at the expense of considerable decreases to other non-
incentivized areas. At the primary and secondary education level, Lavy [2009] explores
the effect on students outcomes of offering individual monetary incentives to math and
English teachers. My paper is also related to the broader lines of research which study
the effect of monetary incentives on publicly provided programs other than education. For
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example, Pham et al. [2007] and Lindenauer et al. [2007], among others, explore the ef-
fect on patient outcomes of payment schemes which link medical care quality to Medicare
reimbursements. The success of spending based Medicare reimbursements implemented
by the Affordable Care Act have been examined by a number of papers including Nyweide
et al. [2015] and Liu et al. [2016].
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the different
state PBF programs and the construction of the PBF dataset. Section 2.3 describes the
college-level data. Section 2.4 explores the effect of performance funding on incentivized
outcomes. Section 2.5 considers how PBF changes labor market outcomes and college
decisions. Section 2.6 examines the differential effect of different PBF implementations.
Section 4.6 concludes.
2.2 STATE PERFORMANCE-BASED FUNDING
College PBF varies the amount of state appropriations a public college receives ba-
sed on measurable outcomes.3 When implemented, this method replaces or supplements
either a funding formula based on educational inputs, such as the number of full-time stu-
dents or number of enrolled credit hours, or a base-plus method of college funding [SRI
International, 2012].4
The proponents of PBF argue that a performance-based system can potentially impact
3In this research, I limit my analysis to transparent performance funding processes which explicitly
state how outcomes are evaluated and rewarded. These funding processes differ from performance-based
budgeting where performance measures are reported to the state legislature as part of the budget process.
Under performance-based budgeting, if measures are used to allocate money to colleges based on outcomes,
the method of allocation is not announced.
4Under base-plus funding, the amount of state college funding is equal to last years funding, the base,
plus or minus some adjustment. This adjustment can be tied to enrollment, legislative budget, or other state
specific factors.
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colleges in two ways ([Dougherty and Hong, 2006] and [Dougherty and Reddy, 2011]).
First, by explicitly defining how funding is allocated to colleges, the government is in-
forming colleges of the outcomes that the government values. Public colleges may then
change their actions in order to align their priorities with the state government. Second, by
tying funding to outcomes, colleges will change their actions to maximize the amount of
performance funding they receive. PBF supplies colleges with information on government
preferences and provides a financial incentive to achieve certain goals.
Arguments against PBF include the possibility that colleges’ preferences are already
aligned with the preferences of the government and therefore knowledge of government
preferences won’t affect colleges’ decisions. In addition, measures used to allocate perfor-
mance funding such as completion and retention rates are highly related to the student’s
ability and effort. Year-over-year these measures are volatile. When funding is tied to
volatile measures, it results in an unsteady income stream which can negatively impact
programs designed to improve student outcomes. Another concern is that the programs
are often complicated. Many resources have to be spent by the government and the col-
leges to determine how much funding should be allocated to each college. Further, these
programs are often short lived. If a program will be only in effect for a few years, it is not
in the best interest of a colleges to make changes in pursuit of a temporary reward. Finally,
some believe a PBF system will incentivize colleges to lower their standards in order to
game the system and receive a high amount of PBF. For example, a college may revise
their degree requirements in order to raise their completion rates.5
Just as there is no consensus on PBF’s effectiveness, among those in favor of PBF
there is no consensus on what form of PBF is the best. Some disagree on what aspects
of college performance are most important to the state while others disagree on which
performance measures to use and how much public funding should be allocated through
5A discussion of each of these points is presented in Dougherty and Reddy [2011].
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PBF. These concerns have resulted in different states enacting very different programs.
For example, North Dakota in 2014 instituted PBF that allocated all college funding based
only on course completion. In contrast, in 2014 Minnesota allocated only 5% of funding
based on progress towards a wide variety of goals, ranging from increasing the number of
degrees to decreasing administrative cost.
This paper aims to answer whether PBF changes colleges outcomes and further ex-
plore which characteristics of PBF are most effective. To answer these questions, a com-
prehensive dataset of all performance-based initiatives is needed. The dataset must contain
information on when each state’s PBF was in effect, the outcomes that performance fun-
ding incentivized, the total amount of performance funding available, and the amount of
funding tied to each outcome. Though there are a number of datasets which list PBF
implementation years, none of these datasets contain information on the other three items.
Since this data is not available, I construct a complete dataset of PBF characteristics.
First, I gather an aggregated list of performance funding implementations. I obtain infor-
mation about current PBF programs from the National Conference of State Legislatures.
This group maintains a list of state budgets, state legislation, and other official state go-
vernment releases that describe in detail the PBF programs currently being implemented or
being developed. From these documents, I am able to determine how long all current PBF
programs were in effect. To obtain historical information, I combine data from a number
of papers which examined PBF. These studies include Burke and Serban [1998], Burke
and Minassians [2002], Dougherty and Reddy [2011], Rabovsky [2012], Rutherford and
Rabovsky [2014], and Tandberg and Hillman [2014]. While aggregating information, I
ran into a number of inconsistencies about when exactly PBF was active. To clear up these
discrepancies, primary sources are consulted. I find that many inconsistencies arise from
labeling performance-based budgeting as performance-based funding while other discre-
pancies arise when a PBF initiative is passed but later repealed before it comes into effect.
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Table 2.1: Summary of Performance Funding for Four-Year Institutions
State
Performance Funding
Years in Operation State
Performance Funding
Years in Operation
Arizona 2013- Nevada 2015-
Arkansas 1996, 2014- New Jersey 2000-02
Colorado 1995-98, 2001-03 New Mexico 2013-
Florida 1997-00 North Dakota 2014-
Illinois 2013- Ohio 1998-
Indiana 2004- Oklahoma 2002-
Kansas 2006- Oregon 2012-
Kentucky 1997-98, 2008 Pennsylvania* 2001-
Louisiana 2011- South Carolina 1997-2004
Maine 2014- South Dakota 2000-2003, 2013
Michigan 2013- Tennessee 1993-
Minnesota 1996-97, 2008-09, 2012- Texas 2009-2011
Mississippi 2014- Utah 2014-
Missouri 1994-2001, 2014- Virginia 2007-
Montana 2015- Washington 1998-99
*PA performance funding is only in effect for the 14 Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education
colleges.
Finally, some of these studies rely on inaccurate survey data.
Once I have a list of PBF implementations, I gather data on how each state allocated
funding. Specifically, I am interested in determining which outcomes were used to allocate
funding. I group all outcomes into five categories: completion, access, progression, effi-
ciency, and research. The rest of the paper only considers performance funding in which
one or more outcome measures are contained within these five categories. Other measures
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Table 2.2: Performance Funding Characteristics 2001-2013
PBF Adoptions PBF Terminations Incentivized Outcome Funding Percent
Number 14 8 Completion 81% 38%
PBF Amount Real PBF Per FTE Progression 63% 24%
Average 82,873,370 418 Research 44% 15%
Median 6,542,330 71 Access 56% 15%
Std. Dev. 230,608,300 1,129 Efficiency 24% 8%
This table presents data information restricted to years 2001-2013. Pennsylvania is excluded from all num-
bers. PBF Amount is the total amount of state funding which will be distributed to all public colleges based
on performance outcomes. Real PBF per FTE is performance funding amount adjusted to 2013 dollars
using a higher-education price index divided by the total number of public full-time equivalent students
in that state. Incentivized Outcome is the percent of performance funding programs which base funding
on each outcome category and Funding Percent measures the average percent of funding attached to each
outcome.
tied to funding are not considered performance measures.6 Only a very small portion of
PBF programs relied on measures that did not fit into these five categories.
I further gather information on how much total performance funding was available and
how much funding was tied to each outcome measure. Information about the amount of
money tied to the performance funding program is available in each state’s budget. The
outcomes tied to funding and the relative importance of each outcome is determined by
consulting legislation and state funding websites. In many cases, these sources detail the
exact performance funding formula. In other cases, the law that implements PBF specifies
the outcomes which will be considered without specifying the exact weight placed on each
outcome. In these scenarios, the percent of funding attached to each outcome is determined
based on the proportion of outcomes in each category.
Table 2.1 displays information on each states’ four-year college PBF programs. This
6Some examples of excluded measures include student satisfaction survey results and program accredi-
tation.
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table reveals that 30 states either currently utilize or in the past have utilized PBF. Of
these states, 11 have started and subsequently terminated a PBF program, and 6 of these
11 states implemented a different form of PBF after terminating performance funding and
returning to another funding strategy. When a state did implement PBF, the state’s specific
implementation of PBF was not constant over time. Law makers frequently changed the
amount of funding associated with PBF, the measures used to allocate funding, and the
relative importance of each measure. The online appendix includes a brief summary of
each state’s PBF programs, including information on how the programs changed over
time.7
Characteristics of the PBF programs are summarized in Table 2.2. Completion had the
largest amount of performance money attached to it, with 38% of all performance funding
being allocated based on completion, and was most often used by states as a performance
measure, used 81% of the time. Efficiency is on the other end of the spectrum, accounting
for the least amount of money, with only 8% of all performance funding being allocated
based on research, and being chosen by states as a performance metric least often, used
24% of the time. Overall, the amount of performance funding per FTE public college
student is relatively small; the average performance funding program only dedicated $418
per FTE public college student.
Further information about the categories used to allocated funding is summarize in
Table 2.3. Panel A of this table shows what percent of all PBF years used pairwise com-
binations of performance categories to allocate funding. The results reveal that PBF pro-
grams often relied on multiple measures. Panel B shows the pairwise correlation between
the amount of real performance-based funding per state FTE public college student, allo-
cated based on each category. The high correlations reveal that completion, research, and
efficiency often had similar levels of funding distributed based on these outcomes.
7The online appendix is located at goo.gl/7UyIkS
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Table 2.3: PBF Category Usage and Funding Amount Correlation
Panel A: Performance Funding Category Usage
Completion Progression Research Access Efficiency
Completion 81%
Progression 52% 63%
Research 35% 19% 44%
Access 48% 26% 31% 56%
Efficiency 21% 15% 20% 19% 24%
Panel B: Real Performance Funding Amount Per State FTE Correlation
Completion Progression Research Access Efficiency
Completion 1
Progression 0.424∗∗∗ 1
Research 0.926∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗ 1
Access 0.008 -0.132 0.094 1
Efficiency 0.791∗∗∗ 0.198 0.824∗∗∗ -0.035 1
This table shows the correlation between the characteristics of PBF programs. PBF programs in effect
between 2001 and 2013 are considered. Pennsylvania is excluded from this analysis. Panel A presents the
percent of PBF programs which rely on both pairwise measures to allocate PBF. Panel B presents the
pairwise correlation between the amount of real performance funding per FTE allocated based on each
category. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1
2.3 DATA
2.3.1 Population Sample
I utilize college-level data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Database Sy-
stem (IPEDS). Due to limited variable availability in earlier years, I restrict the sample to
information on years between 2001 and 2013.8 Since the vast majority of state funding
8Information on the SAT score of the colleges is only available starting in 2001. If this control variable
is not used, completion rate availability would still limit the sample to information on years between 1997
and 2013.
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics
Total Public Private
Obs Mean St Dev Obs Mean St Dev Obs Mean St Dev
Incentivized Outcomes
Completion Percent 16,366 52.35 18.67 5,674 45.76 16.58 10,692 55.85 18.77
Federal Grants/ FTE 15,809 2,650 13,770 5,856 2,823 9,029 9,953 2,548 15,912
Full-time Retention Percent 12,271 73.61 13.07 4,250 72.96 11.47 8,021 73.96 13.83
Bachelor Degrees/1000 FTE 16,841 175.75 61.52 5,860 165.25 51.44 10,981 181.35 65.58
Control Variables
State Approp($000s)/FTE 16,836 2.90 5.06 5,780 8.33 5.42 11,056 0.06 0.43
Unemployment Percent 16,922 6.40 2.08 5,866 6.36 2.09 11,056 6.42 2.07
SAT Average 14,126 1,063 128 5,148 1,035 105 8,978 1,079 137
2014 Labor Market Variables
Average Income 11,849 37,470 16,465 4,214 35,923 13,275 7,635 38,325 17,929
Median Income 11,849 33,232 12,655 4,214 32,157 11,488 7,635 33,826 13,218
Median Income w/o 0s 11,849 35,677 13,209 4,214 34,549 11,994 7,635 36,301 13,795
Proportion 1st Quintile 11,849 0.0916 0.0341 4,214 0.0942 0.0293 7,635 0.0902 0.0364
Proportion 2nd Quintile 11,849 0.1486 0.0562 4,214 0.1529 0.0509 7,635 0.1463 0.0587
Proportion 3rd Quintile 11,849 0.1845 0.0554 4,214 0.1956 0.0510 7,635 0.1784 0.0567
Proportion 4th Quintile 11,849 0.2510 0.0582 4,214 0.2555 0.0467 7,635 0.2485 0.0636
Proportion 5th Quintile 11,849 0.3243 0.1302 4,214 0.3018 0.1149 7,635 0.3367 0.1364
Admission Variables
FTE Count 16,922 6,129 10,314 5,866 12,310 14,852 11,056 2,849 3,845
Admissions 13,821 1,202 1,552 4,842 2,133 2,034 8,979 700 871
Admission Rate 12,714 0.28 0.12 4,448 0.30 0.10 8,266 0.27 0.12
New Undergraduates 15,305 1,609 2,761 5,301 3,309 4,028 10,004 708 852
In-state Tuition ($) 16,711 16,324 11,104 5,842 4,516 2,405 10,869 22,671 8,439
Out-of-state Tuition ($) 16,711 19,433 8,669 5,842 13,402 5,165 10,869 22,675 8,435
Spending by Category
Total Spending/FTE 16,891 25,089 39,270 5,865 21,860 25,879 11,026 26,807 44,696
Instruction/FTE 16,862 9,366 8,135 5,852 8,130 4,942 11,010 10,023 9,335
Research/FTE 9,063 4,600 29,100 5,375 3,343 12,400 3,688 6,431 43,030
Public Service/FTE 9,924 1,214 5,018 5,665 1,283 2,283 4,259 1,122 7,192
Student Support/FTE 16,756 5,300 5,857 5,864 3,708 4,887 10,892 6,157 6,149
Inst. Support & Ops /FTE 15,997 6,540 9,426 5,856 4,302 3,183 10,141 7,832 11,391
College Grants/FTE 7,971 1,559 1,694 5,829 1,362 1,048 2,142 2,097 2,701
This table displays summary statistics for all colleges, public colleges, and private colleges. The first panel displays
variables often tied to funding, the second panel displays control variables, the third panel displays information on 2014
income variables, the forth panel displays measurements associated with various admission decisions, and the fifth panel
displays information on the amount of spending broken into different categories. Inst. Support & Ops is an abbreviation
for institutional support and operations. All variables labeled with “/FTE” are dollar amounts per full-time equivalent
student. All dollar amounts are transformed to 2013 terms using a higher-education price index.
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is distributed to public colleges, I am interested in identifying the effect of PBF on four-
year American public colleges. To control for state-level trends, I also use information on
four-year non-profit private colleges. I restrict my sample to four-year colleges located in
the 50 states. Military institutions, tribal colleges, medical schools, law schools, schools
of art, theological seminaries, and other specialized institutions are excluded. The state
of Pennsylvania is excluded due to the unique performance funding setup in that state. In
Pennsylvania, only colleges under the Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education are
subject to PBF. This program excludes the largest public colleges. Since not all public
colleges are impacted by the performance program, the estimation technique I employ is
not valid for this state. All results are qualitatively the same if Pennsylvania colleges are
included. The final sample consists of 442 public colleges and 853 private colleges.
2.3.2 Incentivized Outcomes
I first examine the impact of performance funding on incentivized outcome variables
which are often tied to government funding. Specifically, I examine the impact on comple-
tion, research, progression, and efficiency. The six-year graduation rate is used to measure
completion. The amount of outside research funding is measured by the dollar amount of
federal grants net Pell obtained by each college divided by the number of FTE students.
These amounts are converted to 2013 dollars using a higher education price index. Federal
grants are competitive and large amounts of federal grant money is interpreted to mean
large research progress. Progression is measured by the first year retention rate. Data on
the retention rate is only available since 2004. Efficiency is measured by bachelor degrees
per 1,000 FTE students.
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2.3.3 Labor Market Outcomes
Data on students’ labor market outcomes was gathered in Chetty et al. [2017]. By
using data from federal tax returns and the Department of Education spanning years 1996-
2014, the authors create a dataset that associates student’s 2014 earnings to their birth
cohort for each college. Each student in the data is assigned to a specific college-birth co-
hort bucket based on their year of birth and the college attended most often between ages
19 and 22. The dataset contains information at the college level by birth cohorts between
1980 and 1991. Colleges are identified by their OPEID, the office of postsecondary educa-
tion identification. In each college-birth cohort bucket, aggregate information on students’
2014 income is computed. Specifically, the average income, median income, median in-
come excluding zero income observations, and percent of students in each income quintile
relative to all other people in the same birth cohort is computed.
To associate college level information with labor market information, I map OPEID to
the IPEDS distinct identification system. This presents some challenges since the OPEID
associates information on students who attend ”branch campuses” into the main campus.
The IPEDS database system instead has separate entries for every branch campus. The-
refore, IPEDS college level data is transformed to follow the OPEID system and subse-
quently incorporated into the student labor market dataset. I attribute college-level infor-
mation describing the college 19 years after the student’s birth year to each college-birth
cohort bucket. Information on colleges 19 years after the student birth corresponds to
college level characteristics present when most students were entering freshman. Results
have also been run attributing college level characteristics 18 and 20 years after student
birth year to each college-birth cohort bucket. The results in each case were qualitatively
the same.
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2.3.4 College Decisions
I also explore the effect on college decision variables which are not incentivized. These
variables represent adjustments college can choose to implement in response to PBF.
I examine how admission decisions change following implementation of PBF. I con-
sider changes to the number of admissions, the admission rate, the number of new under-
graduates, the average in-state tuition, and the average out-of-state tuition. The average
tuition amounts are converted to 2013 dollars using the higher-education price index. I
also consider changes to the SAT score and FTE student number. I would prefer to use
the average SAT score of the incoming class, however the SAT score for this subpopula-
tion is not contained in the IPEDS database. I examine the year-over-year difference in
SAT instead of the level measure to obtain more information about the incoming students.
The year-over-year change should be highly related to the SAT score for new students. To
determine if a college is contracting or expanding, the year-over-year change is also used
when analyzing the number of FTE students.
I utilize information on how much the college spends on different areas. All spending
amounts are adjusted to 2013 dollars using the higher-education price index and divided
by the number of FTE students. I consider total spending and separately consider spending
on expenses related to instruction, research, public service, student support, institutional
support and operations, and grants given to students by the college. The public service
category consists of expenses for activities that provide non-instructional services benefi-
cial to individuals and groups external to the institution. Student support is the sum of the
categories labeled student service and academic support in the IPEDS database. Student
service consists of expenses for admissions, registrar activities, and activities whose pri-
mary purpose is to contribute to students emotional and physical well-being and to their
development outside the context of the formal instruction. Academic support includes
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expenses of activities and services that support the institution’s primary missions of in-
struction, research, and public service. Institutional support and operations is the sum of
the categories labeled institutional support and operations in the IPEDS database. Instituti-
onal support contains the expenses of the day-to-day operational support of the institution
including general administrative services, central executive-level activities concerned with
management and long range planning, legal and fiscal operations, space management,
employee personnel and records, logistical services such as purchasing and printing, and
public relations and development. Operations consists of expenses relating to service and
maintenance of campus grounds and facilities used for educational and general purposes.
Institutional grants is equal to the amount of scholarships and fellowships given by the
college to students.
2.3.5 Performance Funding Variables
From the dataset described in Section 2.2, a performance funding dummy variable is
created. This variables takes on a value of 1 when performance funding is in effect and
0 when performance funding is not in effect. Further, I consider how much funding is
allocated through performance funding. The funding variable is equal to the total amount
of performance funding available divided by the total number of FTE public college stu-
dents in that state. Performance funding amounts are converted to 2013 dollars using the
higher-education price index. Finally, I construct variables equal to the amount of per-
formance funding allocated based on a specific category. These variables are equal to the
total amount of performance funding multiplied by the funding percent for each of the five
outcome categories.
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2.3.6 Covariates
In each of my models, I include covariates which are known to affect college outcomes.
Measures of the state support of the college, students characteristics, and state economic
conditions are included. State appropriations per FTE, contained in the IPEDS database,
is used to measure state support. State appropriations are converted to 2013 dollars using
the higher-education price index. State economic conditions are measured by the annual
unemployment rate of the state, obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. To control
for student ability, the average SAT score of students is used. The inclusion of college fixed
effects makes inclusion of any time invariant college level characteristics unnecessary.
Table 2.4 summarizes key information for each of the variables.
2.4 EFFECT OF PBF ON INCENTIVIZED OUTCOMES
2.4.1 Methodology
In this section, I explore the effect of PBF on incentivized outcomes. Since funding
is attached to improving certain outcomes, if colleges are responding to these incentives
these outcomes should improve. I consider how outcomes change in response to any PBF
program and also differentiate programs based on their performance funding amount.
2.4.1.1 Effect of Any PBF Program Assignment of PBF is not random and college
outcomes may influence when lawmakers decide to adopt PBF. I employ a triple-difference
model to help deal with the endogeneity problem due to potential non-random adoption.
I account for two possible sources of endogeneity, one relating to trends among all public
colleges and another relating to trends in states who adopt performance funding.
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The first source of endogeneity arises because PBF could potentially be adopted in re-
sponse to an overall decrease in public college performance. However, this decrease could
be due to nationwide trends. Changing tastes of students could change the composition
of students who decide to attend public colleges. If nationwide, public college outcomes
started to deteriorate and then subsequently improved, passage of PBF when outcomes are
at their worst could result in the improvement incorrectly being attributed to PBF. To deal
with this issue, I account for nationwide public college trends by comparing the effect of
PBF on public colleges in states with PBF to states that have not adopted PBF.
The second source of endogeneity arises if state-level trends affect the adoption of
PBF. Suppose colleges in a state had unusually bad outcomes for a few years and then
returned to normal levels a few years later. If the government of this state reacted to
the bad outcomes by implementing PBF, it would appear that PBF had a large effect on
outcomes. However, if the real reason these outcomes changed was due to cohort effects,
it would be wrong to attribute the improvement to PBF. To deal with this issue, I account
for state specific trends common among states who adopt PBF by comparing the effect of
PBF on public colleges to private colleges in the same state. According to Hillman and
Weichman [2016], the median four-year public college student attends a college located 18
miles from their home and the median four-year private college student attends a college
located 46 miles from their home. This suggests that the majority of students in both
public and private colleges are in-state students, hence both types of colleges are subject
to the same cohort effects and other statewide trends. When contrasting the improvements
in public colleges to that of private colleges, private colleges act as a control. Using private
colleges in this way is possible since PBF changes do not affect the funding that private
colleges receive from the government. Therefore, differential improvements to outcomes
seen in public colleges can be attributed to PBF.
The triple-difference model that controls for both sources of endogeneity takes on the
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following form:
Yi,s,t = β0+β1Gi ·Es,t +β2Es,t +Gi ·δGt +δi+δt +β3Xi,t + εi,s,t , (2.1)
where Yi,s,t denotes the outcome of interest for college i, located in state s, in year t. Es,t
is an indicator which takes on a value of 1 if PBF is in effect in state s at time t and 0
otherwise. Gi is an indicator equal to 1 if college i is public. The vector of covariates
introduced in Section 2.3 is denoted by Xi,t . δi are college-level fixed effects, δt are year
fixed effects, and δGt are public college specific year fixed effects. εi,t is the error term.
The triple-difference setup utilizes three layers of difference: difference between pu-
blic and private colleges, difference between states who adopt PBF and states who do not,
and difference before and after PBF is adopted. Because the performance funding pro-
grams are enacted at different time periods, the variable Es,t is used to indicate when PBF
is in effect at time t for state s. This term is identical to the interaction term of post and
treatment that is traditionally included. The inclusion of college-level fixed effects account
for the public-private term, Gi, and the treatment indicator. The time fixed effects account
for the post indicator.
College-level fixed effects are included to control for time invariant college level dif-
ferences which may impact outcomes, such as location, public status, and Carnegie Clas-
sification of Institutions of Higher Education.9 Year fixed effects are included to control
for time variant factors which affect all colleges, such as yearly changes in federal college
aid programs. In addition to the overall year fixed effects, the regression includes separate
year fixed effects for public colleges. Inclusion of two types of year fixed effects cont-
rol for any separate nationwide trends that may be occurring in either public or private
colleges.
9Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher Education sorts colleges into categories of roughly
comparable institutions.
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The coefficient of interest, β1, estimates the impact of performance funding on public
colleges. In addition to controlling for public-college trends, endogeneity is controlled
for by accounting for state-level trends common among states that adopt PBF. State-level
trends occurring after the adoption of PBF that affect both public and private colleges are
controlled for through inclusion of the term Es,t . Due to this term, effects common to both
types of college do not effect the estimate of β1 and instead are seen in the coefficient β2.
The identification of β1 does not solely come from the adoption of PBF programs.
In practice, some states see multiple funding transitions, from non-performance-based
funding to performance-based funding and from performance-based funding to back to
non-performance-based funding. This means β1 is identified by changes in outcomes that
occur following states’ adoption of PBF and also through states’ abolishment of PBF.
In my sample, there are 14 adoptions and 8 terminations of PBF. In the next estimation
strategy, I analyze the differential effect of funding amount. Since the funding amount
associated with each PBF program changes often, concerns about limited variation are
addressed by including performance funding amount.
To support the usage of a triple-difference model, Figure 2.1 shows four parallel trend
graphs. These graphs provide an opportunity to test the validity of the assumption of
similar trends in advance of PBF adoption. The variable on the x-axis is the number of
years relative to the year PBF was adopted. Year 0 is normalized to be the year PBF
first went into effect. On the y-axis the graphs plot the average residual, obtained from
running the regression specified in Equation (2.1) without the term Gi ·Es,t , for each of
the four incentivized outcomes. Before enactment of PBF, the movements of the public
and private lines for completion, research, and progression mirror each other. The year-
to-year movements for efficiency are not as close as the other three outcome variables,
but the overall trends before enactment are similar. These similar patterns suggest that the
parallel trend assumption is valid in this situation. Once the performance funding program
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Figure 2.1: College Trend In Incentivized Outcomes Relative to PBF Adoption
Notes: Year 0 is normalized to be the year PBF first went into effect. Other years values are in reference to
this adoption year. The y-axis refers to the average residual, obtained from running the regression specified
in Equation (2.1) without the term Gi ·Es,t , for each of the four incentivized outcomes.
is enacted, public colleges see a large increase in completion and progression. These
differences disappear as time passes. The temporary nature of these effects may be due
to the fact that some states abolish PBF and return to other funding methods. In addition,
since some PBF implementations occurred relatively recently there is not information on
the effect of outcomes many years after PBF was implemented. The compositional change
that occurs when these states drop out of the sample may also contribute to the decrease
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observed a couple of years after PBF is adopted. The gap in amount of research spending
grows following PBF adoption, with public college spending decreasing while private
college spending increases. The public college efficiency measure does not change much
following the PBF adoption.
As a robustness check, I run the following regression separately for private and public
colleges:
Yi,t = β0+β1Es,t +β3Xi,t +δi+δt + εi,t . (2.2)
Private colleges receive relatively little state funding and are not directly affected by fun-
ding changes. In Equation (2.2), the coefficient β1 reveals the average effect of PBF in
reference to colleges in states without PBF. Identification in this model comes from the
differential timing of performance funding adoption and termination. If the change in out-
comes is actually due to the change in public college funding, then in a regression run on
a sample of only on private colleges the estimate of β1 should not be significant. On the
other hand since public colleges are affected, then in a regression run on a sample of only
public colleges the estimate of β1 should be significant.
2.4.1.2 Performance Funding Amount The amount of state college appropriations
tied to performance measures varies widely between states. In 2014, Ohio allocated 50%
of their college appropriations based on performance outcomes while Maine only allocated
5% of their college appropriations based on performance outcomes. If colleges are adap-
ting their policies due to the financial incentive imposed by PBF, then reforms in states
with more PBF would have a larger impact than reforms in states with less PBF.
To account for the impact of states allocating different amounts of funding based on
performance measures, I modify the triple-difference setup. Instead of using an indicator
for PBF, I measure PBF “intensity” by using information on the per student dollar amount
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of PBF. The new regression formula corresponding to this generalized triple different stra-
tegy is now given by:
Yi,s,t = β0+β1Gi ·Fs,t +β2Fs,t +Gi ·δGt +δi+δt +β3Xi,t + εi,s,t , (2.3)
where Fs,t denotes the per student amount of performance funding available in state s at
time t.
The coefficient of interest in Equation (2.3) is β1. Under this specification β1 reveals
information on how distributing more college funding through a PBF program impacts
outcomes. This parameter is identified through adoption and termination of PBF programs
and also through changes in the amount of performance funding available. In every PBF
implementation, the amount of performance funding available changes every year.
2.4.2 Results
2.4.2.1 Effect of Any PBF Program Table 2.5 presents estimates of the effect of PBF
on college outcomes. This table reports statistics corresponding to the triple-difference
regression outlined in Equation (2.1). The table displays estimates of how PBF affects
all colleges, how PBF differentially affects public colleges, and how the covariates impact
outcomes.
The estimates suggest that PBF leads to public colleges seeing an increase in comple-
tion and progression. Column 1 reveals that public colleges subject to PBF increase their
average completion rate by approximately 1.18 percentage points, relative to private colle-
ges in states with performance funding. Considering the average four-year public college
had a completion rate of only 48.87 percent in 2013, this corresponds to a 2.4% increase.
Column 3 estimates that PBF increases the average first year retention rate by 0.87 per-
centage points in public colleges, compared to private colleges, or a relative 1.2% (0.87 /
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Table 2.5: The Effect of Performance Funding on College Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Completion Research Progression Efficiency
Public * PBF Indicator 1.177* -42.17 0.871* 1.997
(0.652) (114.3) (0.510) (2.065)
PBF Indicator -0.376 11.33 -0.0751 -0.239
(0.409) (86.28) (0.334) (1.719)
Unemployment Percent 0.0511 34.57 -0.0165 0.102
(0.125) (27.22) (0.0750) (0.453)
State Appropriations -0.239 4.263 -0.245** 1.664***
(0.147) (54.13) (0.120) (0.557)
Average SAT Score 0.0152*** 2.213*** 0.0189*** 0.0208*
(0.00319) (0.678) (0.00369) (0.0106)
Observations 13,936 13,350 10,550 14,044
Number of Colleges 1,191 1,172 1,180 1,195
College and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public by Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample 2001-2013 2001-2013 2004-2013 2001-2013
Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. State appropriations measures the total
amount of funding allocated to that college per FTE student. This variable is measured in thousands of
2013 dollars per FTE student. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
73.43) increase. The results suggest performance funding does not have much of an effect
on the efficiency outcome.
Research is not affected by the performance funding changes. In fact, the sign of
the coefficient associated with research is the opposite of what is expected. The limited
effect on research could be explained by the fact that research is not often chosen as an
incentivized outcome and when it is chosen a relatively small amount of performance
funding is attached to research. Another possibility, is that research does not fit in well with
the other outcomes. Completion, progression, and efficiency are all related and improving
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any one of these outcomes would help the other outcomes. Since performance funding
programs often attach funding to multiple outcomes, colleges may be choosing to spend
their resources raising the three connected outcomes to improve multiple measures.
As a robustness check, the regression outlined in Equation (2.2) includes only public
colleges or only private colleges. Results of these regressions are presented in Table 2.6.
The outcomes of completion and progression are improved in the public college regression
when performance funding is in effect while no private college outcomes are affected
by performance funding. Though efficiency is not significantly related to public college
outcomes, the p-value of 0.103 is close to significance. The results of this exercise are
consistent with the results found in the triple-difference regressions, presented in Table
2.5. This further validates the choice of private colleges as a comparison group.
2.4.2.2 Performance Funding Amount Table 2.7 presents the regression estimates
for the specification which includes the amount of performance funding, outlined in Equa-
tion (2.3). In each column, the table reports estimates of how the amount of performance
funding affects all college outcomes and the differential impact of this variable on public
colleges. The control variables of state appropriation per FTE, unemployment rate, and
average SAT score are included in all four regressions.
Allocating more funding based on performance measures increases completion and
progression. Increasing the amount of performance funding by $1,220, or one standard
deviation for states with performance funding, results in a 0.55 and 0.57 percentage point
increase to the completion and retention rates, respectively.
Since the control variable of state appropriations per FTE is included, the estimate
of PBF per state FTE is not masking an income effect. By including a control for total
amount of government appropriations, the results instead are to be interpreted as the effect
of allocating more public appropriations through PBF while keeping the total amount of
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Table 2.6: The Effect of Performance Funding on Public and Private Colleges
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Completion Research Retention Degree/FTE
PBF Indicator 0.843** -50.46 0.814* 2.176
(0.370) (83.73) (0.409) (1.308)
State Appropriations -0.245* -28.10 -0.248* 1.664***
(0.143) (56.44) (0.125) (0.391)
Unemployment Percent 0.188 -46.06 -0.00369 1.483***
(0.173) (29.87) (0.172) (0.484)
Average SAT Score 0.0168*** 2.963*** 0.0159*** 0.0336*
(0.00402) (1.073) (0.00458) (0.0172)
Observations 5,012 5,066 3,786 5,066
Number of Colleges 417 419 418 419
College and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
College Type Public Public Public Public
Sample 2001-2013 2001-2013 2004-2013 2001-2013
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Completion Research Retention Degree/FTE
PBF Indicator -0.414 18.40 -0.0764 -0.588
(0.403) (92.29) (0.324) (1.742)
State Appropriations 0.297 461.9** 0.0198 5.798
(0.316) (172.1) (0.399) (5.502)
Unemployment Percent -0.0323 89.15* -0.0235 -0.738
(0.146) (45.05) (0.122) (0.638)
Average SAT Score 0.0147*** 1.954** 0.0199*** 0.0165
(0.00458) (0.831) (0.00494) (0.0122)
Observations 8,924 8,284 6,764 8,978
Number of Colleges 774 753 762 776
College and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
College Type Private Private Private Private
Sample 2001-2013 2001-2013 2004-2013 2001-2013
Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. State appropriations measures the total
amount of funding allocated to that college per FTE student. This variable is measured in thousands of
2013 dollars per FTE student. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.7: The Effect of Performance Funding Amount on College Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Completion Research Progression Efficiency
Public * PBF Amount 0.461*** -2.364 0.472** 0.570
(0.169) (27.19) (0.178) (0.645)
PBF Amount -0.110** -8.801 -0.168*** -0.297
(0.0479) (35.74) (0.0492) (0.358)
Observations 13,936 13,350 10,550 14,044
Number of Colleges 1,191 1,172 1,180 1,195
College and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public by Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample 2001-2013 2001-2013 2004-2013 2001-2013
Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. PBF amount is a measure of the
amount of performance funding available in thousands of 2013 dollars per state FTE student. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
state funding constant. The results estimate the effect of distributing state funding based
on outcome measures instead of through the usual distribution methods.
These results suggest it is possible to see large improvements in outcomes without
spending more money, but instead changing how appropriations are distributed. If the
average state allocated all of their college appropriation based on outcome measures, the
point estimates suggest that the completion rate in the average public college would incre-
ase 4.72% and the first year retention rate would increase 2.63%. These increases would
cut the public-private completion gap in half and result in the average public college having
a higher first year retention rate than the average private college.
32
2.5 EFFECT OF PBF ON NON-INCENTIVIZED OUTCOMES
2.5.1 Methodology
In the previous sections, I present evidence that the incentivized outcomes are impro-
ved under PBF. However, these results do not reveal how these improvements are realized.
Since these incentivized outcomes are tied to funding there is an incentive to engage in
“performance padding” or “window dressing.” To explore whether the improvements ob-
served are the result of these undesirable actions or instead due to real improvements, I
consider non-incentivized outcomes. Specifically, I examine changes to college policies
in order to identify the channel though which the incentivized outcomes are being impro-
ved. Further, student’s labor market outcomes are used to find the effect PBF on student’s
future earnings.
2.5.1.1 Performance-Based Funding Channel If changes in incentivized outcomes
are not attributable to “performance padding” then this effect should be accompanied with
changes in college policies. College policy changes are the mechanisms that colleges can
use to achieve an improvement to incentivized outcomes. I examine two possible channels
that colleges could utilize to improve incentivized outcomes: changes in college spending
or changes in student selection.
If a college were to try to change spending in order to increase the incentivized out-
comes, this would likely be seen in either an increase in spending related to instruction or
student support. Increasing instruction spending could increase outcomes by lowering the
class size or hiring more qualified teachers. On the other hand, increasing student support
spending could increase outcomes by investing in programs that target struggling students.
Colleges may also attempt to increase the incentivized outcomes by changing the type
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of student that attends their college. Colleges can change their student composition by
changing admission or tuition rates. Tuition rates can also be changed for specific students
through the use of institutional grants. Changes in the average ability of students can be
observed through the average SAT score. When examining the average SAT score, data
restricted to entering students is not available. In place of information about entering
students, I use measures of the change in average SAT over consecutive years. The change
should be highly correlated with information about new students. The change is also used
to examine how the number of FTE students responds to implementation of PBF.
To identify the response to PBF, I repeat the analysis outlined in Equation (2.3). I
separately analyze the effect of PBF on various admission and spending variable identified
in Section 2.3.
2.5.1.2 Labor Market Outcomes One way to assess the impact of PBF policies is to
examine data on student’s labor market outcomes. Using data on student’s 2014 wages
I can see if the use of PBF results in any change to student’s lifetime earnings. Future
labor market outcomes have the advantage of not being directly related to state funding.
Therefore, there is not an incentive to game the system in order to increase labor market
measures.
Two possible ways that student’s future income could be affected by implementation
of PBF are either due to increased education quality or alternatively due to increased pro-
bability of college completion. If students are subject to a higher quality of education then
they may find higher paying jobs or be promoted quicker once they do find a job. This
change would positively impact the majority of students. Alternatively, PBF could just
result in a higher chance of college graduation. These students who otherwise would not
have graduated should experience higher earnings because of PBF.
To identify the response of labor market variables to PBF, I repeat the analysis outlined
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in Equation (2.3). I examine the impact on measures of mean income, median income, and
other measures of the 2014 income distribution.
2.5.2 Results
2.5.2.1 Performance-Based Funding Channel Table 2.8 analyzes how college spen-
ding responds to PBF. Each dependent variable measures the spending per FTE student
converted to 2013 dollars. Out of all the spending categories, only spending on instruction
and institutional support are significantly affected by changes in the amount of perfor-
mance funding. For every $1,000 increase in state performance funding per FTE student,
spending on instruction decreases by $167 per FTE student while institutional support and
operations spending increases by $139 per FTE student.
The results suggest that colleges are not changing spending decisions to improve the
incentivized outcomes in the way predicted. Instead of increasing spending on instruction,
colleges are moving spending from instruction towards general administrative services
and operations. A possible rationalization of this response is due to budgetary issues. If
budgets were tight, it is possible that instruction expenses are being cut in order pay for in-
creased institutional expenses that arise because of PBF. A common complaint relating to
PBF is the high resource costs associated with the program. In order to gather and report all
necessary statistics, colleges need to spend more resources on administration related acti-
vities. To stay in compliance with PBF and ensure the college maximizes the performance
money received, colleges are choosing to increase the amount spent on administration.
The effect of PBF amount on college admission and tuition decisions is summarized
in Table 2.9. The variables labeled with “Diff” measure the difference between years.
Information on institutional grants is displayed in the last column of Table 2.8.
The only evidence of selection is seen in an increase to the average SAT score. The
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Table 2.8: The Effect of Performance Funding on College Spending per FTE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Education
& General Instruction Research
Public
Service
Student
Support
Institutional Support
& Operations
Institutional
Grants
Public * PBF Amount -10.15 -167.4*** -126.7 -16.91 13.09 138.5*** 17.97
(81.15) (21.74) (106.3) (15.57) (72.68) (29.29) (43.14)
Observations 14,044 14,044 7,989 8,555 13,986 13,460 6,774
College, Year, and Public by Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample 2001-2013 2001-2013 2001-2013 2001-2013 2001-2013 2001-2013 2001-2013
Table 2.9: The Effect of Performance Funding on Admission Decisions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
SAT Diff FTE Diff Admissions
Admission
Rate
New
Undergraduates
Tuition
In-State
Tuition
Out-of-State
Public * PBF Amount 1.197** 19.48 41.36 0.00320 56.57 -75.17 175.0
(0.467) (33.80) (25.12) (0.00370) (63.43) (131.3) (270.9)
Observations 12,684 14,039 12,775 11,787 13,017 14,001 14,001
College, Year, and Public by Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample 2001-2013 2001-2013 2001-2013 2001-2013 2001-2013 2001-2013 2001-2013
Tables 2.8 and 2.9: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. PBF amount is a measure of the amount of performance funding
available in thousands of 2013 dollars per state FTE student. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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average SAT of the college increases 1.2 points each year PBF is in effect, for every $1,000
increase in performance funding. Though the number is small, since the dependent varia-
ble is the change in SAT score, this effect corresponds to an increase in the average SAT
score of the whole college each year PBF is in effect. If new students are only one forth of
the total student body, then this implies that every year PBF is in effect, for every $1,000
of performance funding, the average new first year student has an SAT score that is about
5 points higher than the average of the students being replaced. In addition, the difference
in average SAT score between public and private colleges is only 40 points. This impro-
vement in student quality could explain some of the improvements seen to the completion
and retention rates.
Table 2.10 further explores the impact of performance based funding on lagged me-
asures of the average SAT score. Since the SAT measure is the college-wide average,
changes in admission standards following implementation of PBF may not be seen imme-
diately through the SAT measure. There should be an affect on lagged measures of the
college-wide average SAT score should since these measures contain a larger percentage
of students who were subject to potential admission policy changes. The table reveals this
intuition is true. The first column, corresponding to the average SAT score has a small
point estimate and is not statistically significant. However, as the lag on the SAT measure
increases, both the point estimate and statistical significance rise sharply. The last co-
lumn reveals in the 3rd year following the PBF increase, the average SAT score of public
colleges increases by 6.24 points for every $1,000 increase in funding.
Figure 2.2 graphs the average SAT scores of public and private colleges in PBF states,
relative to the adoption of PBF. The graph reveals two main points. First, the average
SAT score of public colleges does not increase immediately following adoption of PBF.
Instead, as seen in the regressions, it takes a few years for PBF to result in an increase
in the average SAT scores. Second, the increase in average SAT scores in public colleges
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Table 2.10: The Effect of Performance Funding on Lagged SAT Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average SAT
1 - Year Lagged
Average SAT
2 - Year Lagged
Average SAT
3 - Year Lagged
Average SAT
Public * PBF Amount 1.41 1.99* 2.37* 6.24***
(1.31) (1.04) (1.22) (1.15)
Observations 12,684 11,542 10,414 9,294
College and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public by Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample 2002-2013 2002-2012 2002-2011 2002-2010
Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. PBF amount is a measure of the amount
of performance funding available in thousands of 2013 dollars per state FTE student. Each regression
includes a control for the 1 year lead average SAT score in place of the typical average SAT score used. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure 2.2: Student Average SAT Score Relative to PBF Adoption
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does not perfectly coincide with a decrease in the average score in private colleges. If
public colleges were increasing quality by attracting students who otherwise would have
attended private college, you would expect the timing of the public college increase to
coincide with the private college decrease. The graph reveals that there is a decrease in
average SAT scores in private colleges but that decrease takes place before the public
increase. In the year of the large private college SAT decrease, public colleges also see a
decrease to average SAT scores, though the magnitude of the decrease is less. Therefore,
it is possible that public colleges are receiving this increase by attracting talented students
who would have otherwise attended an institution out of state or who would not have
attended college.
Note the increase in SAT score is not accompanied with a decrease in the admission
rate, changes to tuition, or changes in institutional grants. If colleges were taking measures
to improve the SAT score, changes should also be seen in these measures. By examining
differential programs it is clear that the lack of significance associated with these variables
is due to different PBF measures resulting in different forms of student selection.10
2.5.2.2 Labor Market Outcomes Table 2.11 reveals that PBF programs have a very
positive impact on the 2014 income of students who are starting their college career when
the PBF is in effect. A $1,000 increase in state funding based on performance measures
increases the 2014 mean income of students by $671. The median income increases by
$1,351 or $1,231 if you do not include zero observations in the calculation.
Table 2.12 shows how the income distribution changes when the amount of perfor-
mance funding increases. Due to an increase in performance funding, students are less
likely to have incomes in the bottom three quintiles and more likely to have incomes in the
10The different forms of student selection associated with different performance measures are seen in
Section 2.6.
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Table 2.11: The Effect of Performance Funding on Mean and Median 2014 Income
(1) (2) (3)
Mean Income Median Income
Median Income
No Zeros
Public * PBF Amount 671.3** 1,351*** 1,231***
(309.1) (287.2) (262.9)
Observations 9,185 9,185 9,185
College and Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Public by Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Other Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Sample 2001-2010 2001-2010 2001-2010
Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. PBF amount is a measure of the amount
of performance funding available in thousands of 2014 dollars per state FTE student. ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, *p<0.1
top quintiles. This is evidence that changes made because of PBF are leading to students
finding higher paying jobs or being promoted quicker after graduation.
The interpretation of these labor market results is tricky since the average ability of
students in public colleges increases in response to PBF. Therefore, it is hard to say if the
increase in labor market earnings is due to colleges changing their practices or simply due
to public colleges enrolling more high ability students.
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Table 2.12: The Effect of Performance Funding on 2014 Income Distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1st Income
Quintile
2nd Income
Quintile
3rd Income
Quintile
4th Income
Quintile
5th Income
Quintile
Public * PBF Amount -0.00313* -0.0177*** -0.00772*** 0.0106*** 0.0180***
(0.00171) (0.00151) (0.00116) (0.00342) (0.00343)
Observations 9,185 9,185 9,185 9,185 9,185
College and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public by Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample 2001-2010 2001-2010 2001-2010 2001-2010 2001-2010
Each column shows the results from a regression on the percentage of students in each income quintile,
calculated based on their income compared to others in the same age group. Robust standard errors
clustered at the state level in parentheses. PBF amount is a measure of the amount of performance funding
available in thousands of 2014 dollars per state FTE student. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
2.6 DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS
2.6.1 Methodology
Just as states allocate different amounts of funding based on performance indicators,
different states have designed unique programs which tie funding to different college out-
come measures. The response to PBF may depend on the outcome chosen to allocate
funding. For example, completion-based funding programs should change incentives dif-
ferently than access-based funding programs.
The dataset I constructed categorizes all outcomes used by states into the categories
of completion, access, progression, efficiency, and research. To examine the differential
effects of using different outcome measures to allocate funding, I can use information on
the amount of funding associated with each outcome category. Now instead of having
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a variable, Fs,t , equal to the total amount of performance-based funding, I have five bi-
nary variables, Fks,t . Each variable F
k
s,t corresponds to the amount of performance funding
allocated based on performance measure k, where
k ∈ {completion, research,progression,efficiency,access}.
Using each of these five indicators, I rerun the regression specified in Equation (2.3) in-
cluding all five indicators for each funding category. The new regression equation is given
by:
Yi,s,t = β0+∑
k
β k1 Gi ·Fks,t +∑
k
β k2 F
k
s,t +Gi ·δGt +δi+δt +β3Xi,t + εi,s,t . (2.4)
In this regression, β k1 reveals information on how distributing more performance-based
funding based on outcome k impacts outcomes. This estimate is in reference to private
colleges in states with the same type of PBF.
In this specification, multicollinearity between the performance funding variables may
be present. It is incredibly rare for PBF to be implemented based on measures in only one
category. The average PBF program uses 2.7 of the 5 distinct categories to allocate college
appropriations. States only use one category to allocate all performance funding in under
10 percent of PBF implementations. The percentage of PBF programs using multiple
indicators is summarized in Table 2.3.
To address the potential multicollinearity, Equation (2.4) uses the amount of funding
attached to each outcome category instead of an indicator variable for each category.
Though states often use many outcome categories to allocate funding, the amount of fun-
ding allocated based on each category is usually not the same. Therefore, the variance in
the funding amount associated with each outcome is higher than the variance present in
indicator variables.
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Using information on funding amount does not completely remove the multicolline-
arity problem, but it does make the problem less severe. However, as seen in Table 2.3,
the dollar amount of funding allocated based on categories of completion, research, and
efficiency are very highly correlated. This suggests that multicollinearity may still be at
play even when using information of funding amount. To address this correlation, I create
a variable which is equal to the sum of the completion, research, and efficiency perfor-
mance based funding. I then rerun the regression specified in Equation (2.4), replacing the
completion, research, and efficiency terms with the new combined variable. Though these
three performance funding categories are quite different from each other, they are often
grouped together in states’ implementation of PBF. Therefore, the estimates associated
with this combined measure will reveal the effect of this common grouping.
I examine the differential effects on both the incentivized outcomes and the non-
incentivized outcomes.
2.6.2 Results
2.6.2.1 Incentivized Outcomes Table 2.13 presents the regression which includes the
amount of performance funding attached to each specific outcome category, as outlined in
Equation (2.4). The funding measures are adjusted by their standard deviation to make the
estimates easily comparable.
The results reveal that allocating more performance funding based on a research or
retention causes the incentivized category to increase. Using this technique, I do not find
evidence that the outcomes of completion and efficiency are responsive to PBF programs
that allocate funding based on those measures. This lack of a result may be due to the high
correlation between funding amounts.
To remove the issue of multicollinearity, I rerun the regression outlined in Equation
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Table 2.13: Differential Effect of PBF Amount on College Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Completion Research Progression Efficiency
Public * Completion PBF Amount 0.142 19.59 0.642 1.174
(0.986) (152.9) (0.658) (4.284)
Public * Research PBF Amount 0.317 261.8 ∗∗ -2.179 ∗∗∗ -0.607
(1.395) (102.8) (0.598) (5.210)
Public * Progression PBF Amount 0.606 -151.4 ∗∗ 1.423 ∗∗∗ 4.979 ∗∗
(0.404) (72.37) (0.274) (2.433)
Public * Efficiency PBF Amount -0.149 -406.5 2.068 -2.279
(0.868) (299.9) (1.582) (5.427)
Public * Access PBF Amount 0.831 ∗∗ -339.8 ∗∗∗ 1.712 ∗∗∗ 9.821 ∗∗
(0.412) (103.6) (0.291) (3.756)
Observations 13,936 13,350 10,550 14,044
Number of Colleges 1,191 1,172 1,180 1,195
College and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public by Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample 2001-2013 2001-2013 2004-2013 2001-2013
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis. All PBF amounts are measures of
the amount of performance funding available in 2013 dollars per state FTE student. The PBF amount
variables are scaled by their standard deviations to make the coefficient estimates comparable. ∗∗∗ p<0.01,
∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1
(2.4 using a combined measure of completion, research, and efficiency. The results of
this exercise are reported in Table 2.14. The variables are again scaled by their standard
deviations to make the estimates easily comparable. Now, all three different categories
of PBF significantly improve some outcomes. Using more PBF based on the combined
outcomes leads to a significant increase in the completion rate. In Table 2.13, none of the
three of the categories used to create the combined category had a detectable impact on
their own.
Interestingly, increasing the amount of performance funding based on progression and
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Table 2.14: Differential Effect of PBF Amount on Outcomes with Combined Categories
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Completion Research Progression Efficiency
Public * Combined PBF Amount 0.309*** 18.66 -0.0389 -0.428
(0.0685) (14.12) (0.0501) (0.469)
Public * Progression PBF Amount 0.531* -158.1** 1.499*** 5.056*
(0.298) (74.95) (0.187) (2.603)
Public * Access PBF Amount 0.796* -300.3*** 1.392*** 9.205**
(0.427) (95.20) (0.273) (4.237)
Observations 13,936 13,350 10,550 14,044
Number of Colleges 1,191 1,172 1,180 1,195
College and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public by Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample 2001-2013 2001-2013 2004-2013 2001-2013
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis. All PBF amounts are measures of
performance funding available in 2013 dollars per state FTE student. Combined PBF Amount is equal to
the sum of completion, research, and efficiency PBF amounts. The PBF amount variables are scaled by
their standard deviations to make the coefficient estimates comparable. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1
access impacts multiple outcomes. I find progression and access funding is associated
with increases to completion, progression, and efficiency. The response to progression
and access-based performance funding appears to have spillover effects which improve
variables other than the incentivized outcomes. This can be explained by identifying that
completion, progression, and efficiency measures are linked. Improvements to any one
of these measures should have an impact on the other two measures. Interestingly, the
research outcome decreases as more funding is allocated based on measures of progres-
sion and access. These decreases seem to suggest that the goal of increasing research
productivity is disjoint from the other three incentivized outcomes. This may due to col-
lege employees having to allocate their time between improving research outcomes and
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improving academic outcomes.
2.6.2.2 Performance-Based Funding Channel This section analyzes how colleges
are improving performance, while focusing on the differential effect of using different
measures of performance to allocate PBF. When examining the differential effect, to deal
with multicollinearity, I again combine the measures of completion, research, and effi-
ciency into one combined category.
Table 2.15 displays how performance funding based on a specific performance cate-
gory affects spending decisions. Overall, the table reveals the shift in spending from in-
struction to institutional support, found in Section 2.5, does not characterize the response
to all PBF programs. In fact this response seems to be isolated to the combined category.
A one standard deviation increase in funding based on the combined category is associated
with a $146 per FTE student decrease in instruction and a $119 per FTE student increase
in institutional support. This same response is not observed for the progression or access-
based funding programs. In fact, an increase in access funding is associated with a $407
per FTE student decrease in student support.
By examining the differential effects, a relationship between student support and PBF
is revealed. Increases to both access and combined measures result in increases to student
support. Colleges could be increasing student support to help students who need extra
help. This should result in an increase to completion related metrics.
The differential effect of PBF amount on college admission and tuition decisions is
summarized in Table 2.16. Information on institutional grants is displayed in the last co-
lumn of Table 2.15. When analyzing the response to PBF, the only admission related
impact was seen through improvements to the SAT score. In addition, the increase in SAT
score was not accompanied with a decrease in the admission rate, changes to tuition, or
changes in institutional grants. The lack of evidence relating to other variables was surpri-
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Table 2.15: The Differential Effect of Performance Funding on College Spending per FTE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Education
& General Instruction Research
Public
Service
Student
Support
Institutional Support
& Operations
Institutional
Grants
Public * Combined PBF Amount -8.234 -146.3*** -237.6*** -20.86*** 73.78*** 119.3*** 10.70
(81.27) (22.31) (22.12) (7.471) (13.57) (15.58) (13.26)
Public * Progression PBF Amount 348.5 39.35 43.17 36.03 28.38 -92.24 194.1***
(500.7) (133.7) (76.44) (24.77) (76.91) (79.27) (65.44)
Public * Access PBF Amount 775.2 268.7 -21.74 133.3*** 301.8** -407.2*** 517.0***
(822.2) (216.8) (103.2) (29.73) (120.6) (118.4) (83.78)
Observations 14,044 14,044 7,989 8,555 13,986 13,460 6,774
College, Year, and Public by Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample 2001-2013 2001-2013 2001-2013 2001-2013 2001-2013 2001-2013 2001-2013
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Table 2.16: The Differential Effect of Performance Funding on Admission Decisions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
SAT Diff FTE Diff Admissions
Admission
Rate
New
Undergraduates
Tuition
In-State
Tuition
Out-of-State
Public * Combined PBF Amount 0.469 -54.77** 26.10*** 0.00780*** -31.99*** 97.41** 500.0***
(0.349) (24.93) (8.359) (0.000418) (10.12) (42.40) (49.16)
Public * Progression PBF Amount 1.447*** 120.0*** 38.00 -0.00733** 184.9*** -381.6*** -615.9***
(0.193) (10.79) (29.71) (0.00279) (37.27) (112.1) (174.9)
Public * Access PBF Amount 1.233*** 15.10 -70.89* -0.00426 -47.54 -165.4* -402.8**
(0.281) (43.18) (36.07) (0.00382) (59.58) (97.21) (197.7)
Observations 12,684 14,039 12,775 11,787 13,017 14,001 14,001
College, Year, and Public by Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample 2001-2013 2001-2013 2001-2013 2001-2013 2001-2013 2001-2013 2001-2013
Tables 2.15 and 2.16: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis. All PBF amounts are measures of performance funding available in
2013 dollars per state FTE student. Combined PBF Amount is equal to the sum of completion, research, and efficiency PBF amounts. The PBF amount
variables are scaled by their standard deviations to make the coefficient estimates comparable. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1
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sing. However, by examining differential programs it is clear that the lack of significance
is due to different PBF programs resulting in different forms of student selection.
Under the combined measure, student selection is observed through colleges choosing
to decrease the total number of students. To achieve this goal, colleges increase the number
of admissions, admissions rate, and tuition for in-state and out-of-state students. Though
the amount of students admitted into the college increases, because of the increase in
overall tuition, less students decide to attend. Since completion and retention rates are
both percentage numbers, by decreasing the number of students, colleges are able to better
focus their resources to improve these measures.
Under the progression and access measures, colleges do not decide to decrease the
size of their student body but instead increase the quality of their student body. Colleges
do this by following a three step process. First, colleges restrict admissions. Lowered
admissions is seen by a 0.7% decrease in the admission rate for progression-based pro-
grams and a 71 student decrease in admittance under access-based programs. Second,
colleges lower the tuition charged to both in-state and out-of-state students to increase the
likelihood that high ability students matriculate. Under progression-based programs tui-
tion decreases by $382 and $616 for in-state and out-of-state students, respectively. Under
access-based programs tuition decreases by $165 and $403 for in-state and out-of-state
students, respectively. Third, colleges use institutional grants to decrease tuition for high
ability students. Progression-based programs lead to an increase in grants spending equal
to $194 per FTE student and access-based programs lead to an increase in grant spending
$517 per FTE student. The end result of this process is a higher quality student body.
Every year progression-based programs were in effect, the average SAT score increased
1.4 points while every year access-based programs were in effect, the average SAT score
increased 1.2 points.
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Table 2.17: Differential Effect of Performance Funding on Mean and Median 2014 Income
(1) (2) (3)
Mean Income Median Income
Median Income
No Zeros
Public * Combined PBF Amount 3,731 4,755* 4,316**
(3,059) (2,556) (2,098)
Public * Progression PBF Amount 257.6 453.5 519.8
(540.8) (553.9) (458.5)
Public * Access PBF Amount -763.4 -1,358 -1,047
(813.5) (883.4) (727.4)
Observations 8,943 8,943 8,943
College and Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Public by Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Other Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Sample 2001-2010 2001-2010 2001-2010
Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. PBF amount is a measure of the amount
of performance funding available in thousands of 2014 dollars per state FTE student. Combined PBF
Amount is equal to the sum of completion, research, and efficiency PBF amounts. The PBF amount
variables are scaled by their standard deviations to make the coefficient estimates comparable. ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, *p<0.1
2.6.2.3 Labor Market Outcomes Table 2.17 reveals the impact of different PBF pro-
grams on mean and median income. These results reveal that the combined performance
measure seems to be driving the results seen in Table 2.11. A $1,000 increase in state
funding based on the combined performance measures increases the median 2014 income
by $4,755 or $4,316 if you do not include zero observations in the calculation. Further,
the point estimate for mean income is also very high, however the results are noisy and
the estimate is not statistically significant. Allocating funding based on progression or
access-based measures do not seem to have an impact on 2014 mean or median income
measures.
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Table 2.18: Differential Effect of Performance Funding on 2014 Income Distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1st Income
Quintile
2nd Income
Quintile
3rd Income
Quintile
4th Income
Quintile
5th Income
Quintile
Public * Combined PBF Amount 0.00275 -0.0330* -0.0211 0.00319 0.0482**
(0.0142) (0.0173) (0.0126) (0.0133) (0.0229)
Public * Progression PBF Amount -0.00393 -0.0110*** -0.00356 0.00579 0.0127**
(0.00370) (0.00409) (0.00268) (0.00417) (0.00604)
Public * Access PBF Amount 0.000763 0.00997 0.00469 -0.0141* -0.00129
(0.00657) (0.00671) (0.00415) (0.00759) (0.00969)
Observations 8,943 8,943 8,943 8,943 8,943
College and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public by Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample 2001-2010 2001-2010 2001-2010 2001-2010 2001-2010
Each column shows the results from a regression on the percentage of students in each income quintile,
calculated based on their income compared to others in the same age group. Robust standard errors
clustered at the state level in parentheses. PBF amount is a measure of the amount of performance funding
available in thousands of 2014 dollars per state FTE student. Combined PBF Amount is equal to the sum of
completion, research, and efficiency PBF amounts. The PBF amount variables are scaled by their standard
deviations to make the coefficient estimates comparable. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
Table 2.18 shows how the income distribution responds to different performance-based
funding programs. Allocating government funding based on the combined measure or
progression result in a shift of the income distribution. Specifically, funding based on
these measures result in less students earning in the bottom part of the distribution and
more students earning in the top part of the distribution. This positive income shift is not
observed with access-based performance funding.
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2.7 CONCLUSION
This paper uses a unique dataset to examine the impact of performance-based funding
on public colleges by utilizing triple-difference regressions which control for state-level
and public-college level trends. I find evidence that PBF is effective at improving the
completion and retention rates of colleges. Digging deeper, I find that completion and
retention further increase with the amount of funding allocated based on performance me-
asurements. These increases are not caused by an income effect, and the results reveal that
increases to completion and progression can be achieved by simply changing the method
of allocating public funds. If colleges were to completely allocate funding through perfor-
mance measures, the difference in the completion rate between public and private colleges
would be significantly reduced. I find that the retention and access measures are the most
effective at improving many of the outcomes often incentivized at once. PBF programs
that allocated funding based on completion, research, and efficiency were only effective at
improving completion rates.
Changes in the incentivized outcomes appear to be partially due to colleges using
performance padding to increase the incentivized measure without improving educational
performance. Through examining intermediate outcomes, I find evidence that colleges are
improving outcomes by attracting higher quality students. Every year PBF is in effect, the
average SAT score of public colleges affected by PBF increases. This increase in average
SAT score suggest increased effort to attract higher quality students.
There is some evidence that PBF results in better labor market outcomes for students.
However, this result is hard to interpret since the composition of the student body also
changes in response to PBF. The change in student composition means that I am unable to
rule out that income increases are not due to increases in student ability.
Unexpected consequences arise due to the implementation of PBF. By examining the
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spending decisions of colleges, I find evidence that under PBF spending on instruction
decreases while spending on institutional support increases. This result is driven by a
subset of PBF programs who base funding on a combination of completion, research, and
efficiency. Under these programs, in order to report all necessary statistics and comply
with the state government, the administrative costs of the colleges increase. To pay for
this increased administrative cost, colleges could choose to spend less on instruction. This
finding suggests that some PBF programs may actually be hurting the educational quality
students receive at public colleges.
This research has important policy implications since it helps inform the large number
of states experimenting with PBF. I show that public colleges do produce better outcomes
from PBF. By analyzing the differential effects, I find that the amount of performance
funding and measures of performance used to allocate funding have a large impact on the
improvements to outcomes. However, I also find some evidence that colleges have an
incentive to use performance padding to increase the incentivized outcomes. The results
here supplemented with a model of college and student choice such as in Svoboda [2016]
can be utilized to design a program which maximizes the effect of PBF while limiting the
incentives for performance padding. Together these techniques will allow policy makers
to improve outcomes by observing what is effective and designing new programs while
properly accounting for college and student responses.
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3.0 ACCESS, AFFORDABILITY, AND OUTCOMES: EVALUATING
RATING-BASED COLLEGE AID
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Colleges in the United States are facing increasing criticism of their performance in
regards to access, affordability, and outcomes. Ellwood et al. [2000] presents evidence that
the gap in college enrollment across income levels is widening over time, making college
less accessible to the poor. Long [2004] and Turner [2012] observe that an increase in the
federal support of colleges has not resulted in a large increase in affordability.1 According
to a report by National Student Clearinghouse [2012], under 60 percent of United States’s
first-time degree seeking students who begin at a four-year public university complete their
degree within six years, making the United States college completion rate and college
attainment rate lower than those of many advanced economies.
The poor performance of colleges has led to proposed reforms of the federal college
financial aid system. One such proposal titled “The Presidents Plan to Make College
1These papers show that recent attempts to lower the cost of college, including increasing the maximum
Pell Grant award and creating tax credits for those who attend college, have been met with an increase in
tuition. According to College Board [2013], in the last twenty years, after adjusting for inflation, average
grant aid and tax benefits at public four-year institutions have increased 180 percent. The same period
saw net tuition and fees increase by 53 percent. The situation is similar for private nonprofit four-year
universities, with aid having increased by 133 percent and tuition and fees by 23 percent.
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More Affordable: A Better Bargain for the Middle Class,” suggests tying the financial aid
award a student receives to a college rating based on three areas: access, affordability, and
outcomes.2 Under this proposal, if a student attends a college with a high rating, she will
receive more financial aid than if that same student attends a college with a low rating.
In this paper, I extend the model of higher education first developed in Epple et al.
[2006] and Epple et al. [2016] by explicitly allowing for the possibility that a student
drops out of college. Using college level data and the 1997 National Longitudinal Study
of Youth, I create a quantitative version of this model which produces statistics that closely
resemble the market for higher education under the current student federal aid system. I
model a potential policy change which allows student federal aid to be tied to a rating
determined by a college’s performance. In the model, college performance is defined to
be a function of the characteristics of the college and it’s student body. This general setup
is able to capture many different possible rating schemes. I explicitly consider ratings
that tie the federal aid a student receives to measures of college access, affordability, and
outcomes. I consider proposals based on one measure and proposals that take into account
multiple measures of college performance. This simulated policy change makes it possible
to evaluate how rating-based aid systems will impact the enrollment decisions of colleges
and students. Further, I explore how introducing rating-based aid will affect college access,
affordability, and outcomes.
I use a rich structural model of the market for higher education that incorporates the
actions of both students and colleges. The model is characterized by two types of colleges,
public and private, which compete against one another to attract students. Both types of
colleges make decisions in order to maximize the educational quality they provide. Public
colleges receive assistance from the state government but are not free to set their tuition.
Private colleges do not receive this assistance and can use tuition discounts to attract de-
2More details on this proposal and other proposed federal reforms are outlined in Section 3.2.
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sirable students. Students choose, from the colleges they have been admitted to, what
college to attend after observing the educational quality and tuition at each college. Some
students may choose to not attend any college and instead enter the labor force straight
from high school. Low income students who attend college are awarded financial aid from
the federal government. In the baseline scenario, the amount of aid students receive is
equal to the amount they would receive under the current attendance-based federal aid
system.
The model allows for the possibility that a student drops out of college. College non-
completion is an important feature to include in a model of student choice since the average
graduation rate in public universities in the United States is under 60 percent and the
possibility of non-completion affects student’s attendance decisions. If a student with a
low probability of completion decides to attend college, it is very likely that she will have
to drop out and be worse off than if she initially decided to not attend college. In my
model, the completion rate of a student depends on the characteristics of each student and
the quality of the college they attend. Colleges can change their average completion rate
by altering enrollment decisions or by changing how much they spend on education. This
feature of the model allows me to observe how the college completion rate responds to
federal aid changes. Under the benchmark calibration, the model is able to replicate many
of the main features of the data, including matching the college completion rate of different
types of colleges.
Incorporating rating-based aid into the model yields three main findings. First, basing
aid on any one measure can yield unintended consequences. When aid allocation is deter-
mined entirely by one of the three areas of focus, that area improves but this policy hurts
the other two areas of focus. The magnitude of improvement is small compared to the
magnitude of the deterioration. This result stems from the fact that actions taken in purs-
uit of one goal may be detrimental to a different goal. For example, consider a situation
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where colleges are trying to improve the average graduation rate. Since the likelihood of
graduation is greater if the family income is higher [Light and Strayer, 2000], a college
that wants to increase the average graduation rate may only admit high income students,
resulting in a trade-off between increased completion and decreased access. In the same
way, if the federal aid system puts too much emphasis on one goal, colleges will try to
improve that one goal at the expense of the other less incentivized goals.
Second, introducing a rating-based system can result in overall welfare improvements
when the rating is based heavily on the outcome ratings. In addition, an affordability-
based rating system is effective at improving welfare for some segments of the population.
When aid is based on the outcome rating, high income students benefit. When aid is based
on the affordability rating, low income students benefit.
The third main result is related to how colleges respond to federal aid increases. Un-
der rating-based aid where the rating is based on college completion, colleges react to an
increase in federal aid by increasing tuition. This is similar to the response under the cur-
rent attendance-based rating system. However, under the accessibility or outcome-based
rating-based systems, the incentives introduced by the rating cancel out the incentives to
raise tuition. As a result, colleges no longer choose to raise tuition in response to an
increase in the maximum federal aid.
My research is related to several lines of literature. Besides Epple et al. [2006] and
Epple et al. [2016], other papers also present models of the market for higher education.
Chade et al. [2014] and Fu [2014] both study a model of college choice that includes un-
certainty in college admission. The model I develop instead incorporates uncertainty in
college completion into a structural model of the market for higher education. A number
of papers present equilibrium models of higher education which look at the effect of po-
licy changes on college non-completion. For example, Garriga and Keightley [2007] use
an overlapping generations model to show education policies, including tuition subsidies,
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grant subsidies, and loan limit restrictions, affect college enrollment, time-to-degree, and
dropout. Johnson [2013] uses a dynamic model of education, borrowing, and work deci-
sions to explore how the removal of borrowing constraints affects college attendance and
completion. Though these papers analyze a large variety of education policies, the federal
performance-based aid programs that have been the subject of a number of proposals have
not been considered.
The proposed change to federal aid is following several other changes in federal aid
that share the common goal of increasing college affordability. Some of the previous in-
terventions included increasing the maximum Pell Grant award for lower income families.
Epple et al. [2016] shows that a blanket increase in the Pell Grant will result in universities
increasing their tuition. The findings of their model are supported by the data presented
in Turner [2012]. Turner [2012] uses yearly variation in the Pell Grant amount to show
that an increase in the Pell Grant amount is passed through the colleges in the form of
higher tuition.3 These papers suggest that a blanket increase in the Pell Grant award will
not improve the affordability of colleges. My paper explores how increase in federal aid
will affect affordability under the current aid system and the new proposed rating-based
aid system.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 reviews proposed changes
to federal financial aid. Section 3.3 reviews the Epple et al. [2016] model, presents my
extension, and defines the equilibrium. Section 3.4 discusses the optimal decisions of
students and colleges. Section 3.5 incorporates federal funding into the model. In this
section, the model is solved with the inclusion of attendance-based federal funding and
the proposed rating-based federal funding. Section 3.6 makes functional form assumptions
and calibrates the model. Section 3.7 simulates the proposed federal aid policies. Section
3Increases in federal aid leading to increases in tuition is also discussed in Singell and Stone [2006] and
Rizzo and Ehrenberg [2004]
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3.8 concludes.
3.2 POLICY REVIEW
Proposals to change federal funding follow funding changes made by state govern-
ments. As of 2014, more than half of all state governments base a portion of their college
aid on college performance. These states vary the amount of funding based on a variety
of performance indicators such as course completion, time to degree, transfer rates, num-
ber of degrees awarded, or number of low-income and minority graduates. Generally, the
amount of performance-based aid is between 5 and 30 percent of the total state funding for
higher education. Many of these performance-based funding programs begin as a small
percent of total aid and increase overtime.4
In recent years, there have been many proposed reforms of federal college financial aid
aimed at improving the performance of colleges. Many of these proposals suggest linking
the amount of federal aid awarded to the college attended. The goals of these proposals
are varied. Some design the modifications with the intent of raising the completion rate.
A proposal by the Rethinking Student Aid Study Group [2008] suggests that the federal
government provide direct funding to institutions based on their success in retaining and
graduating low and moderate income students. A similar suggestion is made by The Na-
tional Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators [2013]. Other proposals focus
on increasing the affordability of college. Gillen [2011] suggests a modification of the
4For example, Arkansas instituted 5 percent performance-based funding during the 2012-2013 school
year. This aid is scheduled to increase by 5 percent increments until capped at 25 percent during the 2017-
2018 school year. Similarly, Maine instituted performance-based funding that was 5 percent of base funding
in fiscal year 2014. This funding is scheduled to increase by 5 percent increments each year until 30 percent
of base funding is allocated based on performance.
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Pell Grant award which ties funding to the median cost of college instead of the cost of
attendance at each college, in the belief that this would increase the price consciousness
of students and incentivize colleges to keep tuition low.
A plan proposed by the Obama administration has the goal of simultaneously impro-
ving the colleges’ outcomes, affordability, and accessibility for low income individuals.5
This proposal combines many previously proposed federal aid reforms. The first stage of
the proposal calls for the Department of Education to release ratings based on measures
related to college outcomes, affordability, and accessibility for every college that recei-
ves federal financial aid. These ratings would be transparent and visible not only to the
colleges, but also to potential students who are making college enrollment decisions. A
number of measurements have been proposed for each of these criteria. The proposed
outcome measures include the completion rate and measures of labor market success such
as long-term median earnings, graduate school attendance, or percentage of students re-
paying their loans on time. Potential affordability measures include average tuition net
institutional grant aid or net tuition paid by different income groups. Access measures
include total enrollment of low to moderate income student, percentage of students recei-
ving the Pell Grant, expected family contribution gap, and the number of first generation
college students enrolled.
The federal financial aid students receive would be linked to these ratings. A student
who attends a college with a higher rating will receive more financial aid than a student
who attends a college with a lower rating. Tying aid to the ratings simultaneously encoura-
ges students to attend colleges that are better performing and encourages under-performing
colleges to adopt practices to improve their rating.
This proposal was not well received by colleges. The push-back eventually led to the
government altering the plan. The federal government instead decided to release a website
5The White House [2013] press release contains more information on the proposal.
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that publishes information about all colleges.6 Federal aid is not be tied to these college
statistics; instead the website serves as a resource for students who are making college
attendance decisions.
Though the original plan to tie college performance to federal aid was not implemen-
ted, performance-based funding is an important topic of interest to governments and is at
the center of talk on education policy. As more states move to adopt performance funding
and see success from these programs, the topic of federal performance funding is likely
to be revisited in the future. In this paper, I simulate the effect of federal performance
funding to better inform future changes to federal funding.
3.3 MODEL
To evaluate an introduction of rating-based federal funding I consider a structural mo-
del of the market for education. The setup of the model and baseline results presented in
Sections 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5.1 closely follow the results presented in Epple et al. [2016]. In
these sections, I briefly review the model while focusing discussion on the differences that
arise due to my inclusion of the possibility of non-completion and other generalizations.7
In this section, I describe the decision problem of the potential students and the pro-
blem of each type of college. Then I introduce a government tax rate and define an equili-
brium.
6The website is located at https://collegescorecard.ed.gov/
7For a more thorough discussion of the baseline model results, readers are encouraged to consult Epple
et al. [2016].
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3.3.1 Students
Students choose whether to attend college and, if they decide to go to college, what
college to attend. Students are differentiated by their ability b and their before tax hou-
sehold income y.8 The measure of potential students in the economy is assumed to be
1.
Assumption 1. The joint cumulative distribution of income and ability, F(b,y), is conti-
nuous with convex support S⊂ R2+ and density f (b,y).
Students choose from a set of options J, consisting of colleges that the student is
admitted to and an outside option. The subscript j is used to refer to colleges and the
subscript 0 is used to refer to the outside option. Students observe the level of education
quality, q(e j,θ j), and the required tuition, t j(b,y), for all colleges that admit the student,
where education quality is an increasing function of e j, the per student expenditure on
education, and θ j, the mean ability level of the student body at college j. For convenience,
I refer to q(e j,θ j) as q j.
Assumption 2. The outside option is available to all students at zero cost (t0 = 0) and
provides education quality q0.
Once a student enters college, the decision to complete is determined by a random
draw. A student of type (b,y) who attends college j will receive a random draw that
makes completing college the best decision with probability c(q j,b,y). Students are aware
of these probabilities and this information influences their college decisions.
The completion rate is a function of the college quality, the student’s ability and family
income. It is assumed that students who have higher ability, higher family income, and
8In Epple et al. [2016] students are also differentiated by state of residence. To simplify the analysis, this
feature is not included.
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students who attend higher quality colleges are more likely to complete college. These
assumptions are supported by the results observed in the data, presented in Section 3.6.
When students are making college attendance decisions, they are aware of the possi-
bility that they will not complete college. For students with a low completion probability,
the choice to attend college is risky, since there is a large probability that the student will
have to drop out and pursue their outside option. When students drop out, they do not
have their tuition refunded and are therefore worse off than students who initially decided
to take the outside option. Students with a higher probability of completing college face a
smaller risk.
The utility function of student i with ability b and income y, who attends college j,
is given by a simple expected value over the probability that the student will complete
college. Specifically the utility is:
Ui, j(b,y) = c(q j,b,y) ·u(a(q j,b),x j)+(1− c(q j,b,y)) ·u(a(q0,b),x j)+ εi, j
x j = y− t j(b,y)−ν
In this function, a(·) is the achievement of the student, q j is the education quality at college
j, b is ability of the student, x j is the remaining income, t j(b,y) is tuition for student of
type (b,y) set by college j, ν is the non-tuition costs associated with attending college,
c(q j,b,y) is the probability that student with ability b and income y graduates from college
j, and εi, j is the idiosyncratic preference shock for student i who attends college j.
The first two terms of the utility function are the weighted average of the utility that
the student would receive if she graduated college j, u(a(q j,b),x j), and the utility that the
student would receive if she fails to complete college j, u(a(q0,b),x j). The student is able
to graduate with probability c(q j,b,y). The utility function is an increasing function of
the student’s achievement and remaining income. Achievement is an increasing function
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of the education quality received and the ability of the student. The idiosyncratic prefe-
rence shock εi, j is included to account for the unobservable factors that affect the college
attendance decision.
Assumptions on the utility, achievement, completion, and college quality functions are
summarized below.
Assumption 3. u(·), a(·), c(·), q(·) are increasing in all arguments and are C1.
When solving the student’s problem, I assume students follow Assumption 4.
Assumption 4. When choosing, students take as given the admission policies, tuition le-
vels, and the education quality of the colleges.
Since there are many students at each college, it is reasonable to assume the actions of
one student will not affect the decisions made by colleges.
3.3.2 Colleges
3.3.2.1 Public Colleges Public colleges decide what students to admit and how much
to spend on educational expenditure. When making admittance decisions, public colleges
are able to perfectly discriminate based on ability and income. The admission function is
denoted by α j(b,y). Once students are admitted, they choose the college to attend. This
choice is given by the matriculation function r j(b,y;T,Q). In this function, T and Q refer
to the vector of tuition and quality offers extended to a student of type (b,y).
Colleges maximize the sum of their students’ “success”. Success is a function of
the student’s achievement and completion probability, denoted as o(a(q j,b),c(q j,b,y)).
This term can be thought of as the utility contribution that comes from attending college
adjusted by the probability that a student completes. For brevity, o(q j,b,y) is used to refer
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to this function. The objective function of a public college is equal to
∫ ∫
o(q j,b,y)α j(b,y)r j(b,y;T,Q) f (b,y)dbdy.
A public college can increase the realized value of their objective function by enrolling
more students or by raising their education quality. To increase education quality, the
college must increase either their average ability level or education spending.
Public colleges receive a subsidy of z j per student from the state government. In
addition to giving the subsidy, it is assumed that the state government sets tuition rates,
tˆ j(y), that the public colleges must use. Tuition differentiation is included to match the
empirical fact that the net tuition paid to public colleges increases with income. Further, I
assume the tuition rates are set outside of the model.
Public colleges are constrained by the following budget constraint:
F +V (k j)+ k je j =
∫ ∫
t j(b,y)α j(b,y)r j(b,y;T,Q) f (b,y)dbdy+ k jz j.
Where k j is the total number of students who attend college j.
The left hand side of this equation is the college’s cost equal to the sum of the fixed
cost of operating the college, F , the variable cost of operating a college, V (k j), and the
total amount spent on education, k je j. The right hand side of this equation is the revenue
of a public college, equal to the sum of all tuition revenue collected plus the total subsidy
received from the state government.
The next assumption limits the size of colleges.
Assumption 5. V (·) is a twice differentiable, increasing, and convex function.
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3.3.2.2 Public College Optimization Problem The public college problem is summa-
rized below
max
θ j,e j,k j,α j(b,y)
∫ ∫
o(q j,b,y)α j(b,y)r j(b,y;T,Q) f (b,y)dbdy s.t.
Identity Constraints: θ j = 1k j
∫ ∫
bα j(b,y)r j(b,y;T,Q) f (b,y)dbdy
k j =
∫ ∫
α j(b,y)r j(b,y;T,Q) f (b,y)dbdy
Budget Constraint: F +V (k j)+ k je j =
∫ ∫
t j(b,y)α j(b,y)r j(b,y;T,Q) f (b,y)dbdy+ k jz j
Exogenous Tuition: t j(b,y) = tˆ j(y)
Feasibility Constraint: α j(b,y) ∈ [0,1] ∀ (b,y)
The following assumption is followed when solving the problem.
Assumption 6. When setting policies, colleges take as given their competitors’ admission
policies, tuition levels, and educational quality.
3.3.2.3 Private Colleges Private colleges solve a maximization problem that is similar
to the problem public colleges face. The key differences arise due to their relationship
with the state government.
Private colleges do not have an obligation to the community and their objective is
assumed to be different than that of public colleges. Private colleges maximize the quality
of their college.9 Quality is given by the quality function discussed in 3.3.1. Private
colleges do not receive a subsidy from state governments. In addition, they are able to set
their own tuition for each possible type of student. Private colleges choose tuition levels
and education expenditure in order to maximize quality.
The cost function for private colleges is identical to the cost function for public col-
leges; however, the revenue for private colleges is different. In place of the subsidy from
9A possible interpretation of this assumption is that private colleges want to maximize the prestige of
their university.
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the state government, private colleges receive endowment income D j. This endowment is
exogenously given and is not earmarked.
Private colleges are constrained by the following budget constraint:
F +V (k j)+ k je j =
∫ ∫
t j(b,y)r j(b,y;T,Q) f (b,y)dbdy+D j.
3.3.2.4 Private College Optimization Problem The decision problem for private col-
leges is similar to that of public colleges. The main difference is that private colleges also
need to choose a tuition rate for each possible ability-income combination. In the absence
of tuition caps, since private colleges can choose their tuition rate, there is always some
tuition level that would make a private college want to admit a student. Therefore, instead
of choosing whether to admit students, colleges choose a tuition level where they would
want to admit students. This is the same as if α j(b,y) was equal to one for all students
(b,y). When tuition caps are instituted, this will no longer be true.
The private college maximization problem is summarized below
max
θ j,e j,k j,t j(b,y)
q j s.t.
Identity Constraints: θ j = 1k j
∫ ∫
br j(b,y;T,Q) f (b,y)dbdy
k j =
∫ ∫
r j(b,y;T,Q) f (b,y)dbdy
Budget Constraint: F +V (k j)+ k je j =
∫ ∫
t(b,y)r j(b,y;T,Q) f (b,y)dbdy+D j
Assumption 6 also applies to private colleges.
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3.3.3 State Budget Balance
I assume the state government operates a balanced budget. The state levies a uniform
tax to pay for the subsidy given to public colleges. Assuming there are P public colleges
indexed by j = 1,2, . . . ,P, it follows that the uniform state tax, τs, must satisfy:
τs
∫ ∫
y f (b,y)dbdy =
P
∑
j=1
z jk j
3.3.4 Definition of Equilibrium
Given (i) ability and income distribution, the utility function, and the completion
functions; (ii) college fixed cost and variable cost function; (iii) the college quality function
and public college objective function; (iv) the state subsidies, public tuition levels, and
private endowments; (v) the number of public colleges and private colleges; and (vi) the
quality of the outside option, an equilibrium consists of: (a) a collection of college cha-
racteristics (θ j,e j,k j) for all colleges j; (b) an admission decision α j(b,y) for all public
colleges j; (c) a vector of tuitions t j(b,y) for all private colleges j; (d) a set of student
choice probabilities r j(b,y;T,Q); and (e) a state tax rate τs that satisfies: (1) the public
maximization problem for all public colleges, taking as given other colleges’ charged tui-
tion and quality; (2) the private maximization problem for all private colleges, taking as
given other colleges’ charged tuition and quality; (3) the utility maximization problem for
all students (b,y), taking as given all college’s charged tuition and quality; and (4) the
government budget equation.
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3.4 EQUILIBRIUM DECISIONS
3.4.1 Students
In order to analytically solve the model, the following assumptions about the student’s
achievement and utility function are made.
Assumption 7. The student achievement function a(q j,b) and the utility index u j(·) are
given by:
a(q j,b) = q
ω1
j b
ω2 , u j(a(q j,b),y− t(b,y)) = ρln[(y− t(b,y))a(q j,b)]
The random utility terms εi, j are independent and identically distributed Type 1 Extreme
Value random variables. 10
The utility of student i who attends college j can be written as
Ui, j(b,y) = ρln[(y− t j)qc(q j,b,y)·ω1j q
(1−c(q j,b,y))·ω1
0 b
ω2]+ εi, j.
From this utility and the assumption about εi, j, the matriculation function for each student
(b,y) simplifies to
r j(b,y;T,Q)) =
(y− t j)ρ q jq0
c(q j,b,y)·ρ·ω1
∑k∈J(y− tk)ρ qkq0
c(qk,b,y)·ρ·ω1 .
A college can increase the matriculation of a student with type (b,y) by either incre-
asing quality or decreasing tuition. If a college decides to increase quality, an increase in
matriculation comes from two sources. First, higher education quality increases the return
to schooling for this college. Second, an increase in education quality increases the proba-
bility that any student will graduate. This makes the decision to attend college less risky
and results in more students being willing to attend this college.
10This utility function is chosen to maintain comparability between the results presented here and those
presented in Epple et al. [2016].
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3.4.2 Public Colleges
The solution to the public college maximization problem yields the following admit-
tance equation. The derivation of this equation is in Appendix A.1.1.
α j(b,y) = 1 ⇐⇒ o(q j,b,y)λ j + tˆ j(y)+ z j >V
′(k j)+ e j +
qθ j
qe j
(θ j−b). (3.1)
This equation is the one state version of Proposition 2 described in Epple et al. [2016].
According to Equation (3.1), a public college will admit a student of type (b,y) if the
marginal benefit of admitting this student is larger than this student’s effective marginal
cost. The marginal benefit, on the left side of the inequality, is equal to the sum of the
increase to the success function, the tuition the student will pay and the subsidy from the
state government. The effective marginal cost is equal to the increase in variable cost,
the per student educational expenditure, and a cost component that differs based on the
student’s ability.
Since the effective marginal cost reappears many times in the equilibrium solution, I
write it as EMC j(b,y).
EMC j(b,y)≡V ′(k j)+ e j +
qθ j
qe j
(θ j−b)
Note the effective marginal cost changes with the student’s ability. If a student has ability b
lower than the average ability θ j, then admitting the student will lower the average ability
of the college. This will hurt the rest of the students in the college and lower the value of
the college’s objective function. It is appropriate that this cost should be considered when
deciding whether or not to admit a student. Likewise, if a student has ability b higher
than the average ability θ j, then admitting this student will raise the average ability of the
college. The ability cost component will be negative, and admission decisions will favor
these high ability students.
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3.4.3 Private Colleges
The solution to the private college maximization problem yields the following implicit
expression for the optimal tuition. The derivation is presented in Appendix A.1.2 .
r j(b,y;T,Q)−EMC j(b,y)∂ r j(b,y;T,Q)∂ t j(b,y) =−t j(b,y)
∂ r j(b,y;T,Q)
∂ t j(b,y)
(3.2)
This equation is equivalent to Proposition 1 in Epple et al. [2016]. Private colleges
set the marginal benefit from increasing tuition equal to the marginal cost. The marginal
benefit of increasing tuition is equal to the increased revenue from students who are at-
tending the college plus a decrease in the effective marginal cost derived from students
changing attendance decisions due to the higher tuition. The marginal cost of increasing
tuition is equal to the decrease in the amount of tuition collected from students who change
attendance decisions.
Equation (3.2) can be solved to determine tuition for each type of student.
t j(b,y) = EMC j(b,y)
[
ρ(1− r j(b,y;T,Q))
ρ(1− r j(b,y;T,Q))+1
]
+ y
[
1
ρ(1− r j(b,y;T,Q))+1
]
(3.3)
3.5 FEDERAL AID, TUITION CAPS AND NON-TUITION COSTS
3.5.1 Attendance-Based Federal Aid
In the baseline scenario, federal aid is attendance-based. It is assumed federal aid is
given directly to students who exhibit financial need. The amount of aid depends on the ex-
pected family contribution, EFC(y), and the tuition of the university. The expected family
contribution is an increasing function of income. If tuition is higher than the students’s
expected contribution, the federal government provides aid, A¯ j(b,y), to the student up to
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some maximum aid level, A¯.11 Federal aid received by a student with ability and income
(b,y) who attends university j can be summarized by the following equation.
A¯ j(b,y) = min{A¯,max[t j(b,y)−EFC(y),0]}
In this aid policy, the amount of aid received at two universities who charge the same
tuition is exactly the same.
Since tuition is set exogenously for public colleges, the inclusion of federal aid does
not directly change the practices of public colleges. The aid program indirectly affects
public colleges by making public college cheaper for some students. The increase in af-
fordability increases the matriculation at these colleges.
The inclusion of federal aid dramatically changes the tuition pricing for private colle-
ges. This occurs since private colleges can exploit the aid formula to receive higher levels
of tuition. The private colleges know that federal aid will be given to the students and will
never set tuition to be anywhere in the range t j(b,y) ∈ (EFC(y),EFC(y)+ A¯). For any
tuition in this range, a small increase in tuition would not be seen by the students. Every
increase in tuition would be met with a one-to-one increase in aid. Therefore, students
would be indifferent between that tuition level and a small increase in tuition. At the same
time, a small increase in tuition would be preferred by the college since it would result
in the college receiving more tuition revenue. It follows that if tuition was set to be in-
between EFC(y) and EFC(y)+ A¯, the college would want to deviate from this pricing and
increase tuition to EFC(y)+ A¯. This translates to a kinked demand curve, as illustrated in
Figure 3.1.
The optimal tuition level is determined by comparing the effective marginal cost to
the marginal revenue. If effective marginal cost equals marginal revenue to the left of the
11The federal government levies a tax τ f to pay for the aid given to students. The tax is set such that the
revenue raised is exactly equal to the aid given to students.
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Figure 3.1: Demand for Student of Type (b,y)
kink, full aid is given and tuition is determined by the upper portion of the demand curve.
If marginal cost crosses in-between the two pieces of the marginal revenue curve, then
it is optimal to game the system and set tuition such that the student is eligible for the
maximum amount of aid. Finally, if marginal cost equals marginal revenue to the right of
the kink, because of the discontinuity, one of two tuition levels could be optimal. Tuition
is either set by the lower portion of the demand curve or the college sets tuition equal to the
level where the student receives the maximum aid. The tuition that maximizes effective
profit is the one that the college ultimately chooses to charge. Effective profit is equal to
the difference between total revenue and total effective cost. All optimal tuition choices
are presented in Appendix A.1.3.
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3.5.2 Rating-Based Federal Aid
In this section, I modify the federal aid policy to tie aid to a college specific rating.
This modification, along with the inclusion of endogenous completion rate, is the main
contribution of this paper. This rating-based system will be used to simulate policy chan-
ges. More details of the optimization problems faced by colleges are outlined in Appendix
A.2. The college specific rating is modeled to be general in order to explore the impact of
the college ratings proposed in the White House’s plan and many other types of potential
ratings. Denote the rating of university j as ϒ j. This college specific rating is equal to the
average rating υ(q j, t j(b,y),b,y) of the students who attend that college.
ϒ j = min
(
1
k j
∫ ∫
υ(q j, t j(b,y),b,y)α j(b,y)r j(b,y;T,Q) f (b,y)dbdy,1
)
To be compatible with the “Better Bargain Plan,” the individual rating of a student can
change with the quality of the college the student attends, the tuition charged to the student,
and the student’s type. The maximum rating a college can receive is 1.
The rating is related to the amount of aid a student will receive at college j. Specifi-
cally, a student who decides to attend a college with rating of ϒ j will receive federal aid
equal to ϒκj A˜ j(b,y),12 where
ϒκj A˜ j(b,y) = ϒ
κ
j min{A˜,max[t j(b,y)−EFC(y),0]}.
The parameter κ dictates how important the rating is in determining the maximum aid
amount. The exponent κ will be referred to as the rating intensity. When κ is zero, the
rating does not affect the maximum aid amount. As κ increases, the rating’s importance
increases. The maximum aid is now denoted as A˜. The maximum aid is set to be higher
in the rating-based system than under the attendance-based system. Since the maximum
12A proportional tax τ f is levied to pay for all aid given by the federal government.
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possible aid will be multiplied by this rating, it is necessary to increase the maximum
possible aid to achieve a budget neutral policy change.
3.5.2.1 Modified Public College Solution Under the rating-based aid policy, the so-
lution to the public college maximization problem is very similar to the solution under
attendance-based federal aid. The admittance decision is now determined by the follo-
wing statement
α(b,y) = 1 ⇐⇒ o(q j,b)
λ j
+ tˆ j(y)+ z j > EMC j(b,y)+
Ψ j
λ j
(ϒ j−υ(q j, t j(b,y),b,y))
(3.4)
where Ψ j is the Lagrange multiplier of the rating identity.13 Appendix A.2 outlines the
derivation of this equation.
Notice equation (3.4) is identical to equation (3.1), with the exception of the term
Ψ j
λ j
(ϒ j−υ(q j, t j(b,y),b,y)). This term adjusts the effective marginal cost of any student
based on that student’s impact on the rating. Admitting a student with a rating that is
lower than the average rating ϒ j will lower the college’s rating. A lower ϒ j results in less
federal aid for students who decide to attend this college. On the other hand, admitting a
student whose rating is higher than the average rating ϒ j will increase the college’s rating.
Increased aid makes it easier for the college to attract students. By increasing the rating,
public colleges are decreasing the tuition students actually have to pay if they attend public
college. A higher rating results in more federal aid for students who attend that college.
This is the only method public colleges can use to change their effective tuition.
The logic behind this term mirrors the logic behind the term
qθ j
qe j
(θ j− b). The term
qθ j
qe j
(θ j− b) is equal to the cost (benefit) associated with admitting a student with ability
13If a college has a perfect rating,Ψ j = 0 and this expression is exactly the same as under attendance-based
aid
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lower (higher) than the average ability of the college and Ψ jλ j (ϒ j−υ(q j, t j(b,y),b,y)) is
equal to the cost (benefit) associated with admitting a student with a rating lower (higher)
than the average rating of the college.
3.5.2.2 Modified Private College Solution One major difference between this policy
environment and the attendance-based aid is how federal aid responds to an increase in
tuition when tuition is in between EFC(y) and EFC(y)+ A˜. Under the attendance-based
aid system, if tuition started off in this range, an increase would be accompanied by a
one-to-one increase in federal aid. Therefore, students were indifferent between all tuition
levels in this range. It was optimal for colleges to manipulate this indifference and either
set tuition such that a student type received no aid or they received the maximum amount
of aid. In the new environment, this is no longer the case. With the policy change, if
college j increases tuition by 1, the aid received by the student would only increase by ϒκj .
If 1−ϒκj > 0, the student is no longer indifferent to any tuition levels in this range and
colleges can not manipulate the aid formula in the same manner they previously could.
An example of the new demand, marginal revenue, and effective marginal cost curves
is illustrated in Figure 3.1. The demand curve is no longer vertical between EFC(y) and
EFC(y) + A˜. This reflects the fact that once a student is eligible for aid, an increase
in tuition will now be partially paid by the federal government until tuition reaches the
maximum aid amount.
To determine the optimal tuition, I first find where the marginal revenue curve crosses
the effective marginal cost. It is now possible for the marginal revenue to cross the effective
marginal cost between the two kinks. Under rating-based aid, tuition may be set such that
a student only receives a fraction of a college’s maximum aid amount. All optimal tuition
choices are presented in Appendix A.2.2.
76
3.5.3 Tuition Caps
For empirical reasons, tuition caps are introduced into both the attendance and rating-
based scenarios. Tuition caps are assumed to be self imposed and determined outside of
the model. In the data, tuition caps are interpreted as the sticker price of a college.
Assuming a tuition cap of T cj for each private college, the equilibrium is adjusted
in the following way. Label t∗j (b,y) as the optimal tuition without considering a tuition
cap. If the tuition cap is higher than the optimal tuition then the equilibrium tuition is not
adjusted and t j(b,y) = t∗j (b,y). If the cap is less than t∗j (b,y), the college can only charge
a maximum of the tuition cap. However, with this limited tuition, admitting the student
may no longer be beneficial to the college. A college determines if admitting the student
is beneficial by comparing the effective marginal cost of the student to the tuition cap. If
the tuition cap is larger than the effective marginal cost, then the student is admitted and
t j(b,y) = T cj . Otherwise, if the effective marginal cost is larger than the tuition cap, the
student does not benefit the college and the student is not admitted.
3.6 QUANTITATIVE MODEL SPECIFICATIONS AND CALIBRATION
In this section, the remaining functional form assumptions are outlined, a number
of parameters are set using the data, and the remaining parameters are calibrated. The
parameters set a priori are summarized in Table 3.1 and the calibrated parameters are
summarized in Table 3.2.
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3.6.1 Functional Form Assumptions
The functional forms that have not yet been set are the objective function of the public
colleges, the quality function, the variable cost function of colleges, and the completion
function.
Public colleges are assumed to maximize an objective that is aligned with the students.
The success function of the students is equal to
o(q j,b,y) = q
c(q j,b,y)ω1
j b
c(q j,b,y)ω2.
This term, which appears in the student’s utility function, is the achievement a student
would receive if they were to complete college, adjusted by the completion probability of
that student. The interpretation is that colleges want to provide a high level of education
and graduate many students.
The education quality is assumed to follow the functional form
q(θ j,e j) = θ
γ1
j e
γ2
j .
The exponents on this function determine the relative importance of peer quality and edu-
cation spending on education quality.
The college variable cost function is assumed to follow the form used in Epple et al.
[2016]:
V (k) = v1k+ v2k2.
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3.6.1.1 Income-Ability Distribution and Completion Function I estimate the joint
student income and ability distribution, along with the completion function, using the
Geocoded 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97). The NLSY97 is a
nationally representative sample of approximately 9,000 youths who were born between
1980 and 1984. The first round of the survey took place in 1997. Subsequent rounds
of the survey have been conducted on an annual basis. Among other information, the
public version of the NLSY97 collects data on the family income, ability, and education
attainment of the survey participants. The restricted geocoded dataset contains additional
information on the college attended by each respondent.
When estimating the student distribution, I limit the initial data set to students who
have finished high school. Family income is set equal to the average family income when
a student was 16 and 17. Those who are missing one of these years are assigned the
family income of the remaining year. If an observation is missing for both years, family
income from previous years is used. The income measure is then converted to 2011 dollars.
The ability measure used is the percentile rank on the Armed Forces Qualification Test
(AFQT). Since percentile alone does not reveal any information about the actual ability
measure, I map the percentiles to student ability measures following the distribution used
in Epple et al. [2016]. A lognormal distribution with a location parameter fits the family
income data well. Once I have both the ability and income data, the correlation between
income and ability is calculated. The results of these estimates are summarized in Table
3.1.
The NLSY97 is also used to estimate the completion function. A college’s completion
rate varies with family income, the ability of the student body, and college quality. To esti-
mate how completion is related to each of these variables, the following probit regression
is performed:
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Prob(Ci, j = 1) =Φ(β0+β1yi+β2bi+β3q j) (3.5)
Equation (3.5) is also the completion function functional form used in the model. Ci, j
takes on a value of one if the student i completed college j within six years and zero
otherwise. Since the last available year of data is 2014, I restrict the sample to students
that first attended college in 2008 or before. The independent variables yi, bi, and q j
represent the family income of student i, ability of student i, and the quality of college
j. Family income and student ability are determined using the method described above.
College quality is calculated following the function outlined in Section 3.6.1. I use the
Delta Cost Project data set to obtain information on the average expenditure per student,
e j, and average SAT score, θ j, for every college a student in my sample attends. Average
expenditure is converted to 2011 dollars. The average SAT score is converted to average
AFQT percentile using information from students in the NLSY97 who report both a AFQT
score and an SAT score. This converted score is then transformed into average ability.
This conversion ensures that individual student ability and average college ability are in
the same units.
The parameter values of the completion function are reported in Table 3.1. The com-
plete regression table is in Appendix A.4.
3.6.2 A Priori Parameters
The parameters set a priori fall into four categories: market variable, tuition limits,
government aid, and quality parameters. All of these variables, with the exception of
public tuition, are determined following the example of Epple et al. [2016].14
14Public tuition doesn’t follow Epple et al. [2016] since that model does not include public tuition diffe-
rentiated by family income.
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Table 3.1: A Priori Parameters
Market Variables
Number of Public Colleges 2
Number of Public Colleges 5
Tuition Limits($000s)
Public Tuition By Income Quartile 7, 8, 9, 10
Private Tuition Caps 26, 28, 30, 32, 34
Government Aid($000s)
Public Per-student Subsidy 6.6
Maximum Federal Aid 7.25
Quality Parameters
γ1 .85
γ2 .14
Student Distribution
Income Distribution ln(y+15,700)∼ N(10.952,0.618)
Ability Distribution ln(b)∼ N(1.0,0.15)
Ability-Income Correlation 0.3307
Completion Function Parameters
β0 -2.4060
β1 .0014
β2 .4118
β3 .3502
3.6.2.1 Market Variables The total number of colleges is assumed to be seven. Of
these, two are public and five are private. The public colleges are assumed to be exactly
the same while the private colleges are differentiated by their endowments and tuition caps.
3.6.2.2 Tuition Limits Public college tuition is set so that tuition minus federal aid is
in line with the net tuition levels observed in the data. The net tuition in the 2011-2012
school year for full-time public four-year institutions was $0 for the lowest income quar-
tile, $2,325 for the second quartile, $6,417 for the third quartile, and was $8,346 for the
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forth quartile [College Board, 2014]. To match these net tuition values, gross tuition va-
lues of $7,000, $8,000, $9,000, and $10,000, respectively, are chosen. The private college
tuition caps are set to match the sticker prices at private universities. According to Desro-
chers and Hurlburt [2014], the average sticker price at private research universities in 2011
was $32,400. Using this as a guide, the private college tuition caps are set to be $28,000,
$30,000, $32,000, $34,000, and $36,000.
3.6.2.3 Government Aid The public college subsidy given by the state government
is set to be equal to the average state subsidy. In 2011-2012, the average public subsidy
given by state governments was $6,600 per full time equivalent [College Board, 2014].
The maximum federal aid in the model is set to be a sum of a number of government aid
programs. The maximum aid amount is based on a combination of the maximum Pell grant
amount, the maximum work study reward, and the maximum amount given in subsidized
federal loans. In the end, aid is determined by the following formula: Federal Aid = Grants
+ .33 Work Study+ .1 Loans. This formula yields a number close to $7,250.
To approximate the expected family contribution formula, I use the 2011-2012 Ex-
pected Family Contribution Worksheet A to determine EFC(y) for each student. I assume
students make no income and are a part of a four member household with one student in
college. I assume the contribution from assets is 7% when income is above $50,000 and
$0 otherwise. Further, I assume the state allowance is equal to the median state allowance
of 5% of income under $15,000 and 4% of income above $15,000.
3.6.2.4 Quality Parameters Following Epple et al. [2016], education quality parame-
ters γ1 and γ2 are set to be 0.85 and 0.14, respectively. These variables are set to ensure
the relative importance of education expenditure and student ability are comparable with
financial aid regressions.
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Table 3.2: Calibrated Values
Utility Parameters
ρ 11.45
ω1,ω2 1.05,.85
ν ($000s) 3
q0 2.45
Cost Function Parameters
F ($000s) .25
v1,v2 2, 40
D3,D4,D5,D6,D7 ($000s) .0048, .0070, .0103, .0186, .0754
3.6.3 Calibration and Baseline Results
A number of parameters are determined through calibration. The parameters ρ , ω1,
ω2, q0, ν , F , v1, v2, D3, D4, D5, D6, and D7 are chosen such that (i) the average private
tuition is $27,900, (ii) total enrollment of students is 42%, (iii) Share of private college
enrollment is 33%, (iv) custodial costs are about 60% of all costs on average, and (v)
endowment spending per student is equal to $155, $243, $386, $755, and $4,149 in each
of the five private colleges.15 The utility parameters ρ,ω1,ω2,q0,ν are closely tied to
the first three targets; cost parameters F,v1,v2 are tied to the average custodial share; and
endowment values are tied to the average endowment per student. The calibration targets
and the calibrated values are summarized in Table 3.2.
15The average tuition and fees a private nonprofit universities during the 2011-2012 school year was
$27,883 (Trends in College Pricing, College Board, 2014, Table 2) Data for the percent of total enrollment
and private college enrollment was obtained from the 2012 NCES Digest of Education Statistics. The en-
rollment of students is assumed to be the percentage of recent high school graduates enrolled in a four-year
college. The percent of students enrolled in private colleges is calculated from the number of FTE students
at private nonprofit and public four-year universities. The average custodial cost is taken from Epple et al.
[2006]. The per student endowment targets are obtained from the average endowment spending at different
quality private universities.
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Table 3.3: Baseline Model Results
Calibration Targets
Data Baseline
Enrollment 42% 42%
Percent of Public Students 67% 67%
Average Private Tuition 27.9 27.9
Average Custodial Share 60% 55%
Private College Endowment per Student
.144, .226, .359,
.702, 3.859
.143, .224, .355,
.703, 3.856
Additional Moments Not Targeted
Data Baseline
Public Completion Rate 57.2% 50.9%
Private Completion Rate 65.5% 73.0%
Fraction Receiving Federal Aid (Public) 45.8% - 71.4%* 51.2%
Fraction Receiving Federal Aid (Private) 37.8% - 74.9%* 52.4%
Average Public Tuition 8.28 8.82
Average Price Cap 32 31.5
Average Institutional Aid (Private) 4.1 3.6
Average Federal Aid (Public)** 3.8 - 8.8* 5.7
Average Federal Aid (Private)** 4 - 11.8* 6.7
*Any Federal Aid **Conditional on Positive Aid
Table 3.4: Baseline College Results
j k j θ j e j q j Mean t j Mean A¯ j(b,y) Mean y Mean c(q j,b,y)
1 0.1409 2.905 6.01 3.182 8.815 2.90 85.06 50.92%
2 0.1409 2.905 6.01 3.182 8.815 2.90 85.06 50.92%
3 0.0333 3.281 14.22 3.981 24.924 3.65 125.23 69.42%
4 0.0311 3.313 15.41 4.059 26.476 3.62 130.15 71.04%
5 0.0289 3.347 16.57 4.137 28.021 3.57 136.08 72.69%
6 0.0265 3.391 17.94 4.230 29.736 3.46 144.26 74.67%
7 0.0196 3.558 21.01 4.505 32.719 2.93 165.49 80.38%
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The model is able to closely approximate all calibration targets. To further test the
model, important statistics that were not calibrated are compared with data to verify that
the model is able to produce statistics that resemble the real world. The statistics used for
verification are completion rate in public and private colleges, fraction of students recei-
ving aid in public and private colleges, average public tuition, average federal aid in public
and private colleges, average tuition cap in private colleges, and average institutional aid
in private colleges. The results of this comparison are presented in Table 3.3.
The model is able to produce statistics very close to the checks found in the data. The
percentage of students receiving federal aid in the model is closer to the percentage of
students receiving a Pell grant than to the percentage of students receiving any federal aid
found in the data. The same is true for the average amount of aid. The completion rate
predicted in the model is lower for public colleges and higher for private colleges.
Table 3.4 displays the results of the calibration for each college. Colleges 1 and 2
are public colleges and colleges 3-7 are private colleges. Private colleges labeled with
a higher number correspond to colleges with larger endowments and higher tuition caps.
The baseline calibration shows that colleges with higher endowments enroll fewer students
and the students they do enroll on average have higher income. In addition, average abi-
lity, expenditure per student, and average completion is higher in colleges with a larger
endowment.
In summary, public colleges are less selective than private colleges. This is evident
from the fact that students from all ability deciles attend public college while no students
below the median ability attend any private college. Further, as colleges increase in quality
they become more selective. The highest quality private college only admits students from
the top two ability deciles while the lowest quality private college admits students in the
top four ability deciles. Private colleges charge more tuition as income increases, since
wealthier students are able to pay more. Further, higher ability students pay less in tuition.
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Figure 3.2: Attendance Probability by Student Type
Colleges value the high ability students and choose to lower tuition to entice these students
to matriculate. Higher quality colleges charge a higher tuition. Baseline tuition and student
attendance choices are displayed in Appendix A.4.
The calibration of the model also results in an equilibrium where almost all types of
students are able to attend some college. Lower ability students are only able to attend
the lower quality public colleges while high ability students can choose from public and
private colleges. Figure 3.2 shows that the overall attendance probability by income and
ability produced by the model very closely resembles the probabilities seen in the NLSY
97 data.
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3.7 POLICY DISCUSSION
Section 3.7.1 simulates the impact of a change from the attendance-based federal aid
to a rating-based federal aid based on outcomes, affordability, or access. Section 3.7.2
discusses increases in the maximum amount of federal aid available. Section 3.7.3 finds
the rating policy that maximizes the average welfare of potential students.
3.7.1 Policy Simulation
Each rating is modeled to be a linear function that takes the following form:
υ(q j, t j(b,y),b,y) = χ1+χ2 ·Measure j.
Measure j is the variable used to measure either outcomes, affordability, or access. I use
choose completion probability to measure outcomes, tuition charged to each student type
to measure affordability, and an indicator that gives a value of 1 if the student is under
the median income to measure access. In order to make the policies comparable between
measures, χ1 and χ2 are chosen such that, before the policy change, the average rating
and the difference between the minimum and maximum rating is the same for all three
measures.16
To obtain a budget neutral policy change, I increase the maximum amount of aid and
adjust the rating intensity κ to ensure that each policy change results in the same federal
tax rate.17
16The average rating is computed by weighting by the number of students who attend each college. For
the affordability-based rating, since public colleges are unable to change their tuition, the average and range
is calculated only considering private colleges.
17In terms of the model I fix a A˜ > A¯. When ϒ < 1 raising κ lowers the total amount of aid and the tax
rate, while lowering κ increases the total amount of aid and the tax rate.
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Table 3.5: Effect of Policy Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Outcome Affordability AccessRating Rating Rating
Average Completion Rate (Public) 50.92% 51.79% 51.00% 50.35%
Average Completion Rate (Private) 73.00% 73.83% 73.16% 73.47%
Average Price Cap 31.54 31.47 31.45 31.46
Average Private Tuition 27.92 29.01 27.30 28.42
Average Institutional Aid 3.62 2.46 4.15 3.04
Average State Tuition 8.82 9.00 8.87 8.78
Accessibility of Public Colleges* 40.11% 32.77% 38.24% 43.91%
Accessibility of Private Colleges* 6.05% 9.96% 11.04% 13.64%
Total Enrollment 42% 39% 42% 41%
Share of Students in Public College 67% 65% 68% 68%
Average Federal Aid (Public) 5.66 4.35 5.85 5.23
Average Federal Aid (Private) 6.66 10.02 6.66 6.82
Fraction Receiving Aid (Public) 51.21% 43.84% 48.90% 53.40%
Fraction Receiving Aid (Private) 52.38% 59.41% 54.52% 57.01%
Maximum Aid 7.25 12.50 12.50 12.50
Intensity 0.43 1.18 0.58
χ1 -0.161 2.066 0.328
χ2 1.358 -0.0513 1.358
Average Rating Public 0.54 1.00 0.79
Average Rating Private 0.84 0.67 0.47
Change in Average Student Cost (Public) 1.18 0.09 0.07
Change in Average Student Cost (Private) -1.37 -0.76 0.10
State Tax Rate 2.61% 2.38% 2.65% 2.60%
Federal Tax Rate 1.83% 1.83% 1.83% 1.83%
*The accessibility of a college is measured by the percentage of the students who are below median
income.
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3.7.1.1 Results for Outcome-Based Rating The results of the outcome-based policy
change are presented in Column 2 of Table 3.5. Under the outcome-based aid system, the
average completion rate in the public colleges and private colleges increases by 0.87 and
0.84 percentage points, respectively. However, changing the aid to be based on completion
hurts the other two policy goals. The average tuition charged by public colleges increases
$180 and average tuition charged by private colleges increases $1,090. Further, the overall
number of low income students who attend college decreases.
The relatively small increase to the average completion rate at both types of colleges
is a result of the colleges’ limited ability to increase the completion rate. To increase the
average completion rate, a college must either increase quality or alter the composition of
their student body. Independent of the federal aid policy in effect, since college quality is
in the objective function, both types of colleges benefit from having high quality. There-
fore, under the attendance-based aid system colleges already would have adopted policies
aimed to increase college quality. Then, when the federal aid switches to an outcome-
based system, colleges are not able to greatly increase their completion rate by increasing
educational quality, since any feasible change that greatly increases educational quality
would have been adopted under the attendance-based aid system. Student selection also
can only potentially result in minor changes to a college’s completion rate. The best way
to increase the completion rate through selection is to admit more students with a high
completion probability. However, almost all of these students are already attending some
college. Taking a student with a high completion probability from another college will
not result in a higher average completion rate among all colleges. The gains in average
completion rate must come from changes in enrollment to the few students with a high
completion probability who are not attending college or by limiting enrollment of students
with a low completion rate.
The private colleges respond to the outcome-based aid by changing their enrollment
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decisions in two ways. First, private colleges admit fewer low ability students. Second,
private colleges increase tuition. Colleges use the additional tuition to increase their edu-
cational expenditure. Together these two changes increase education quality and raise the
completion rate for all students.
Public colleges do not change their admission decisions much in response to the po-
licy; the same type of students are admitted before and after the rating introduction. The
admission changes made by private colleges positively impact the average completion rate
of public college as many of the lower ability students that private colleges no longer ad-
mit decide to attend public colleges. Though these students were the low ability students
in private colleges, they have higher ability than the average student in public colleges.
The inflow of these students raises the average ability of the public colleges. In the end,
the education quality of public college increases as well and results in a higher average
completion rate.
Basing federal aid on completion results in private colleges receiving a higher rating
than public colleges. A student who chooses to go to a private college will receive more
federal aid than before. The higher quality private colleges become more affordable for
poorer students and many students who would have gone to a public college now decide
to attend a private college. At the same time, public colleges are now less affordable for
low income students. Moreover, low income students who are not accepted into private
colleges are more likely to choose the outside option over a public college. In sum, the
change results in private colleges enrolling a higher percentage of low income students
and public colleges enrolling a lower percentage of low income students, meaning that the
total number of low income students attending college decreases.
Overall the completion-based rating system results in the total number of potential
students who graduate decreasing from 24.5 percent to 23.4 percent. Though less federal
money is going to students who will drop out, overall the number of students who are
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graduating from college is smaller. This result illustrates the importance of choosing the
correct measure of achievement. If the government made this policy to try to increase the
total number of college graduates, a rating based on the completion rate will not meet this
goal. By basing aid on the completion rate, there is no importance placed on the quantity
of students enrolled. In response to this rating, colleges decide to enroll fewer students
and the overall number of college graduates declines.
3.7.1.2 Results for Affordability-Based Rating The results of the affordability-based
policy change are presented in Column 3 of Table 3.5. Under the affordability-based rating
system, the average private college tuition decreases by $620 while the average public
tuition is virtually unchanged. The change to an affordability-based rating also affects
the completion rates and accessibility of the colleges. In public colleges, both of these
measures improve. The completion rate increases 0.17 percentage points and the percent
of students below median income increases by 4.99 percentage points. In private colleges
the completion rate increases by 0.08 percentage points and the percent of students below
median income decreases by 1.86 percentage points.
The parameters chosen result in public colleges receiving the maximum possible rating
while the private colleges receive a high rating. Private colleges become more affordable
while the cost of public colleges is virtually unchanged. Admittance decisions are very
similar to the attendance-based aid system. The decrease in cost leads to more low income
students attending private colleges.
Changing the rating to be based on average tuition for private and public colleges may
not be appropriate, since the public colleges can not change the tuition they charge to any
one student. Further, by applying the same policy change to both types of colleges, it is
hard to put a strong incentive on lowering tuition while having a budget neutral policy.
Any policy that attaches a large reward to lower tuition would give a large amount of
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aid to public colleges who have an exogenous tuition that is always at a low level. In
Appendix A.3, I consider a policy change where only the private colleges are subject to
an affordability-based rating and the public colleges federal aid is attendance-based. This
scenario is able to generate a much larger decrease in private tuition and, therefore, an
increase in affordability.
3.7.1.3 Results for Access-Based Rating The results of the access-based change are
presented in Column 4 of Table 3.5. Under the access-based rating system, the percent of
students under median income enrolled in private colleges more than doubles (increases
from 6.05% to 13.64%) and the percent of students under median income enrolled in
public colleges increases slightly (increases from 40.11% to 43.91%). The change to this
rating results in a $500 increase in tuition charged by private colleges. The completion rate
increases by 0.47 percentage points in private colleges and decreases by 0.57 percentage
points in public colleges.
Both college types respond to the policy change by admitting low income students that
previously would not have been admitted. The private colleges further change their enrol-
lment decisions and deny admittance to some high income students that were previously
admitted. These two decisions result in a large increase in the percentage of low income
students in private colleges. The denied students who would have attended private college
change their enrollment decisions and attend public colleges. Public colleges receive an
inflow of two types of students: the newly admitted low income students and the displaced
high income students. The effect of these two groups entering public colleges offsets and
the percent of low income students in public colleges increases slightly.
The private colleges charge a higher tuition to the remaining rich students. This additi-
onal charge is necessary to subsidize the entry of the newly admitted low income students
who are unable to pay high levels of tuition.
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3.7.2 Maximum Aid Change
Under the current attendance-based federal aid system, increases in the maximum aid
amount are met with increases in tuition. Private colleges respond to an increase in aid
by raising tuition since an increase in tuition is met with a one-to-one increase in aid.
Students are happy to pay the higher tuition since the cost is actually paid by the federal
government. Under a rating-based system this is no longer true for two reasons. First,
students at most can only receive a fraction of the maximum aid. The maximum amount
of aid any student could receive at college j is ϒκj A˜. A one dollar increase in A˜ will
only increase this maximum amount of aid by ϒκj A˜ and students who are eligible for the
maximum amount of aid will have to pay some portion (1−ϒκj ) of that higher tuition.
Second, under this new aid policy students can be charged a tuition in-between EFC(y)
and EFC(y) + A˜. The students being charged a tuition in this range are not receiving
the maximum amount of federal aid that a student at college j can receive. Increasing
the maximum amount of aid college j can receive will not affect these students. Under
a rating-based system colleges would be expected to raise tuition in response to an aid
change, but the magnitude of the increase should be smaller than the increase under an
attendance-based system.
When a rating-based aid system is implemented, raising the maximum aid amount in-
creases the importance of the college’s rating. When more federal aid is available, changes
in the college rating result in larger changes to student federal aid. When the amount of
aid available is large, changes in college rating are more likely to change a student’s atten-
dance decisions. Therefore, when the maximum aid increases, colleges take further steps
to increase their rating. If changing tuition affects the rating, colleges would be expected
to further adjust tuition in response to maximum aid changes. For example, consider the
tuition-based rating system. Under this system, if a college tried to increase tuition in re-
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sponse to an aid change, the college rating would decrease and the maximum aid amount a
student would receive may also decrease. If the rating responds to tuition changes, raising
tuition in response to an aid change could drive students away and lower the total amount
of tuition collected.
I simulate the effect of increasing and decreasing the maximum federal aid available
under the baseline and the three rating systems. I run scenarios that increase and decrease
the maximum aid amount by 10 and 20 percent. The effect on tuition is presented in Table
3.6 while the effect on other variables is presented in Appendix A.4.
Under the attendance-based and outcome-based aid system, increases in the maximum
amount of federal aid are met with increases in tuition. The magnitude of the tuition re-
sponse under the attendance-based aid system is similar to the findings in Epple et al.
[2016]. Surprisingly, the tuition increases under the outcome-based aid system are slig-
htly larger than under the attendance-based system. Tuition is raised in the outcome-based
system for two reasons. First, the rating received by private colleges is high. As a result,
students who are eligible for aid only pay a small portion of any tuition increase. Second,
colleges choose to increase completion by increasing the amount spent on education. To
increase education spending, private colleges must charge a higher tuition. The combined
effects result in private colleges responding to a maximum aid increase by increasing tui-
tion more than they would under an attendance-based aid system. Under both attendance
and outcome-based aid, the majority of the tuition increase comes from increases to the
tuition for students receiving federal aid. These students only pay a fraction of any tuition
increase and therefore are less likely to change their attendance decisions when tuition is
increased.
Tuition does not increase following an increase of maximum aid under the affordability
and access-based ratings. The incentives put in place by the affordability and access-based
rating cancel out the incentive to increase average tuition and capture more federal aid
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Table 3.6: Average Private Tuition Under Different Maximum Aid Levels
20%
lower aid
10%
lower aid Baseline
10%
higher aid
20%
higher aid
Attendance-Based 27.68 27.81 27.92 28.02 28.12
–Not Receiving Aid 29.28 29.34 29.36 29.38 29.41
–Receiving Aid 26.09 26.36 26.61 26.84 27.03
Outcome-Based 28.66 28.86 29.01 29.14 29.28
–Not Receiving Aid 30.45 30.60 30.65 30.67 30.66
–Receiving Aid 27.29 27.60 27.89 28.14 28.40
Affordability-Based 27.50 27.42 27.30 27.22 27.27
–Not Receiving Aid 30.32 30.11 29.90 29.54 29.30
–Receiving Aid 24.95 25.07 25.13 25.32 25.60
Access-Based 28.46 28.44 28.42 28.32 28.35
–Not Receiving Aid 31.26 31.33 31.42 31.55 31.41
–Receiving Aid 25.98 26.07 26.16 26.14 26.37
money. Under the affordability-based rating, the lack of a tuition increase is a result of two
different tuition responses. The affordability rating puts pressure on the college to reduce
tuition for all types of students. For the students receiving aid, the increase in available aid
makes colleges want to raise tuition to capture the new money available. In the end, those
receiving aid actually do have their tuition raised slightly while those not receiving aid
have their tuition reduced. The average tuition levels decrease slightly. Under an access-
based rating system, the average tuition for both those receiving and those not receiving
aid increases slightly. However, tuition still decreases since the private colleges enroll
more low income students. The decrease in overall tuition comes from the increase in the
proportion of low income students who pay a tuition rate less than the average tuition.
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Table 3.7: Student Welfare Change by Income and Ability Quartile
Income Quartiles
1 2 3 4 All
Outcome Rating
A
bi
lit
y
Q
ua
rt
ile
s
1 16 87 155 243 33
2 18 1 312 746 68
3 -40 -573 389 161 -79
4 -101 -254 1886 964 417
All -4 -177 787 627 77
outcome-based rating
1 -3 -19 -34 -68 -7
2 -4 25 -5 -129 -4
3 -3 229 137 -960 -3
4 30 559 442 -1535 -4
All 0 175 166 -956 -5
Access Rating
1 0 2 4 -93 0
2 -86 -385 475 -628 -104
3 -86 -524 21 -1197 -234
4 -149 -216 -519 -1196 -392
All -53 -282 -40 -970 -136
Each cell in this table shows the amount of income the average student of that type would have to receive to
be indifferent between the baseline scenario and the policy change. Positive numbers indicate that students
prefer the policy change and negative numbers indicate that students prefer the baseline.
3.7.3 Optimal Rating
After exploring how the policy changes alter the incentives, a natural question to ask
is, ”What policy should be implemented?” Table 3.7 shows the welfare effect of each
policy change on different types of students. This table reveals that the outcome-based
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rating improves overall welfare, the access-based rating lowers overall welfare, and the
affordability-based rating has a small negative effect on overall welfare. The increase to
average welfare from the completion rating comes from an increase to the well being of
wealthy students. These students are not displaced because of the policy change and bene-
fit from the increase in education quality. The affordability change, though it has virtually
no average welfare effect, improves the welfare of low income students and lowers the
welfare of high income students. The increase in affordability helps the low income stu-
dents attend college. The high income students do not benefit much from the affordability
increase and are hurt by the decrease in educational quality.
Basing a rating entirely on one area of interest seems to hurt the other areas the pro-
posal hopes to improve. It is possible that the best rating to use may be a combination of
multiple measures. I consider a new individual rating that is a convex combination of the
outcome rating, outcome-based rating, and access rating.
I create a grid of possible weights and calculate the welfare of each rating combination.
For every choice of weights the rating intensity κ is chosen to ensure that this new policy
change is budget neutral for the federal government. Performing this exercise reveals that
the policy that maximizes welfare is the rating system where full weight is place on the
outcome rating. The outcome-based rating system maximizes the welfare of the potential
students since increasing the outcome rating helps those who choose to attend college the
most. By increasing the outcome rating, the educational quality increases and the decision
to enter college becomes less risky for all students. When combining the outcome rating
with other ratings, the addition of the other ratings weaken the incentive to increase the
completion rate and the welfare gain is not as great.
Though the outcome-based rating maximizes the overall utility, it doesn’t meet all the
goals of the proposal. Specifically, the outcome rating results in reduced affordability in
private colleges and reduced access in public colleges. Using the model, ratings can be
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combined in order to find a rating that can simultaneously satisfy all of the proposal’s
goals.
3.8 CONCLUSION
A quantitative equilibrium model of the market for college education with the pos-
sibility of non-completion is employed to simulate the effect of tying a student’s federal
financial aid to the performance of the college in which she chooses to enroll. A ra-
ting system that can take on many specifications is introduced into the theoretical model.
Rating-based aid systems that are based on average completion rate, average tuition, and
percent of student body below median income are explicitly considered.
The policy simulations reveal three main findings. First, basing college ratings heavily
on one area of focus results in colleges making decisions that hurt other areas of concern.
This was true when college aid was based on the completion rate, average tuition, and the
accessibility of the college. For example, basing aid on the completion rate only modestly
increased the completion rate but lowered the affordability of colleges and also resulted in
fewer low income students attending college.
Second, the rating-based aid systems result in an overall increase in welfare when
outcomes play a large role in determining the rating. Basing aid entirely on completion
maximizes the average welfare of the students. I further show that each of these aid chan-
ges have different distributional effects. The outcome-based rating system increases the
welfare of the high income students and lowers the welfare of the low income students. On
the other hand, the affordability-based rating raises the welfare of the low income students
and lowers the welfare of the high income students.
Third, I show that while the outcome-based rating system maximizes the overall wel-
98
fare of the economy, it still had many of the problems of the original attendance-based aid
system. Specifically, under both the attendance-based system and the outcome-based ra-
ting system, when the maximum aid amount increases, there is great incentive for colleges
to respond by increasing tuition. This characteristic makes it difficult for the federal go-
vernment to increase affordability by expanding aid. The proposed aid systems that base
aid on tuition and access remove the incentive to match federal aid increases with incre-
ases in tuition. Under these rating-based systems, reducing tuition increases the rating.
Therefore, when these systems are in place, the incentive to increase tuition that arises
following an expansion of aid is canceled out by the increased incentive to lower tuition.
It follows that increasing federal support under these two systems does not lead to an in-
crease in college tuition and translates to an increase in affordability. This finding shows
that a rating-based system, if designed correctly, could be implemented to eliminate the
incentive to increase tuition following an expansion of federal aid.
This model can be modified to study the use of performance-based payment methods
in other publicly provided services. Beyond education funding, the federal government
has also began giving bonuses to certain medical providers based on their ability to limit
the cost incurred by Medicare patients. A model such as the one developed here, can
explore how this payment scheme will effect hospitals and patients.
From a broader perspective, this paper shows that while basing federal aid on college
rating will change the behavior of colleges, if these ratings are not designed properly
they can incentivize colleges to take actions that are not preferred by the policy maker.
Therefore, it is important to analyze how a college will attempt to achieve a high rating.
Once the likely response is identified, this response can be compared with the goals of the
policymaker. This exercise will facilitate the decision of whether or not to use a particular
rating system.
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4.0 ALLOCATING FUNDING BETWEEN DIFFERENT
LEVELS OF EDUCATION: A MAJORITY VOTING RESULT
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Standard models of public provision of education typically focus on one level of edu-
cation. However, in reality the education budget of many governments is split between
different levels of education, each attended by different groups of people. Heterogeneity
among individuals leads to conflicting preferences as to which education allocation is most
desirable. The existing models cannot easily be used to explain how a society would split a
public education budget between two levels of education spending. In this paper, I present
a majority voting model which supports multiple levels of publicly provided education
spending. The model illustrates the tradeoffs that exist when choosing how to allocate
resources between different levels of education and has predictions about why different
societies may choose different education fund allocations. Further, the predictions made
by the model match the pattern found in the data.
The standard public goods framework can be adopted to explain the existence of pu-
blic provision of funds for primary and secondary education. However, a departure from
this framework is necessary to explain the existence of public provision of funds for post-
secondary education. In primary and secondary education, virtually all individuals are able
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to receive the benefits from public spending. This statement is not true for post-secondary
education. Barriers to entry in post-secondary education prevent some students from be-
nefiting from public post-secondary education funding. One barrier exists because public
post-secondary funding typically isn’t complete. If a student attends a public primary and
secondary school, almost all of the education expenses are paid by the government. Ho-
wever, if a student chooses to attend a public post-secondary school, the funding received
is usually only a fraction of the total tuition. In other words, the post-secondary education
cost is partially subsidized while the primary and secondary education cost is paid entirely
by the government.
Due to the partial subsidization of post-secondary education, there is a financial bar-
rier to attending a post-secondary institution that does not exist in primary and secondary
institutions. This financial barrier prevents low income students who would like to receive
post-secondary education from enrolling in college. If low income students are unable
to attend post-secondary institutions, then spending on primary and secondary education
benefits poor students more than equivalent spending on post-secondary education. In ad-
dition, the tax revenue used to fund education is usually based on property value or income
which is larger for rich people than poor people. Since the cost of primary and secondary
education is shared between all those who attend primary and secondary school, rich fa-
milies generally pay, in absolute amounts, more for primary and secondary education than
poor families. In fact, prior research has found that education spending on post-secondary
education acts as a transfer from the poor to the rich while education spending on primary
and secondary acts as a transfer from the rich to the poor.1
Since this tension exists, in a framework where agents vote to decide how to split edu-
1As noted in Fernandez and Rogerson [1995], primary and secondary education spending being a transfer
from the rich to the poor is documented in Glomm and Ravikumar [1992] and Saint-Paul and Verdier [1993].
Post-Secondary education spending being a transfer from the poor to the rich is documented in Bishop [1977]
and Hansen and Weisbrod [1969].
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cation funds, it is not clear how much funding each level of education would receive. To
explore how a society would choose to split education funds when these conflicting intere-
sts exist, I develop a model of public provision of education which contains two levels of
education. The two levels are modeled after the education system in the United States. The
lower level of education is primary and secondary education and the higher level of educa-
tion is post-secondary education. In the model, agents are distinguished by their income.
These agents make decisions about whether or not to attend post-secondary education and
also vote on how many public funds to allocate to post-secondary education. The total
amount of public funds is exogenously given, only the split is decided by the agents. The
model assumes that expenditure on lower levels of education increases the return to higher
levels of education. This makes individuals of all incomes desire spending on lower levels
of education. Expenditure on higher levels of education lowers the individual cost of hig-
her education. Higher levels of education may only be partially funded. In this case, some
agents many not be able to afford the remaining cost of post-secondary education.
Using the model, I explore how the choice to attend college changes for different in-
come groups, as public education funds are shifted away from the lower level of education
to higher levels of education. I then examine how the utility of the agents evolve as the
split in education funds changes. Using this information, I am able to determine what
education allocations could potentially be a majority voting equilibria.
Further, I propose an explanation as to why some societies would spend a higher pro-
portion of education funds on post-secondary education. I show that different distributions
of income lead to different education funding splits. Specifically, when a state experien-
ces higher income inequality, a majority of the agents desire a higher amount of spending
on post-secondary education when compared to states with less income inequality. This
relationship exists since higher income agents are able to team up with the middle income
agents to extract resources from the poor. However, when income inequality becomes
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too large, rich individuals would rather fund primary and secondary education in order to
maximize the return to college. At very high levels of inequality, the rich do not want
to subsidize the middle class’s post-secondary education. This leads to the rich agents
using the poor agent’s preference for less college funding to shift funding away from post-
secondary education back to primary and secondary education.
I turn to the data to test the implications of my model. Using state level data from
1977 until 2010, I examine how the allocation of education funds is related to the income
distribution. The data show that the education allocation ranking between states is sta-
ble throughout time. Further, I find evidence that within a state income inequality and
education fund allocation has an inverted U-shape as predicted by the model.
Previous literature has presented majority voting models which focus on one level of
education, but none consider the allocation of funding between two levels of schooling.
Papers discussing voting models of lower levels of education include Epple and Romano
[1996b], Glomm and Ravikumar [1992], and Saint-Paul and Verdier [1993].
Explaining the existence of funding for post-secondary education requires a departure
from the traditional public good models. The traditional arguments for public provision
of education are centered around the idea of a redistribution from the rich to the poor.
Therefore, one would expect public education funding to focus mostly on funding of pri-
mary and secondary education. Some models use externalities or other factors to explain
why a society would desire post-secondary education spending. Fernandez and Rogerson
[1995] have shown how a partially subsidized education system can lead to post-secondary
education spending and a transfer from the poor to the rich without the presence of any
externalities. The basic setup of my model most closely resembles this paper.
These papers focus either entirely on one form of education or on total education ex-
penditure. They do not consider a model with both lower levels of education and higher
levels of education. Given this limitation, previous literature does not consider how incre-
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asing spending on one level of education affects other levels. When expanding to a model
with multiple levels of education, it is not immediately obvious if an economy would
choose to move funding away from lower education, which benefits everyone, to higher
education, which only benefits a fraction of the society. Furthermore, it is not clear why
some states would choose to heavily subsidize higher education while other would choose
to only spend a small amount of their education budget on higher education.
The rest of the paper proceeds in the following fashion: in Section 4.2, I setup a
model which allows for multiple levels of education spending. After the setup, I analyze
how each group’s utility changes when the education allocation changes. In Section 4.3,
I explore potential majority voting equilibria. In Section 4.4, I use the model to explain
how changing the income distribution results in a shift of education funds from one level
of education to the other. In Section 4.5, I present data on how states allocate education
funds between primary and secondary education and post-secondary education. I explore
how the income distribution and other state specific factors affect spending on different
education levels within state. Specifically, I change the income distribution and show that
the model’s dynamics resemble the dynamics found in the data. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 MODEL
In this section, I first setup the framework of the model. Section 4.2.2 solves the model
assuming that the education allocation is fixed. Section 4.2.3 explores how the decisions
of the agents change as the education allocation changes. The majority voting education
allocation is determined in Section 4.3.
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4.2.1 Setup
In order to gain insight on how a state allocates education funds, a model with two
types of education is developed.
Consider an economy with three types of agents, differentiated by their income. The
three types of agents are high income (type 1), middle income (type 2), and low income
(type 3). For simplicity (and without loss of generality), the measure of all agents is
normalized to 1. The income level and the proportion of a type i agent is given by yi and
λi, respectfully. Let µ denote the average income of all individuals in the economy.
Agents gain utility from consumption and human capital attainment. Utility from
consumption is assumed to be linear. Human capital can be attained from two levels of
education. The two levels are designed to resemble the education levels in the United Sta-
tes. The first level of education is called “primary and secondary” or lower level education.
Primary and secondary education is compulsory and is fully funded through taxation. The
second level of education is called “post-secondary”, higher level education, or simply
college. Post-secondary education is subsidized by the government but may not be fully
funded. In addition, this level of schooling is not compulsory. Agents of the model choose
whether or not to attend post-secondary school.
The utility gained from human capital is denoted by the function H(σ ,y,s). Human
capital varies with the amount of public primary and secondary funding σ , the agent’s
income y, and the post-secondary schooling decision s. The schooling decision s is a
binary variable which takes the value of one if an agent attends college and zero if an
agent does not attend college. Below I make some simple assumptions about the human
capital function
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Assumption 8. (Human Capital Function Derivatives)
Hσ (σ ,y,s)> 0 and Hy(σ ,y,s)> 0
Hσσ (σ ,y,s)≤ 0 and Hyy(σ ,y,s)≤ 0
Hyσ (σ ,y,s)≥ 0
This assumption states that increasing lower school funding or having a higher in-
come increases the human capital of an agent. Further, the human capital function has
non-increasing returns in lower school funding and parental income. Finally, it is assu-
med lower school spending and parental income are complements in the human capital
function.
Throughout the paper, the difference in human capital H(σ ,y,1)−H(σ ,y,0) is refer-
red to as the human capital premium. The next assumption outlines the properties of the
human capital premium.
Assumption 9. (Human Capital Premium Assumptions)
H(σ ,y,1)−H(σ ,y,0)≥ 0
Hσ (σ ,y,1)−Hσ (σ ,y,0)> 0
Hy(σ ,y,1)−Hy(σ ,y,0)> 0
It is assumed the human capital premium is weakly positive. Attending college can
never lower an agent’s human capital. Further, the assumption states that the human ca-
pital premium is increasing in lower school funding. Primary and secondary education
is a complement to post-secondary education. Spending more on lower school education
increases the return to higher school education. In addition, the human capital premium
is increasing in an agent’s income. An interpretation of this assumption could be that a
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larger initial income is correlated with more spending on education early in a child’s life.
This allows the child to excel in all levels of school.
To fund education, a portion of every agent’s income is taxed. The tax rate is exoge-
nously given and is denoted as θ . The amount of funds available for education expenditure
is equal to the tax rate times the average income, θµ . A majority vote determines τ , how
much of the tax pool is spent on the post-secondary subsidy. The amount spent on the
post-secondary subsidy is τθµ and the amount spent on primary and secondary education
is (1− τ)θµ .
The quality of primary and secondary school is determined by how much public fun-
ding is spent per student. Since the measure of students is one and all students attend
primary and secondary school, the amount spent per person on lower education is equal to
the total amount spent on primary and secondary education, σ ≡ (1− τ)θµ .
Post-secondary education is potentially only partially subsidized. The per person sub-
sidy is determined by the total amount spent on post-secondary education and the number
of students who choose to attend higher education. The total subsidy is split evenly among
all the agents who decide to attend post-secondary education. Let N(τ) be the number of
students who decide to attend college. College attendance depends on how much funding
is available for college. Consequently, the per person subsidy amount is τθµN(τ) . It is assu-
med the per capita gross cost of higher education is E. Since it is possible that the gross
cost of higher education is larger than the subsidy, in the presence of incomplete credit
markets it may not be possible for all types of agents to afford education. Type i agents
can afford to attend college if their after tax income is larger than the net cost of college,
(1−θ)yi ≥ E− τθµN(τ) .
Spending more on primary and secondary education increases the human capital recei-
ved by all agents. In addition, because higher education and lower education are assumed
to be complements, increasing the amount spent on primary and secondary education in-
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creases the return received from post-secondary education. On the other hand, increasing
the amount spent on post-secondary education decreases the cost of higher education and
potentially gives more agents the opportunity to attend college.
Given a tax split τ , an agent i chooses a mixed strategy ρi to maximize the following
problem:
max
ρi
(1−θ)yi+ρi
[
H(σ ,yi,1)− (E− τθµN(τ))
]
+(1−ρi)H(σ ,yi,0)
s.t.
ρi ·
[
(1−θ)yi− (E− τθµN(τ))
]
≥ 0
ρi ∈ [0,1]
Here ρi is equal to the probability that agent i chooses to attend college. If an agent
does not attend college he gets utility from after tax income and the human capital earned
in high school. If an agent attends college he gains utility from income remaining after
taxes and from the human capital earned in both primary and secondary school and in
post-secondary school. In addition, this agent’s utility is decreased since he has to pay the
remaining cost of college.
The individual maximization problem reveals that attending college is beneficial if the
human capital premium is larger than the net cost of attending college. The next equation
summarizes this condition.
H(σ ,yi,1)−H(σ ,yi,0)≥ E− τθµN(τ) (4.1)
I refer to Equation (4.1) as the return constraint. If this holds, an agent i will want to attend
school if he can afford college and Equation (4.2), the budget constraint is satisfied.
(1−θ)yi ≥ E− τθµN(τ) (4.2)
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The solution of the agent’s problem can be summarized as follows: An agent will choose
the maximum ρi such that both the return constraint and the budget constraint are simul-
taneously satisfied. If these constraints are never satisfied for any values of ρi, the agent
will not choose to attend college.
It is not assumed that all individuals want to go to college if they can afford to attend.
Here, by making college more affordable the value of college is decreased. This arises
because in order to increase the affordability of college, funds have to be shifted to the
college subsidy from lower school education. This creates a tradeoff between providing
access to college and increasing the return to college.
4.2.2 Attendance Equilibrium
It is important to note the subsidy amount and the decision to enter school are jointly
determined by τ . In an equilibrium, only some values of the subsidy and the college
attendance can be jointly consistent. In this section an equilibrium is defined, then to
determine what values are consistent, results about the equilibrium attendance decisions
of each income group are developed.
In the definition of equilibrium, is it necessary to specify the beliefs of all agents. In
this problem, the joint attendance decisions of all agents determine N(τ), the number of
agents who attend college. At any tax allocation, each income group chooses whether or
not to attend college. Since the subsidy is split evenly between all those who choose to
attend college, the choice to attend college for any one agent is dependent on the choices
of the other agents. The per student subsidy amount decreases as more students attend
college. It is possible that the low income group would be able to afford college if only low
income individuals choose to attend, but would not be able to afford college if individuals
from the high income group and the middle income group also choose to attend college.
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Similarly, there could be a case where students of some type i would want to attend college
if no other students of type i attended college; however, if all students of type i entered
college, the cost of college would make it such that type i students no longer would want
to attend college. In this case, if type i students didn’t realize that other type i students are
making similar choices, type i students would cycle between attending and not attending
college and there would be no equilibrium. To remove this cycle, I define the equilibrium
such that students believe all students with a common type will make the same decision.2
The formal definition of equilibrium is below.
Definition 1. Given a tax split τ , an attendance equilibrium is a set of attendance deci-
sions {ρ1,ρ2,ρ3} such that ρi (i ∈ {1,2,3}) solves the agent’s problem assuming that all
other agents of the same type also choose ρi.
The following result simplifies the problem of whether or not an individual group will
attend college.
Result 1. In an equilibrium:
1. If 0 < ρi < 1, then it must be the case that either the budget constraint or the return
constraint is binding for group i.
2. If 0 < ρi < 1 and σ 6= 0, then for any higher income group (∀k < i) ρk = 1
Proof. 1. This follows directly from the individual maximization problem. If neither
constraint is binding then agents from group i could place a little more probability on
attending college and achieve a higher return without violating either of the constraints.
2. By way of contradiction assume ρk < 1. By Part 1 of this result, for agent i either
the budget constraint or the return constraint must be binding for group i. If the return
constraint is binding for group i, by Assumption 9, the return constraint will not be binding
2This equilibrium concept follows the equilibrium concept described in Fernandez and Rogerson [1995].
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for group k. Further, group k has a higher income than group i. If the budget constraint is
satisfied for group i the budget constraint is not binding for group k.
Since the return constraint and the budget constraint are not binding, agents in group k
could place slightly more probability on attending college. This would increase ρk slightly
while still satisfying the budget constraint and the return constraint. This is true for any
value of ρk < 1. This contradicts the assumption that agents from income group k were
maximizing utility. Therefore, it must be the case that ρk = 1.
Part 1 of this result shows that the only reason all members of a certain income group
wouldn’t go to college is if increasing the probability of enrollment would result in the cost
of college being larger than the after tax income or larger than the return to college. Part 2
of the result shows that when making the decision to enter post-secondary education, in-
come groups are able to consider this decision assuming that all agents with higher income
would attend college. Using the equilibrium definition, agents know what proportion of
their own income group will choose to attend college. These pieces of information allow
agents to deduce how many students would attend college if they were to attend college.
I am now ready to describe the procedure for determining the attendance rate for any
given tax allocation. Before outlining this procedure, it is helpful to define the maximum
number of students who can afford college, A(τ). The maximum number of students who
can afford college can be found by identifying the maximum number of agents which could
satisfy the budget constraint ignoring the return constraint. Since this value ignores the
possibility of the return constraint not being satisfied, it must be the case that A(τ)≥N(τ).
Using Result 1, if an individual from group j would benefit from attending college then
an individual from group i < j would also benefit from attending college. The equilibrium
attendance rate N(τ) then can be determined by a three step procedure.3
3A more detailed description of this procedure is contained in Appendix B.1.
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1. Determine the maximum number of agents who can afford to attend college, A(τ).
When making this determination use that fact that if a lower income level can afford
to attend college then a higher income level also can afford to attend college. Label
the agents who could afford college potential attendees.
2. Check if all of the potential attendees who can afford college satisfy the return con-
straint. If this is true then N(τ) = A(τ), else proceed to step 3.
3. If there are some income groups who do not satisfy the return constraint, remove some
of the lowest income agents from the group of potential attendees until all remaining
attendees satisfy the return constraint. The proportion of agents that remains is then
equal to the attendance rate.
4.2.3 Preferred Tax Allocation
I now look at how changes in the tax allocation affect the budget constraint and the
return constraint.
Result 2. The number of agents who can afford to attend college is non decreasing in τ .
Proof. By way of contradiction, assume an increase in τ decreases the number of
students who can attend college. This means there exists a τ ′ > τ where A(τ) > A(τ ′).
However, if A(τ)> A(τ ′) there must be some agent who previously could afford to attend
college with some probability but now, at a higher tax split, can only afford to attend
college at a lower probability. In terms of the model this mean ∃ i s.t.
(1−θ)yi ≥ E− τθµA(τ)
&
(1−θ)yi < E− τ
′θµ
A(τ)
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However, this is a contradiction since
E− τθµ
A(τ)
> E− τ
′θµ
A(τ)
The budget constraint binds for less students as the post-secondary education budget is
increased. Another key factor of whether or not an income group attends post-secondary
education is whether the return to education is higher than the cost of education. To sim-
plify this problem I make the following single crossing assumption:
Assumption 10 (Single Crossing Assumption). The return to education, H(σ ,y,1)−
H(σ ,y,0) = H((1− τ)θµ,y,1)−H((1− τ)θµ,y,0), and the cost of higher education
assuming everyone who can afford higher education attends, E − τθµA(τ) , satisfy a single
crossing assumption for all income levels.
Specifically, ∀τ ≤ τn(y),
H((1− τ)θµ,y,1)−H((1− τ)θµ,y,0)≥ E− τθµ
A(τ)
and ∀τ ≥ τn(y),
H((1− τ)θµ,y,1)−H((1− τ)θµ,y,0)≤ E− τθµ
A(τ)
Eventually lower school funding drops to a point where the return from attending
college is not worth the cost of attending those schools, assuming everyone who could
afford to attend college were to attend. The assumptions on the human capital function
give us an ordering of these single crossing points. This ordering is established in Result
3. For the rest of these paper, the notation τn(y1),τn(y2), and τn(y3) is used to refer to the
single crossing points for each income level as described in the single crossing assumption
above.
Result 3. τn(y1)> τn(y2)> τn(y3)
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Proof. In this section I prove τn(y2)> τn(y3). The proof for τn(y1)> τn(y2) is identi-
cal. Assume, by way of contradiction, that τn(y2)≤ τn(y3). τn(y2) is defined such that
H((1− τn(y2))θµ,y2,1)−H((1− τn(y2))θµ,y2,0) = E− τn(y2)θµA(τn(y2)) .
By single crossing, since τn(y3)≥ τn(y2) at τn(y3)
H((1− τn(y3))θµ,y2,1)−H((1− τn(y3))θµ,y2,0)≤ E− τn(y3)θµA(τn(y3)) .
From Assumption 8 since y2 > y3
H((1− τn(y3))θµ,y3,1)−H((1− τn(y3))θµ,y3,0)<
H((1− τn(y3))θµ,y2,1)−H((1− τn(y3))θµ,y2,0)
H((1− τn(y3))θµ,y3,1)−H((1− τn(y3))θµ,y3,0) < E− τn(y3)θµA(τn(y3))
E− τn(y3)θµ
A(τn(y3))
< E− τn(y3)θµ
A(τn(y3))
A contradiction.
The previous two results illustrate what happens to the two important constraints as τ
is changed. According to Result 2, the budget constraint becomes less strict as τ is incre-
ased. When the tax allocation increases, more students can afford college. Result 3 and
the single crossing assumption show that increasing τ eventually results in the return to
college being smaller than the cost of college for some income levels. By analyzing how
these constraints change, it is possible to determine how N(τ) changes as τ changes. Spe-
cifically, N(τ) is weakly increasing in τ before τn(y3). After τn(y3), some lower income
students decide to not attend college. They make this decision since if they were to attend
college the return to college would be less than the cost of college.
114
Figure 4.1: Return to College and Cost of College
Figure 4.1 illustrates how the cost of education and return to education for each income
group. For all groups the cost of college is lower than the return for most values of τ. At
point G, the cost of college would become higher than the return to college for the low
income group. This point corresponds to τn(y3) discussed before. To the right of this
point, students from the low income group drop out of college until the cost of college is
exactly equal to the return to college. At tax allocations to the right of G, every low income
individual is indifferent between attending college or not attending college.
To the left of point G, as the tax allocation increases, the cost of college either de-
creases or remains constant. The decrease in cost occurs because the subsidy amount is
growing while the number of students attending college is staying constant. However,
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once the cost reaches a point where an income group who previously was not attending
college can afford college, the cost stays constant. While the cost is constant, the total
amount spent on college increases but the per student amount stays the same. The increase
in college spending goes towards providing a greater number of subsidies to agents who
can barely afford to attend college.
I now define notation to label the values of τ where the slope of the college cost
changes. Let τˆi be the maximum value of τ for which
(1−θ)yi <
(
E− τθµ
∑ j<iλ j
)
This is the highest value of τ such that no agents in group i could afford to attend college.
In Figure 4.1, this point is labeled B for the middle income group and D for the lowest
income group.
Define τ i to be the minimum value of τ for which
(1−θ)yi >
(
E− τθµ
∑ j≤iλ j
)
This is the smallest value of τ such that all agents in group i can afford to attend college. In
Figure 4.1, this point is labeled A for the highest income group, C for the middle income
group and F for the lowest income group.
In between τˆi and τ i, only some members of group i are able to attend higher education.
Increasing the amount of post-secondary education funds available does not make college
more affordable. Instead, more agents from group i are able to attend higher education. At
the same time, increasing the post-secondary education funds lowers the quality of primary
and secondary education. It may be possible that the decrease in utility from lower quality
of primary and secondary education is more than the corresponding increase in utility from
increasing access for group i. I label the point where these two effects are exactly equal
for group i as τe(yi).
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Holding fixed the number of agents who choose to attend college, increasing post-
secondary education funds lowers the cost of post-secondary education for all agents who
choose to attend college. However, increasing the post-secondary education funds also
lowers the quality of primary and secondary education. Define τr(yi) to be the point where
the benefit from increasing the post-secondary subsidy is exactly equal to the cost associa-
ted with moving education funds away from primary school. It follows that τr(yi) satisfies
the following equation
Hτ((1− τr(yi)θµ,yi,1) =− θµN(τr(yi))
In Figure 4.1, τr(y1) is labeled E.
Proposition 1 summarizes how the utility of each group changes as τ changes. The
proof is contained in Appendix B.2.
Proposition 1. Assume the single crossing assumption holds, then
For income 1: Utility is decreasing on (τr(y1),1]. If ∃τe(y1) s.t. 0 ≤ τe(y1) < τ1,
then for τ < τr(y1), utility is increasing on (0,τe(y1)), decreasing on (τe(y1),τ1), increa-
sing on (τ1, τˆ2), decreasing on (τˆ2,τ2), increasing on (τ2, τˆ3], decreasing on (τˆ3,τ3), and
increasing on (τ3,1]. If @τe(y1) s.t. 0≤ τe(y1)< τ1, then for τ < τr(y1), utility is increa-
sing on (0, τˆ2), decreasing on (τˆ2,τ2), increasing on (τ2, τˆ3], decreasing on (τˆ3,τ3), and
increasing on (τ3,1].
For income 2: Utility is decreasing on (τr(y2),1]. If ∃τe(y2) s.t. τˆ2 ≤ τe(y2) < τ2,
then for τ < τr(y2), utility is decreasing on [0, τˆ2), increasing on (τˆ2,τe(y2)), decreasing
on (τe(y2),τ2), increasing on (τ2, τˆ3), decreasing on (τˆ3,τ3), and increasing on (τ3,1]. If
@τe(y2) s.t. τˆ2≤ τe(y2)< τ2, then for τ < τr(y2), utility is decreasing on [0, τˆ2), increasing
on (τˆ2, τˆ3), decreasing on (τˆ3,τ3), and increasing on (τ3,1).
For income 3: Utility is decreasing on (τr(y3),1]. If ∃τe(y3) s.t. τˆ3 ≤ τe(y3)< τ3, then
for τ < τr(y3), utility is decreasing on [0, τˆ3), increasing on (τˆ3,τe(y3)), decreasing on
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Figure 4.2: Expected Utility of Income Groups
(τe(y3),τ3), and increasing on (τ3,1]. If @τe(y3) s.t. τˆ3 ≤ τe(y3)< τ3, then for τ < τr(y3),
utility is decreasing on [0, τˆ3) and increasing on (τˆ3,1).
It is not clear what tax allocation is the maximum here without specifying the parame-
ters and human capital function. Also it is obvious that in most cases preferences are not
single peaked. Figure 2 illustrates one possible evolution of the expected utilities. Notice
point B or τˆ2 is the maximum of high income agents, D or τˆ3 is the maximum of the middle
income group and The maximum utility for group 3 occurs in between point E and F.
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4.3 MAJORITY VOTING EQUILIBRIUM
I now evaluate what values of τ could be a majority voting equilibrium. I first define a
majority voting equilibrium.
Definition 2. A majority voting equilibrium is a tax distribution τ∗ such that ∀τ ∈ [0,1],
the number of agents with EUi(τ∗)≥ EUi(τ), is strictly greater than 0.5
To eliminate trivial cases the following assumption is made.
Assumption 11 (Non-Trivial Equilibria). ∀i λi < 0.5
This assumption allows us to ignore cases where one group is the majority and the
preferences of the other two groups do not matter. It follows from this assumption, that
the sum of the proportions of any two groups must be larger than 0.5. Therefore, if any
two groups have the same preferred point, this point is a majority voting equilibrium.
Result 4 helps narrow down the number of potential majority voting equilibrium can-
didates. The possible candidates are presented in Proposition 2.
Result 4. In order for τ∗ to be an equilibrium, τ∗ must be a local maximizer for at least
one of the three groups.
Proof. By way of contradiction, assume that τ∗ is not a local maximizer for any of the
three groups. If τ∗ is 0 it must be the case that all utilities are increasing at 0. Otherwise
τ∗ would be a local maximizer. When all utilities are increasing and τ∗ is 0, any τ ′ slightly
above 0 would be preferred by all members. So τ∗ can’t be 0. With similar reasoning τ∗
will not take the value of 1.
Now consider the case where τ∗ is between 0 and 1. At τ∗ group 1 either has increasing
or decreasing utility. Assume type 1 agents have increasing utility. It follows that either
both type 2 and type 3 agents have decreasing utility or at least one of them has increasing
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utility at τ∗. In either scenario, at least two groups either have increasing or decreasing
utility. If two groups have increasing utility, a tax split τ ′ that is slightly above τ∗ will
be preferred for more than fifty percent of the population. Similarly, if two groups have
decreasing utility any tax split τ ′ that is slightly below τ∗ will be preferred by more than
fifty percent of the population. Either way this is a contradiction and τ∗ can not be an
equilibrium. If group 1 has decreasing utility at τ∗, the same logic can be used to show
that τ∗ still can not be an equilibrium.
Proposition 2. If a majority voting equilibrium exists, the only possible equilibrium values
of τ are 0, τˆ3, τr(y1), and τr(y2).
Proof. According to Result 4 if a majority voting equilibrium exists it must be a local
maximizer for at least one income group. From Proposition 1, the local maximizers for
each group can be determined.
The potential local maximizers for each of the three income groups are
• Income group 1: {τˆ2, τˆ3,τr(y1)}
• Income group 2: {0,τe(y2), τˆ3,τr(y2)}
• Income group 3: {0,τe(y3),τr(y3)}
Further note that any interior τ where two groups have increasing or decreasing utility
could not be a maximum. If two groups had increasing or decreasing utility at an interior
τ , slightly increasing or decreasing τ will result in a tax split that the majority of students
prefer. Using this logic most possible candidates for equilibrium can be eliminated.
First consider τˆ2. A τ slightly smaller than τˆ2 will yield higher utility for groups 2 and
3. Therefore this can not be an equilibrium.
If τe(y2) and τe(y3) exist in between τˆ2≤ τe(y2)< τ2 and τˆ3≤ τe(y3)< τ3 then τe(y2),
and τe(y3) are local maximums for group 2 and 3. However, at these points utility for the
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other two groups are decreasing. Therefore, even if parameters welcome the existence of
τe(y2) and τe(y3) they could not be potential equilibria values.
Next consider τr(y1),τr(y2) and τr(y3). The utility for each group i is decreasing after
τr(yi) and τr(y1)< τr(y2)< τr(y3), it is not possible for any values of τ > τr(y2) to be an
equilibrium. This rules out τr(y3). Also if τr(y1) > τˆ3 then at τr(y1) utility for groups 2
and 3 are increasing and τr(y1) can not be an equilibrium.
The possible equilibria depend on where τr(y1) and τr(y2) occur.
• If τr(y1)≥ τˆ3
– If τr(y2)> τ3 the potential equilibria are {0, τˆ3,τr(y2)}
– If τˆ3 < τr(y2)< τ3 the potential equilibria are {0, τˆ3}
• If τ2 < τr(y1)≤ τˆ3 the potential equilibria are {0,τr(y1)}
• If 0 < τr(y1)≤ τ2 then the only potential equilibrium is {0}
This being said, the interesting equilibria are the internal ones. Equilibrium value of
0 corresponds to no college funding and the value of τ(y2) is the case where everyone
attends college. Both of these are not in line with reality. The equilibrium values of τˆ3 and
τr(y1) are the equilibrium values that coincide with partial college attendance and positive
college funding.
4.4 EQUILIBRIUM DYNAMICS
Since the benefits of different levels of education depend on an agents income, it is
natural to believe the income distribution may affect the equilibrium education allocation.
Using the model, I show that this is true. At low levels of income inequality, as income
inequality increases, education spending begins to shift towards college. Eventually, when
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income inequality is large enough, a further increase in inequality shifts education funds
back towards primary and secondary school.
The intuition behind this result is as follows, an internal equilibrium requires the rich
and middle class to agree on an income level that excludes the poorest agents from col-
lege. When income inequality increases, larger subsidies can be provided to the rich and
the middle class without allowing the poor to enter college. Motivated by an ability to
extract more resources from the poor, the rich and middle class increase the funding sent
to the college subsidy. Eventually there becomes a level of income inequality where if
the rich were to shift more resources to the college subsidy, the return to college would
decrease more than the cost of college would decrease. Once this point is reached, the
high income agents prefer to spend less on the college subsidy and the middle income
agents want to spend more on college. Spending less than the optimum level of the middle
class is possible because the lower class support a smaller subsidy. For the middle class,
this smaller college subsidy is still better than no subsidy which the lower class desires.
Therefore, the rich are able to use the lower class to move the equilibrium level away from
what the middle class desires.
By focusing on the internal equilibria candidates, I use the model to show how a
change in income distribution can lead to the tax split first increasing and then decrea-
sing. First consider an equilibrium where τˆ3 is the equilibrium tax split. Under this tax
split, the high and middle income agents receive post-secondary education. This split is
the maximum tax split such that low income agents can not afford to attend college. The
tax split τˆ3 can only be the equilibrium if the return to college decreases more than the cost
of college at an education split above τˆ3. In other words, if τˆ3 < τr(y1).
Now consider an increase to income inequality which keeps mean income constant.
To simulate this change, increase the highest group’s income and decrease the middle and
lowest income groups’ income. This changes both potential internal equilibria.
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Since the poorest agents now have less income, these agents require more college fun-
ding to be able to enter college. At education splits slightly above the original equilibrium
low income agents can no longer afford to attend college. The two higher income agents
can now extract more income from the lowest income agents if they increase the tax split.
This is reflected by an increase in τˆ3.
The increase of the rich agents income changes τr(y1). Recall τr(y1) is the tax split
where any further increase in the tax split would lower utility for group 1. At this point,
overall utility decreases since the increase in college affordability increases utility less than
the decrease in lower school funding lowers utility. The tax split τr(y1) was the value of τ
such that
Hτ((1− τ)θµ,y1,1) =− θµN(τ) .
When y1 increases, by the assumptions on human capital, Hτ((1− τ)θµ,y1,1) decreases.
Further, when y2 and y3 decrease N(τ) weakly decreases. This decrease only happens if
low income agents are partially enrolled in college at the tax split τr(y1). However, once
the low income agents can no longer afford college at tax allocation τr(y1), the change in
N(τ) is equal to zero. Therefore, when income inequality increases a large amount, τr(y1)
will decrease.
Based on the above analysis, if the original equilibrium level corresponds to an equi-
librium split of τˆ3, when income inequality is marginally increased, the equilibrium tax
split will increase. This will send more resources towards the college subsidy. When the
income inequality is increased a large amount, eventually τˆ3 will become larger and τr(y1)
will decrease. When τr(y1) falls under τˆ3 the tax split will begin to decrease and the society
will begin to shift resources back towards primary and secondary education.
It is interesting to note that this relationship is dependent on the presence of primary
and secondary education. In a model which does not consider the existence of lower levels
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of education, when income inequality increases the rich and middle class agents would
increase spending on higher education. The increase in higher education spending would
happen even for high levels of income inequality.4
Table 4.1: U.S. Education Statistics in 2008
Average
Standard
Deviation
Maximum
(State of Max)
Minimum
(State of Min)
Primary and secondary spending
per 5 to 17 year old 9,888 2,536
17,138
(Wyoming)
6,500
(Tennessee)
Post-secondary spending
per 18 to 24 year old 2,534 700
6,590
(Wyoming)
237
(Colorado)
Primary and secondary
spending per student 10,624 2,991
18,966
(New York)
6,768
(Utah)
Post-secondary spending
per student 6,604 1,838
18,719
(Wyoming)
655
(Colorado)
Correlation between a state’s primary and secondary spending per 5 to 17
year old and post-secondary spending per 18 to 24 year old (Significance Level)
0.1618
(0.2616)
4.5 DATA ANALYSIS
I now turn to the data to test the predictions of the model. First I take a general look at
how states spend on different levels of spending. The first striking feature I notice is across
states there are large differences in education spending. Table 1 presents key statistics on
the population adjusted and student adjusted local and state government education spen-
4This is shown in a model of only post-secondary education in Fernandez and Rogerson [1995].
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ding in 2008. The table shows that that differences in education spending are still present
even when adjusting for the state’s population. Further, states spend on average more on
primary and secondary education than post-secondary education. Interestingly, it seems
that primary and secondary education spending is not a good indicator of post-secondary
education spending. Many states which spend relatively a lot on primary and secondary
(post-secondary) education spend relatively little on post-secondary (primary and secon-
dary) education. For example, North Carolina ranks 5th among all states in post-secondary
spending per eligible student but ranks 44th in primary and secondary spending per eli-
gible student. In the other direction, Massachusetts ranks 45th among all states in post-
secondary spending per eligible student but ranks 7th in primary and secondary spending
per eligible student. Other states have similar ranks for both categores, Wyoming ranks
1st in both post-secondary and primary and secondary spending and Montana ranks 37th
in both categories. The insignificant and small correlation between primary and secondary
spending and post-secondary spending is evidence that primary and secondary education
spending is not a good indicator of post-secondary education spending. Further, it suggests
that some states may have a preference towards one type of education spending.
Overtime, the proportion of education funds allocated to colleges is relatively stable.
Table 2 contains information on the proportion of education expenditure across states in
different years. The table also shows the standard deviation and average proportion spent
on college slightly increases with time. Another striking feature of the data is the many
of the states who spend a relatively large portion of their budget on college are the same
states who in the past spent a large portion of their education budget on college. Using
education spending data from 1960 until 2010, I calculate the Spearman rank correlation of
the proportion of education funds allocated to college education. The results are displayed
in Table 3. The table reveals that the rank between 1960 and 2010 are highly correlated.
This suggests that differences in the education allocation across the states may be attributed
125
to state specific features.
The model predicts that within a state, different income distributions may result in
differences in the distribution of education expenditure. To test this prediction, I run a fixed
effect regression to see how the income distribution is related to the percent of education
funds spent on college education.
This regression is performed using data from the United States Census and the Natio-
nal Center for Education Statistics. I compiled data on all states for years between 1977
and 2010.5
The regression takes the following form:
Yst = α+βXst + γt +δs+ εst (4.3)
The dependent variable of interest Yst is the percent of education funds that states spend
on post-secondary education. In the data, this includes all direct expenditure by state and
local governments to public schools. This is obtained from the Census State and Local
Finance data.6 In various specifications, the covariates Xst include the income distribution,
the average income, population composition, and the amount spent on education by the go-
vernment. To quantify the income distribution, I use the mean household income divided
by the median household income of each state. This data is calculated from the IPUMS
CPS data. The population composition is represented as the college age population divi-
ded by the sum of college age population and primary and secondary age population. The
amount spent on education by the government is equal to the total public expenditure spent
5The earliest year of data is 1977 since the IPUMS data used to estimate the mean and median income in
each state does not specify the exact state in years before 1977. Data on years 2001 and 2003 are not included
in the regression. For these years, the Census did not gather data on state and local finances separated by
state. Instead only an aggregate number for the entire United States is available.
6Unfortunately, this does not contain scholarships given directly to students to pay for private primary
and secondary schools, public colleges, or private colleges. The census does not have scholarship data
separated by primary and secondary scholarships and post-secondary scholarships, therefore scholarships
are not included in the dependent variable.
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Table 4.2: Split of Education Expenditure
1980 1990 2000 2010
Average Proportion of Education
Funds Allocated to Colleges 28.3% 28.5% 29.0% 31.3%
Standard Deviation 5.49% 5.86% 5.71% 6.04%
Maximum
(State)
38.5
(HI)
38.1
(ND)
40.3
(UT)
43.5
(UT)
Minimum
(State)
14.1
(MA)
16.8
(CT)
15.5
(NY)
18.3
(NJ)
Table 4.3: Spearman Rank Correlation
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
1960 1 .62 .47 .40 .54 .59
1970 1 .70 .67 .64 .65
1980 1 .87 .76 .77
1990 1 .90 .81
2000 1 .89
2010 1
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Table 4.4: Fixed Effect Regressions
1 2 3 4 5
Mean/Median Income
1.953**
(0.952)
0.839**
(0.391)
1.278**
(0.411)
1.227**
(0.413)
1.005**
(0.451)
(Mean/Median Income)2
-0.803**
(0.380)
-0.317**
(0.148)
-0.492**
(0.157)
-0.464**
(0.157)
-0.384**
(0.174)
Log of Mean Income - - -
-0.028
(.031)
-0.049*
(0.026)
College Age Population/ Primary and Secondary
Age Population - - -
0.358**
(0.123)
0.282**
(0.130)
Total Amount Spent on Education /Mean Income - - - -
-0.050**
(0.013)
State Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Significance level: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05
on education. This measure is normalized by average income in the state. This variable is
included as a robustness check since in the model, total expenditure on education is treated
as exogenous. The terms γt and δs are the time and state fixed effects.
Table 4.4 shows the results of this regression. The regression is weighted by the
average state population in the sample years. The standard errors reported are clustered at
the state level.
The regression results show the distribution of income is an important determinant in
how states decide to allocate education funds. Further, the data supports the prediction
of the model. When the income distribution becomes more unequal, states tend to spend
more on college education. However, this relationship is not linear. Eventually, when
the distribution becomes too unequal, states shift education funds back to lower levels of
education. Figure 4.3 illustrates this quadratic relationship. Columns 1 through 5 show this
relationship persists even if year fixed effects, state fixed effects, and other state specific
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Figure 4.3: Fitted relationship between education allocation and the mean median ratio
variables are added to the regression.
4.6 CONCLUSION
This paper examines how different states split their education budget between primary
and secondary education and post-secondary education. A majority voting model is crea-
ted to gain insight into how states decide to split education funds between different levels
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of education. Using model of education attainment with multiple levels of education, I
observe when the income distribution increases more funds are allocated towards college.
However, this relationship is not linear. Eventually, when income inequality is very high,
education funds are shifted back towards primary and secondary school.
The model illustrates how, in a majority voting framework, the rich can use the pre-
ferences of the other agents to receive the tax allocation they desire. I show at low levels
of income inequality, when a state experiences higher income inequality, a majority of
the agents desire a higher amount of spending on post-secondary education when com-
pared to states with less income inequality. The intuition behind this is higher incomes
and the middle income levels both wish to extract resources from the poor. When income
inequality increases, it is harder for the poor to afford to attend college and these two in-
come groups can lower the price of college while still excluding the poor. However, when
income inequality becomes too large, rich individuals would rather fund primary and se-
condary education to maximize their return to college. At very high levels of inequality,
the rich do not want to subsidize the middle class’s post-secondary education since, at the
allocation level the middle incomes desire, the return to college for the rich decreases.
Therefore, when income inequality increases further the rich agents use the poor agent’s
preference for less college funding to shift funding away from post-secondary education
back to primary and secondary education.
Using data from the United States, I am able to confirm the relationship between in-
come distribution and education fund allocation present in the model. Specifically, I show
that within a state, as the income distribution becomes more unequal, first the state spends
a large portion of their education budget on higher education. However, once the income
distribution becomes too high the state shifts public funds back to lower levels of edu-
cation. This feature of the data is not present in previous models of education spending
which only consider one level of spending.
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This paper could benefit from an extension of the model that allows agents to choose
not only the split of a tax pool but also the tax rate itself. Allowing agents to choose this
variable will allow the model to closer resemble real life. Under this model it is possible
to explore if there is any correlation between how much total is spent on education and
how education funds are split. In addition, further analysis could be done to uncover what
other state specific features determine why states allocate education funds differently.
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APPENDIX A
ACCESS, AFFORDABILITY, AND OUTCOMES
A.1 EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTION - BASELINE
A.1.1 Public optimization solution
The derivation of the admittance decision for public schools, outlined in Equation
(3.1), follows the process used in Epple et al. [2016].
To solve for the equation set up the Lagrangian of the public school problem.
L =
∫ ∫
o(q,b,y)α(b,y)r(b,y) f (b,y)dbdy
−λ
[
F +V (k)+ ke− kz−
∫ ∫
t(b,y)α(b,y)r(b,y) f (b,y)dbdy
]
−η
[∫ ∫
bα(b,y)r(b,y) f (b,y)dbdy−θk
]
−Ω
[∫ ∫
α(b,y)r(b,y) f (b,y)dbdy− k
]
Then take the derivative with respect to the admittance decision and divide this ex-
pression by λ . Note that λ is the multiplier associated with the budget constraint. Use Lθ ,
Le, and Lk to simplify this expression. From feasibility constraints, note α(b,y) > 0 iff
Lα(b,y) > 0. Which yields the equation:
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o(q,b,y)
λ
+ t(b,y)+ z≥V ′(k)+ e+ qθ
qe
(θ −b) ⇐⇒ α(b,y)> 0 (A.1)
By using Equation (A.1) with a utility maximization argument Equation (3.1) is obtai-
ned.
A.1.2 Private optimization solution
The derivation of the implicit tuition equation , outlined in Equation (3.2), follows the
process used in Epple et al. [2016].
Suppressing the j subscript the Lagrangian is:
L = q+λ
[∫ ∫
t(b,y)r(b,y) f (b,y)dbdy−F−V (k)− ke+D
]
−η
[∫ ∫
br(b,y) f (b,y)dbdy−θk
]
−Ω
[∫ ∫
r(b,y) f (b,y)dbdy− k
]
Then take the derivative with respect to the charged tuition. Use Lθ , Le, and Lk to sim-
plify this expression. This yields Equation (3.2). Equation (3.3) is obtained by substituting
in ∂ r(b,y;T,Q)∂ t(b,y) and solving for t(b,y).
I differentiate with respect to θ , e, and k
Lθ = qθ +λ
[∫ ∫
t(b,y)
∂ r(b,y)
∂q
qθ f (b,y)dbdy
]
+η
[
k−
∫ ∫
b
∂ r(b,y)
∂q
qθ f (b,y)dbdy
]
(A.2)
−Ω
[∫ ∫ ∂ r(b,y)
∂q
qθ f (b,y)dbdy
]
= 0
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Le = qe+λ
[∫ ∫
t(b,y)
∂ r(b,y)
∂q
qe f (b,y)dbdy− k
]
−η
[∫ ∫
b
∂ r(b,y)
∂q
qe f (b,y)dbdy
]
(A.3)
−Ω
[∫ ∫
α(b,y)
∂ r(b,y)
∂q
qe f (b,y)dbdy
]
= 0
Lk =−λ
[
V ′(k)+ e
]
+ηθ +Ω= 0 (A.4)
I combine (A.2) and (A.3)
η
λ
=−qθ
qe
(A.5)
Dividing (A.4) by λ and substitute in equation (A.5) yields
Ω
λ
=V ′(k)+ e+
qθ
qe
θ . (A.6)
I now take the derivative with respect to t(b,y). Then substitute in equations (A.5), (A.6),
and the derivative of the matriculation function. Finally I solve for t(b,y).
Lt(b,y) = λ
[
t(b,y)
∂ r(b,y)
∂ t(b,y)
f (b,y)+ r(b,y) f (b,y)
]
−ηb∂ r(b,y)
∂ t(b,y)
f (b,y)−Ω∂ r(b,y)
∂ t(b,y)
f (b,y) = 0
This simplifies to [
t(b,y)− η
λ
b− Ω
λ
]
∂ r(b,y)
∂ t(b,y)
=−r(b,y)
Substituting in equation (A.5) and (A.6) yields[
t(b,y)−
(
V ′(k)+ e+
qθ
qe
(θ −b)
)]
∂ r(b,y)
∂ t(b,y)
=−r(b,y)
I now solve for t(b,y) and plug in the derivative of the demand function.
t(b,y) =
(
V ′(k)+ e+
γ1e
γ2θ
(θ −b)
)
+
r(b,y)
ρ
y−t(b,y)r(b,y)(1− r(b,y))
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A.1.3 Admittance Based Federal Aid
In the discussion that follows I outline the procedure to determine the tuition a college
charges in the presence of federal aid. Since colleges are monopolistically competitive,
in order to find the optimal tuition I find the point where marginal revenue is equal to
effective marginal cost. An illustration of a possible student demand, marginal revenue,
and marginal cost is shown in Figure 3.1. In this figure, the student demand is kinked.
The top part of the demand curve corresponds to the student demand for a college if they
were to receive the full federal aid amount, A¯. The bottom part of the curve corresponds
to the demand if they were not to receive any aid. Once tuition reaches the expected
family contribution, EFC(y), the student qualifies for federal aid. From that point until
EFC(y)+ A¯, any increase in tuition will be matched with an increase in government aid.
This creates a kinked demand curve.
The marginal revenue is given by
t j(b,y)+
r j(b,y)
∂ r j(b,y)
∂ t j(b,y)
.
If we plug in the derivatives of student demand. This results in
t j(b,y)+
r j(b,y)
∂ r j(b,y)
∂ t j(b,y)
=
t j(b,y)−
y−t j(b,y)
ρ(1−r j(b,y)) , if t j(b,y)< EFC(y)
t j(b,y)− y−t j(b,y)+A¯ρ(1−r j(b,y)) , if t j(b,y)> EFC(y)+ A¯
(A.7)
Note for tuition t j(b,y)∈ [EFC(y),EFC(y)+ A¯], the derivative of the demand function
is zero and the marginal revenue is not defined.
The effective marginal cost is given by
V ′(k j)+ e j +
qθ j
qe j
(θ j−b).
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The marginal cost is not a function of r j(b,y). If marginal revenue crosses marginal
cost to the left of the kink then tuition is set by the upper part of the demand curve. This
corresponds to a tuition of
t j(b,y) = EMC j(b,y)
[
ρ(1− r j(b,y))
ρ(1− r j(b,y))+1
]
+(y+ A¯)
[
1
ρ(1− r j(b,y))+1
]
(A.8)
If marginal cost crosses between the discontinuous marginal revenue curves, then the op-
timal tuition is EFC(y)+ A¯. If marginal cost crosses marginal revenue to the right of the
kink, then because of the discontinuous marginal revenue, there are two values that could
be optimal. Either the tuition is set by the lower portion of the demand curve or the tui-
tion is set to be EFC(y)+ A¯. The tuition at the lower part of the demand curve is equal
to the tuition without any federal aid presented in Equation (3.3). The tuition that would
maximize profit is chosen.
A.2 EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTION - RATING-BASED AID
A complexity arises in the maximization problem due to the fact that the rating con-
straint is a minimum function. If the solution to the maximization problem with the con-
straint:
ϒ j =
1
k j
∫ ∫
υ(q j, t j(b,y),b,y)α j(b,y)r j(b,y;T,Q) f (b,y)dbdy. (A.9)
results in a rating, ϒ∗j < 1 the minimum is irrelevant and this is the solution. In practice
the student rating can always be chosen such that at the optimum ϒ∗j < 1.
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In the policy changes I implement, the rating is always less than 1 with the exception of
the affordability-based rating. In affordability-based rating, the parameters chosen result
in both public colleges having
1
k j
∫ ∫
υ(q j, t j(b,y),b,y)α j(b,y)r j(b,y;T,Q) f (b,y)dbdy > 1.
However, under the affordability-based rating, the only way to affect the rating is for col-
leges to change their tuition, something that public colleges are constrained from doing.
Under this scenario, independent of their actions the public colleges will always receive a
rating of 1. Therefore, the problem can be solved by setting ϒ j = 1.
Since the minimization is not relevant to my policy changes, In this section I present
the solution to the optimization problem using the constraint in Equation A.9.1
A.2.1 Public Optimization
The derivation of Equation (3.4) follows a process similar to equation (3.1). Suppres-
sing the j subscript the Lagrangian is:
L =
∫ ∫
o(q,b)α(b,y)r(b,y) f (b,y)dbdy
+λ
[∫ ∫
t(b,y)α(b,y)r(b,y) f (b,y)dbdy−F−V (k)− ke+ kz
]
+η
[
θk−
∫ ∫
bα(b,y)r(b,y) f (b,y)dbdy
]
+Ω
[
k−
∫ ∫
α(b,y)r(b,y) f (b,y)dbdy
]
−Ψ
[
ϒk−
∫ ∫
υ(q, t(b,y),b,y)α(b,y)r(b,y) f (b,y)dbdy
]
1The more general case can be solved by first performing the maximization outlined here, then if the
resulting solution has ϒ∗j > 1 for any college j perform a further maximization with the additional con-
straint that ϒ j ≤ 1. The end result can then be obtained by comparing the realized objective function in the
first maximization problem with the rating replaced with 1 to the realized objective function in the second
maximization problem.
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To obtain the admittance equation, take the derivative with respect to α(b,y) and divide
this expression by λ . Use Lθ , Le, and Lk to simplify this expression. From feasibility
constraints, note α(b,y)> 0 iff Lα(b,y) > 0. Which yields:
o(q,b)
λ
+ t(b,y)+ z≥V ′(k)+ e+ qθ
qe
(θ −b)+Ψ
λ
(ϒ−υ(q, t(b,y),b,y))
⇐⇒ α(b,y)> 0 (A.10)
A.2.2 Private Optimization
To obtain the updated tuition equation, again start with the Lagrangian. Suppressing
the j subscript the Lagrangian is:
L = q+λ
[∫ ∫
t(b,y)r(b,y) f (b,y)dbdy−F−V (k)− ke+D
]
+η
[
θk−
∫ ∫
br(b,y) f (b,y)dbdy
]
+Ω
[
k−
∫ ∫
r(b,y) f (b,y)dbdy
]
−Ψ
[
ϒk−
∫ ∫
υ(q, t(b,y),b,y)r(b,y) f (b,y)dbdy
]
Then take the derivative with respect to the charged tuition. Use Lθ , Le, and Lk to
simplify this expression. Then due to kinked demand ∂ r(b,y;T,Q)∂ t(b,y) has different expressions
for different values of t(b,y).
∂ r(b,y;T,Q)
∂ t
=
−
(1−ϒκ )ρ
(y−t+ϒκ A˜(b,y))r(b,y)(1− r(b,y)), if EFC(y)< t < EFC+ A˜
− ρ
(y−t+ϒκ A˜(b,y))r(b,y)(1− r(b,y)), otherwise
(A.11)
Plugging this expression into the modified Lt(b,y) yields:
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If EFC(y)< t < EFC+ A¯
t(b,y) = (y+ϒκ A˜(b,y))
(
1+ Ψλ
∂υ(q,t(b,y),b,y)
∂ t(b,y)
)
(
1+ Ψλ
∂υ(q,t(b,y),b,y)
∂ t(b,y)
)
+(1−ϒκ)ρ1(1− r(b,y))
+
(
V ′(k)+ e+
qθ
qe
(θ −b)+ Ψ
λ
(ϒ−υ(q, t(b,y),b,y))
)
(1−ϒκ)ρ1(1− r(b,y))(
1+ Ψλ
∂υ(q,t(b,y),b,y)
∂ t(b,y)
)
+(1−ϒκ)ρ1(1− r(b,y))
(A.12)
else
t(b,y) =
(
V ′(k)+ e+
qθ
qe
(θ −b)+ Ψ
λ
(ϒ−υ(q, t(b,y),b,y))
)
ρ1(1− r(b,y))
ρ1(1− r(b,y))+
(
1+ Ψλ
∂υ(q,t(b,y),b,y)
∂ t(b,y)
)
+(y+ϒκ A˜(b,y))
(
1+ Ψλ
∂υ(q,t(b,y),b,y)
∂ t(b,y)
)
ρ1(1− r(b,y))+
(
1+ Ψλ
∂υ(q,t(b,y),b,y)
∂ t(b,y)
) (A.13)
The top equation gives the expression for the middle portion of the demand curve and
the bottom equation gives the expression for the upper and lower portions of the demand
curve. These equations give us the the marginal revenue.
The marginal revenue now has three pieces. These are equal to
t j(b,y)+
r j(b,y)
∂ r j(b,y)
∂ t j(b,y)
=

t j(b,y)− y−t j(b,y)ρ(1−r j(b,y)) , if t j(b,y)< EFC(y)
t j(b,y)− y−t j(b,y)+ϒ
κ
j A˜ j(b,y)
ρ(1−ϒκj )(1−r j(b,y)) , if EFC(y)< t j(b,y)< EFC(y)+ A˜
t j(b,y)− y−t j(b,y)+ϒ
κ
j A˜
ρ(1−r j(b,y)) , if t j(b,y)≥ EFC(y)+ A˜
The effective marginal cost is
EMC j =V ′(k j)+ e j +
qθ j
qe j
(θ j−b)+Ψ jλ j (ϒ j−υ(q j, t j(b,y),b,y))
The marginal cost is equal to the baseline marginal cost plus a term that depends on the
student’s rating compared to the college’s average rating. Once again the marginal cost is
not a function of r j(b,y).
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If marginal revenue crosses marginal cost to the left of the first discontinuity, then
tuition is set by the upper part of the demand curve and tuition is equal to Equation (A.13)
with A˜(b,y) = A˜. Note if ∂υ(q j,t j(b,y),b,y)∂ t j(b,y) = 0 and ϒ
κ
j = 1, tuition is exactly the same as in
the baseline scenario.
If marginal cost only crosses the second portion of the marginal revenue curve then
tuition is set by the middle portion of the demand curve and tuition is equal to Equation
(A.12).
If the curves don’t cross at all and instead marginal cost is between the first discon-
tinuity of the marginal revenue curve, then the optimal tuition is EFC(y)+ A˜.
If marginal cost only crosses the third portion portion of the marginal revenue curve
then tuition is set either by the bottom portion of the demand curve or it is set to be
EFC(y)+ A˜. The tuition level that maximizes profit is the one chosen. The tuition at the
bottom portion of the curve and tuition is equal to Equation (A.13) with A˜(b,y) = 0.
Finally, if the marginal cost curve crosses both the second portion of the marginal
revenue curve and the third portion of the marginal revenue curve then tuition is either set
by the middle of the demand curve or by the bottom portion of the demand curve. Again
the tuition that maximizes profit is the one chosen.
A.3 PRIVATE ONLY AFFORDABILITY RATING
The results of a private college only policy change are presented in Column 3 of Table
A1. I change the parameters used in the affordability-based rating and apply this rating
to only private colleges. This scenario results in a large reduction in average tuition since
a budget neutral change that only affects private colleges attaches a stronger incentive to
lowering tuition than the comparable policy that effects all colleges. The total reduction
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Table A1: Alternative Rating Specifications
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Affordability AffordabilityAll Colleges Private Only
Average Completion Rate (Public) 50.92% 51.00% 50.81%
Average Completion Rate (Private) 73.00% 73.16% 72.96%
Average Price Cap 31.54 31.45 31.45
Average Private Tuition 27.92 27.30 26.96
Average Institutional Aid 3.62 4.15 4.49
Average State Tuition 8.82 8.87 8.87
Accessibility of Public Colleges* 40.11% 38.24% 37.88%
Accessibility of Private Colleges* 6.05% 11.04% 12.11%
Total Enrollment 42% 42% 42%
Share of Students in Public College 67% 68% 67%
Average Federal Aid (Public) 5.66 5.85 5.68
Average Federal Aid (Private) 6.66 6.66 6.86
Fraction Receiving Aid (Public) 51.21% 48.90% 48.65%
Fraction Receiving Aid (Private) 52.38% 54.52% 54.78%
Maximum Aid 7.25 12.50 12.50
Intensity 1.18 0.90
χ1 2.066 2.485
χ2 -0.0513 -0.07
Average Rating Public 1.00 -
Average Rating Private 0.67 0.60
Change in Average Student Cost (Public) 0.09 0.19
Change in Average Student Cost (Private) -0.76 -1.23
State Tax Rate 2.61% 2.65% 2.64%
Federal Tax Rate 1.83% 1.83% 1.83%
*The accessibility of a college is measured by the percentage of the students who are below median
income.
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in average private tuition is $960. Further, under this scenario a further increase in overall
private affordability occurs. However this change results in a slight decrease in completion
rates for both types of colleges. In addition, private colleges enroll more low income
students and public colleges enroll less low income students.
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A.4 ADDITIONAL TABLES
Table A2: Completion Regression
Probit Estimates Marginal Effects
Marginal Effect
Adjusted by Std Dev
Family Income 0.0014** 0.0005** 0.0407
(0.0004) (0.0001)
Student Ability 0.4118** 0.1560** 0.0579
(0.0877) (0.0326)
College Quality 0.3502** 0.1326** 0.0489
(0.1187) (0.0351)
Constant -2.4060** n/a
(0.4174)
N 1,927 1,927
Standard errors clustered at the college level are in parenthesis, **p< .01 *p< .05
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Table A3: Tuition
Ability Decile
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Worst Private College
In
co
m
e
D
ec
ile
1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 7.43
2 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 24.56 19.65 9.36
3 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 28.00 25.85 20.89 11.66
4 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 28.00 26.83 22.21 13.65
5 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 28.00 27.60 23.43 15.68
6 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 28.00 27.95 24.85 18.18
7 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 28.00 28.00 26.40 21.14
8 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 28.00 28.00 27.67 24.36
9 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 28.00 28.00 28.00 22.02
10 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 28.00 28.00 28.00 25.13
Best Private College
1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 7.47
2 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 7.84
3 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 34.20 8.76
4 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 35.40 12.96
5 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 35.93 16.91
6 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 36.00 21.55
7 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 36.00 25.99
8 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 36.00 31.04
9 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 36.00 33.59
10 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 36.00 34.55
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Table A4: College Attendance Proportions
Ability Deciles
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
State Colleges
In
co
m
e
D
ec
ile
s
1 0 0 0 0 0 0.051 0.072 0.074 0.090 0.091
2 0 0 0 0 0 0.400 0.510 0.535 0.556 0.527
3 0 0 0 0 0.146 0.614 0.669 0.684 0.704 0.577
4 0 0 0 0 0.355 0.704 0.715 0.729 0.740 0.518
5 0 0 0 0 0.374 0.653 0.668 0.677 0.655 0.331
6 0 0 0 0.127 0.532 0.540 0.555 0.523 0.455 0.171
7 0 0 0 0.178 0.519 0.531 0.542 0.396 0.313 0.109
8 0 0 0.007 0.429 0.619 0.631 0.642 0.329 0.249 0.126
9 0 0 0.103 0.702 0.713 0.723 0.731 0.350 0.252 0.140
10 0 0.004 0.431 0.809 0.821 0.830 0.831 0.198 0.128 0.070
Private Colleges
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.087
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.103
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.206
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.008 0.326
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.009 0.062 0.545
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0.085 0.234 0.727
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.003 0.291 0.461 0.824
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.007 0.500 0.633 0.824
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.007 0.530 0.670 0.822
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.009 0.764 0.849 0.919
Best Quality Private
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.005
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.003
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.011
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.012
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.032
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.002 0.061
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.011 0.120
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.032 0.204
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.069 0.232
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.078 0.307
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Table A5: Effect of Maximum Aid Change
20% lower aid 10% lower aid Baseline 10% higher aid 20% higher aid
Attendance-Based Aid
Average Federal Aid (Public) 4.78 5.27 5.66 5.85 5.86
Average Federal Aid (Private) 5.41 6.04 6.66 7.27 7.88
Fraction Receiving Aid (Public) 48.25% 50.03% 51.21% 51.51% 51.33%
Fraction Receiving Aid (Private) 49.99% 51.25% 52.38% 53.36% 54.44%
State Tuition Average 8.91 8.86 8.82 8.82 8.82
Private Tuition Average 27.68 27.81 27.92 28.02 28.12
Change in Average Student Cost (Public) 0.68 0.30 - (0.11) (0.11)
Change in Average Student Cost (Private) 0.55 0.29 - (0.29) (0.60)
Total Enrollment 40.36% 41.35% 42.10% 42.45% 42.62%
Maximum Aid 5.80 6.53 7.25 7.98 8.70
Tax Rates (State/Federal) 2.46% / 1.38% 2.54% / 1.62% 2.61% / 1.83% 2.63% / 1.97% 2.65% / 2.05%
Outcome Rating
Average Federal Aid (Public) 4.35 4.35 4.35 4.35 4.35
Average Federal Aid (Private) 8.22 9.13 10.02 10.91 11.78
Fraction Receiving Aid (Public) 44.86% 44.30% 43.84% 43.28% 42.75%
Fraction Receiving Aid (Private) 56.56% 58.14% 59.41% 60.48% 61.38%
State Tuition Average 8.98 8.99 9.00 9.01 9.02
Private Tuition Average 28.66 28.86 29.01 29.14 29.28
Change in Average Student Cost (Public) (0.06) (0.03) - 0.03 0.07
Change in Average Student Cost (Private) 0.96 0.49 - (0.52) (1.01)
Total Enrollment 39.03% 39.24% 39.43% 39.59% 39.71%
Maximum Aid 10.00 11.25 12.50 13.75 15.00
Tax Rates (State/Federal) 2.36% / 1.58% 2.37% / 1.71% 2.38% / 1.83% 2.39% / 1.96% 2.4% / 2.08%
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Table A6: Effect of Maximum Aid Change
20% lower aid 10% lower aid Baseline 10% higher aid 20% higher aid
Average Federal Aid (Public) 5.84 5.85 5.85 5.86 5.86
Average Federal Aid (Private) 5.43 6.03 6.66 7.23 7.58
Fraction Receiving Aid (Public) 49.80% 49.41% 48.90% 48.52% 48.56%
Fraction Receiving Aid (Private) 52.52% 53.40% 54.52% 55.06% 54.98%
State Tuition Average 8.86 8.86 8.87 8.88 8.88
Private Tuition Average 27.50 27.42 27.30 27.22 27.27
Change in Average Student Cost (Public) (0.06) (0.04) - 0.03 0.02
Change in Average Student Cost (Private) 0.98 0.53 - (0.44) (0.57)
Total Enrollment 41.81% 41.90% 42.05% 42.15% 42.28%
Maximum Aid 10.00 11.25 12.50 13.75 15.00
Tax Rates (State/Federal) 2.64% / 1.7% 2.64% / 1.76% 2.65% / 1.83% 2.66% / 1.9% 2.66% / 1.94%
Access Rating
Average Federal Aid (Public) 5.30 5.28 5.23 5.16 5.17
Average Federal Aid (Private) 5.25 5.97 6.82 7.82 8.52
Fraction Receiving Aid (Public) 55.28% 54.37% 53.40% 51.78% 51.67%
Fraction Receiving Aid (Private) 52.93% 54.94% 57.01% 59.69% 60.65%
State Tuition Average 8.74 8.76 8.78 8.82 8.82
Private Tuition Average 28.46 28.44 28.42 28.32 28.35
Change in Average Student Cost (Public) (0.17) (0.10) - 0.15 0.15
Change in Average Student Cost (Private) 1.15 0.62 - (0.88) (1.34)
Total Enrollment 41.12% 41.29% 41.50% 41.67% 41.95%
Maximum Aid 10.00 11.25 12.50 13.75 15.00
Tax Rates (State/Federal) 2.59% / 1.66% 2.6% / 1.74% 2.6% / 1.83% 2.6% / 1.94% 2.59% / 2.06%
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APPENDIX B
ALLOCATING FUNDING BETWEEN DIFFERENT
LEVELS OF EDUCATION
B.1 ATTENDANCE RATE PROCEDURE
1. Determine the maximum number of agents who can afford to attend college, A(τ).
When making this determination use that fact that if a lower income level can afford
to attend college then a higher income level also can afford to attend college. Label
the agents who could afford college potential attendees.
2. Check if all of the potential attendees who can afford college satisfy the return con-
straint. If this is true then N(τ) = A(τ), else proceed to step 3.
3. If there are some income groups who do not satisfy the return constraint, remove some
of the lowest income agents from the group of potential attendees until all remaining
attendees satisfy the return constraint. The proportion of agents that remains is then
equal to the attendance rate.
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To determine A(τ) solve the following problem
max i
s.t. (1−θ)yi−E + τθµ(∑ j<i λ j) > 0
Given this i find the greatest pi such that
(1−θ)yi−E + τθµ
(∑ j<iλ j)+ piλi)
≥ 0
It follows that A(τ) = ∑k<iλk +λi pi. The potential attendees are all agents of type k
with k < i and pi percent of agents of type i.
To remove potential attendees who could afford college, but do not find college benefi-
cial follow the following procedure. By Assumption 9, if college is not beneficial for some
of the income groups who can afford it, the lowest income level who can afford college
does not find college beneficial. Denote this income group l. The following inequality
must hold
H(σ ,yl,1)−H(σ ,yl,0)< E− τθµA(τ)
To determine if any portion of group l may find college beneficial, first check if college
would be beneficial to agents of type l if no other agents of type l attended college. If this
is true the following inequality would hold:
H(σ ,yl,1)−H(σ ,yl,0)> E− τθµA(τ)− plλl .
If this inequality is true, there exists some attendance level for group l such that the return
to college is exactly equal to the cost of college. Denote this level as p′l . Attendance is
given by N(τ) = λ1ρ1+λ2ρ2+λ3ρ3 where ρl = p′l , ρ j = 1∀ j < i, ρk = 0 ∀k > l. However,
if
H(σ ,yl,1)−H(σ ,yl,0)< E− τθµA(τ)− plλl
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then even if all of group l did not go to college, the cost of college would still be higher
than the return of college for anyone in group l. Therefore, attending college will never be
beneficial for group l.
We now look at the second lowest income group l− 1 who can afford college and if
college is beneficial for this group when all income groups below it do not attend. If it
is, then attendance is given by N(τ) = λ1ρ1 +λ2ρ2 +λ3ρ3 where ρl = 0, ρ j = 1∀ j < l,
ρk = 0 ∀k > l. If college isn’t beneficial for group l−1 when all of the members of group
l−1 attend college then repeat the procedure applied to group l.
Eventually there will be some fraction of agents who will find college beneficial. This
follows from that fact that agents are atomless. This guarantees that for any value of
H(σ ,y1,1)−H(σ ,y1,0) there exists an attendance ρ1 small enough such that
H(σ ,y1,1)−H(σ ,y1,0)> E− τθµρ1λ1 .
B.2 PROPOSITION 1 PROOF
The utility of an agent of group i can be written as
Ui(τ) = (1−θ)yi+H((1− τ)θµ,yi,0)+
ρi
[
τθµ
N(τ)
−E +H((1− τ)θµ,yi,1)−H((1− τ)θµ,yi,0)
]
The derivative of the utility with respect to τ yields
Hτ((1− τ)θµ,yi,0)+ρi
(
θµ
N(τ) − τµθNτN(τ)2 +Hτ((1− τ)θµ,yi,1)−Hτ((1− τ)θµ,yi0)
)
+
[
τθµ
N(τ) −E +H((1− τ)θµ,yi,1)−H((1− τ)θµ,yi,0)
]
ρiτ
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Now for various values of τ this expression can be evaluated to determine how utility
responds to changes in tax allocation.
I examine how utility changes in each of the following four exhaustive ranges of pos-
sible tax allocations.
1. Tax allocations where income group i can not yet afford college and college would
be beneficial for all agents (τ < τˆi & τ < τn(y3))
In this subset of allocations, no one from group i attends college. This means ρi = 0.
Further, a marginal increase in τ will not be enough to allow anyone from group i to attend
college. It follows that the derivative of utility is equal to
Hτ((1− τ)θµ,yi,0)< 0.
In this range, an increase in the college subsidy lowers the human capital received by group
i from lower school and decreases group i’s overall utility.
2. Tax allocations where all of income group i can afford college and college would
be beneficial for all agents (τ ≥ τ i & τ < τn(y3))
In this subset of allocations all members of income group i are able to afford college
and benefit from college. Therefore, ρi = 1. Further, any increase in τ will not raise or
lower the number of students in group i attending college. If follows that the increase in
utility in this range is:
Hτ((1− τ)θµ,yi,1)+ θµN(τ) −
τµθNτ
N(τ)2
The sign of this expression is dependent on whether the income groups below i are partially
enrolled in college or not. If any other income group below i is partially enrolled in college,
i.e. 0 < ρ j < 1∀ j > i, then it must be the case that group j must spend all of there income
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to attend college at tax allocation τ. If more of group j were to try to attend college,
the per person subsidy would drop to a level where no member of group j can afford
to attend college. Therefore, any increase in this tax allocation will be used to provide
additional subsidies to members of group j. In other words, in response to an education
fund allocation increase the subsidy amount will not increase only the number of subsidies
provided will increase. Mathematically, this means that
θµ
N(τ)
=
τµθNτ
N(τ)2
.
Therefore, if any lower income group is partially enrolled, an increase in τ will change
income group i’s utility by
Hτ((1− τ)θµ,yi,1)< 0.
However, if no other lower income groups are partially enrolled in college then an
increase in τ will not change enrollment(Nτ = 0). The change in utility is then equal to
Hτ((1− τ)θµ,yi,1)+ θµN(τ) .
This term is the sum of the decrease in higher education return plus the increase in sub-
sidy. Note Hτ((1− τ)θµ,yi,1) is negative and decreasing in τ while θµN(τ) is positive and
decreasing in τ . Recall τr(yi) is the first τ such that
−Hτ((1− τr)θµ,yi,1) = θµN(τr)
It can be shown that for every tax allocation τ ∈ (τr(yi),τn(yi)),
−Hτ((1− τ)θµ,yi,1)> θµN(τ) .
Then for any τ > τr(yi), utility is decreasing in τ . For any τ < τr(yi), utility of group i is
increasing in τ if τ > τ i with τ not in between τˆ j and τ j,∀ j > i.
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3. Tax allocations where some of income group i can afford college and college would
be beneficial for all agents (τˆi ≤ τ < τ i & τ < τn(y3))
In the third subset of allocations when τˆi ≤ τ < τ i, members of group i are partially
enrolled in college (0 < ρi < 1). The change in utility from changing τ is:
Hτ((1− τ)θµ,yi,0)+ρi
(
θµ
N(τ) − τµθNτN(τ)2 +Hτ((1− τ)θµ,yi,1)−Hτ((1− τ)θµ,yi,0)
)
+
[
τθµ
N(τ) −E +H((1− τ)θµ,yi,1)−H((1− τ)θµ,yi0)
]
ρiτ
Increasing τ in this range simply increases access to members of group i. Therefore,
θµ
N(τ) =
τµθNτ
N(τ)2 which simplifies the above equation to
(1−ρi)Hτ((1− τ)θµ,yi,0)+ρiHτ((1− τ)θµ,yi,1)
+
[
τθµ
N(τ) −E +H((1− τ)θµ,yi,1)−H((1− τ)θµ,yi,0)
]
ρiτ
In this range utility increases if the benefit from granting access to more individuals is
greater than the decrease in human capital of those attending lower education plus the
decrease in return for those attending higher education. The decrease in human capital is
increasing in τ and the increase in utility from more access is decreasing in τ . Therefore,
if this ever occurs at τ ∈ [τˆi,τ i) it also occurs at ∀τ ′ s.t. τ < τ ′ < τ i. Let the smallest τ
where the above equation is equal to 0 be called τe(yi). This value of τ may or may not
exist depending on the specific parameters and the human capital function. If it does occur,
utility is increasing from τˆi until τe(yi) then decreasing from τe(yi) until τ i.
4. Tax allocations where college is not beneficial for all agents( τ > τn(y3))
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To analyze how utility changes in this range, it is useful to talk about each specific
income group. First consider income group 3. As discussed in Section 4.3, for τ slightly
above τn(y3) members of income group 3 begin to drop out of school. They drop out until
the point where the return to college is exactly equal to the cost. In other words increasing
τ changes utility for group 3 by
(1−ρ3)Hτ((1− τ)θµ,y3,0)+ρ3Hτ((1− τ)θµ,y3,1)< 0
Therefore, the change in overall utility is negative. Once τ increases to levels where even
if all of group 3 didn’t go to college, the cost of college would still be higher than the return
of college for anyone in group 3, then no one from group 3 attends college and increases
in τ do not change attendance for group 3. The change in utility is then
Hτ((1− τ)θµ,y3,0)< 0
Next consider the utility of income group 2. First consider τn(τ2) > τ > τn(y3), in this
range students from group 3 are potentially dropping out. However, group 2 is not chan-
ging attendance decisions. The increase in utility is
Hτ((1− τ)θµ,y2,0)+
(
θµ
N(τ)
− τµθNτ
N(τ)2
+Hτ((1− τ)θµ,y2,1)−Hτ((1− τ)θµ,y2,0)
)
When group 3 begin to drop out, before all of group 3 has dropped out of college,
τµθNτ
N(τ)2
− θµ
N(τ)
= Hτ((1− τ)θµ,y3,1)−Hτ((1− τ)θµ,y3,0)
therefore the change in utility for group 2 can be written as
(Hτ((1− τ)θµ,y3,1)−Hτ((1− τ)θµ,y3,0)+Hτ((1− τ)θµ,y2,1))< 0
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The sum of these first two terms is less than zero and the third term is less than zero,
therefore utility is decreasing when only a fraction of group 3 remains in college. When
none of group 3 remains in college the derivative is
Hτ((1− τ)θµ,y2,1)+ θµN(τ)
as stated this is negative after τr(y2). For τ > τn(τ2) the utility change will always be
negative, the logic follows the same logic as in the case of group 3. Therefore, utility for
group 2 is always decreasing after τn(y3). Similarly the change in utility for group 1, will
be negative if τ > τr(y3).
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